State v. Ronald R. Fontenot

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED
MARCH 1999 SESSION
July 8, 1999
Cecil W. Crowson
Appellate Court Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE, * C.C.A. #01C01-9808-CC-00323
Appellant, * WILLIAMSON COUNTY
VS. * Honorable Timothy L. Easter, Judge
RONALD R. FONTENOT, * (Motion To Suppress)
Appellee. *
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
JOHN KNOX WALKUP V. MICHAEL FOX
Attorney General and Reporter 315 Deaderick Street
First American Center, 20th Floor
MARVIN E. CLEMENTS, JR. Nashville, TN 37238-2075
Assistant Attorney General
425 Fifth Avenue North
2d Floor, Cordell Hull Building
Nashville, TN 37243
RONALD L. DAVIS
District Attorney General
LEE E. DRYER
Assistant District Attorney General
P. O. Box 937
Franklin, TN 37065-0937
OPINION FILED: _______________
AFFIRMED
JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS,
Judge
OPINION
The Williamson County Grand Jury indicted the defendant, Ronald R.
Fontenot, for three counts of driving under the influence.1 The trial court found
that the initial traffic stop was invalid and thus granted Fontenot’s motion to
suppress and dismissed the state’s case. The state appeals, alleging that the
arresting officer conducted a legitimate investigatory stop based on reasonable,
articulable suspicion of criminal activity, and, therefore, the trial court should
have denied the motion to suppress. We AFFIRM the trial court’s judgment.
BACKGROUND
Sergeant Ball of the Williamson County Sheriff’s Department followed the
defendant’s vehicle for some distance on Lewisburg Pike. He observed the
defendant execute a left-hand turn onto Wilhoite Road, a dead-end road. Ball
testified that he had no particular reason for following the defendant’s vehicle,
but he believed the defendant may have braked heavily when making this turn.
Ball stopped his vehicle and waited several minutes before entering Wilhoite.
Ball met the defendant as he was returning to Lewisburg Pike, approximately
100 yards from the intersection. Ball turned around and, on reaching Lewisburg
Pike, observed that the defendant’s vehicle had resumed its original direction of
travel on that roadway. Ball observed the vehicle’s “taillights in the [unspecified]
distance.” Ball pursued the vehicle, believing that the defendant might be
fleeing, and on his reaching the vehicle he activated his blue lights. The
defendant promptly pulled over and stopped his vehicle. Ball testified that during
this entire incident he observed no traffic violations.
1
The three counts are: (1) that the defendant operated a motor vehicle while under the
influence of an intoxicant, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated § 55-10-401; (2) that the
defe nda nt op erate d a m otor v ehic le wh ile his b lood a lcoh ol con tent m et or e xce ede d .10 %, in
violation of Tennessee Code Annotated § 55-10-401; and (3) that his actions constituted a second
offens e of driving w hile under the influenc e beca use he allegedly had a prior out-o f-state
conviction for driving u nder the influence .
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Based on investigation subsequent to the stop, including Ball’s
observation of an odor consistent with consumption of alcohol on or about the
defendant, the defendant’s red eyes, the defendant’s statements and his
performance of field sobriety tests, Ball arrested the defendant for driving under
the influence. The defendant filed a motion to suppress all evidence acquired
after the traffic stop. At the subsequent suppression hearing, the trial court
noted that one’s accelerating from an intersection does not necessarily constitute
fleeing and that the defendant promptly pulled over and stopped when Ball
activated his blue lights. The trial court found “no articulable facts” to support the
stop, granted the defendant’s motion, and dismissed the case. The state
appeals, arguing that Ball legitimately stopped the vehicle pursuant to an
investigation.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court’s determination of fact at a suppression hearing “is
presumptively correct on appeal.” State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 544
(Tenn. 1994). This Court upholds a trial court’s decision “unless the evidence in
the record preponderates against the finding.” State v. Henning, 975 S.W.2d
290, 299 (Tenn. 1998). “Questions of credibility of witnesses, the weight and
value of the evidence, and resolution of conflicts in the evidence are matters
entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of fact.” Id. “The party prevailing in the
trial court is entitled to the strongest view of the evidence, as well as all
reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn from the evidence.” Id.;
see also State v. Curtis, 964 S.W.2d 604, 608 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (The
state, appealing a trial court’s granting a motion to suppress, must show this
Court that the evidence in the record preponderates against the trial court’s
findings of fact.). This Court does review de novo the trial court’s application of
law. See State v. Yeager, 958 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tenn. 1997).
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ANALYSIS
The sole issue presented for review is whether the trial court erred by
finding that Ball lacked reasonable suspicion supported by specific and
articulable facts such that warranted the investigatory stop of the defendant and
therefore erred by granting the defendant’s motion to suppress and dismissing
the state’s case.
“Stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a ‘seizure’
within the meaning of [the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution].” Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). Even
absent probable cause, a warrantless stop may be a valid investigative
procedure if the police officer has reasonable suspicion, supported by specific
and articulable facts, that a criminal offense has been or is about to be
committed. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 20 (1968); State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626, 632 (Tenn. 1997).
However, a warrantless stop is presumptively unreasonable. See Simpson, 968
S.W.2d at 780. In the instant case, Ball testified that he observed no violations
by the defendant prior to the stop. Further, the record does not indicate that Ball
either had received reliable information that the defendant had, or was about to,
commit an offense, cf. State v. Banner, 685 S.W.2d 298 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1984), or was aware of an outstanding capias for the defendant’s arrest, cf. State
v. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d 293 (Tenn. 1992).
The record submitted does not provide the requisite preponderance of
evidence for this Court’s interfering with the trial court’s suppressing the
evidence. See Curtis, 964 S.W.2d at 608. Evidence from an invalid traffic stop
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is subject to suppression. See State v. Norwood, 938 S.W.2d 23, 26 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1996). The trial court did not erroneously grant the defendant’s
motion. Further, the state’s evidence originated solely from investigation after
the stop, and without this evidence the record is void of any evidence against the
defendant. Therefore, the trial court properly dismissed the case. This issue is
without merit.
CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the trial court’s judgment.
_______________________________
JOHN EVERETT W ILLIAMS, Judge
CONCUR:
______________________________
DAVID H. WELLES, Judge
______________________________
JOE G. RILEY, Judge
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