State v. Morrell

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE FILED
FEBRUARY 1997 SESSION
October 21, 1997
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
)
Appellee, ) No. 03C01-9511-CC-00344
)
) Sullivan County
v. )
) Honorable R. Jerry Beck, Judge
)
RANDY SCOTT MORRELL, ) (Denial of Pretrial Diversion)
)
Appellant. )
For the Appellant: For the Appellee:
Stephen M. Wallace Charles W. Burson
District Public Defender Attorney General of Tennessee
and and
Terry Jordan Darian B. Taylor
Assistant Public Defender Assistant Attorney General of Tennessee
P. O. Box 839 450 James Robertson Parkway
Blountville, TN 37617-0839 Nashville, TN 37243-0493
H. Greeley Wells, Jr.
District Attorney General
and
Gene Perrin
Nancy S. Harr
Assistant District AttorneysGeneral
P.O. Box 526
Blountville, TN 37617-025
OPINION FILED:____________________
AFFIRMED
Joseph M. Tipton
Judge
OPINION
The defendant, Randy Scott Morrell, is before us in an extraordinary
appeal, T.R.A.P. 10, from the order of the Sullivan County Criminal Court affirming the
prosecuting attorney’s denial of his application for pretrial diversion. The sole issue for
our review is whether the trial court erred by affirming the denial.
The defendant was indicted on one count of statutory rape, a Class E
felony, and two counts of contributing to the unruly behavior of a minor, a Class A
misdemeanor. The defendant requested pretrial diversion, and pursuant to a stipulation
of the parties, the trial court ordered the Department of Correction to conduct a
background investigation on the defendant. In a letter dated January 19, 1995, the
prosecuting attorney denied the defendant’s application for pretrial diversion for the
following reasons:
1. The defendant is charged under T.C.A. 39-13-506. As of
January 1, 1995 this statute is one of those enumerated in
T.C.A. 40-39-102, “Definitions” (Sex Offender Registration and
Monitoring Act) as constituting a sex offense requiring
registration under the act. It would be against the public policy
of the statute to grant pretrial diversion and thus evade the
registration requirement of that statute.
2. The two victims of these offenses were troubled youths in
State custody. This factor is not an element of any charge
against the defendant. The defendant took advantage of this
particular vulnerability.
3. The defendant has expressed no regret regarding the
incident, nor any acknowledgment of a realization that his
actions were improper. On the contrary, the defendant
indicated to Detective Russell that he knew his actions were
wrong but did it anyway. This indicates no inclination toward
rehabilitation.
4. The defendant is charged with a total of three charges,
involving two victims. Further, the defendant is approximately
ten years older than the victims far in excess of the statutory
requirement of four years.
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The defendant petitioned the trial court for a writ of certiorari to review the
denial of pretrial diversion. The state submitted a copy of the record it relied upon to
deny pretrial diversion to the court. The record included the investigative report that
was prepared by the Department of Correction, a statement the defendant gave police,
a victim impact statement,1 two Tennessee Bureau of Investigation missing child
reports, the indictment, and an affidavit of complaint. No further evidence was
presented at the certiorari hearing.
In the statement he gave police, the twenty-four-year-old defendant
admitted that the victim called him after she and a friend had run away from the Sullivan
County Youth Center. The defendant said that he knew the girls were runaways and
that he tried to convince the victim to return to the youth center. He admitted that he
drove the girls to Kingsport where he dropped one of them off. He said that he and the
victim eventually went to a barn where they had sexual intercourse. He admitted that
he penetrated her digitally and performed oral sex on her later that day. The sexual
conduct was consensual, and the defendant admitted that he knew the victim was
fourteen at the time.
In the victim impact statement, the victim stated that the defendant hurt
her mentally. She accused the defendant of playing with her mind and said that he
convinced her to run away and to have sex with him.
According to the investigative report, the defendant dropped out of school
in the eleventh grade to work to help support his family. He is in good health mentally
and physically and does not drink alcohol or use illegal drugs. He has no prior criminal
1
The trial court granted a petition to rehear in this case because it concluded that it erred
by consid ering the vic tim im pact sta teme nt when it denied the defend ant’s petition fo r writ of certior ari.
However, consideration of the victim impact statement was proper in so far as the statement was
conside red by the p rosecu tor and re flects the c ircum stance s of the o ffense . See State v. Carr, 861
S.W .2d 850, 855 (Tenn. Crim . App. 1993).
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record and is presently employed doing farm labor. The report states that the
defendant told a detective that he knew what he did was wrong but that he did it
anyway.
The trial court held that there was no abuse of discretion in the prosecutor
declining to grant the defendant pretrial diversion because the circumstances of the
offense sufficiently support the denial of pretrial diversion. The court stated that the
girls were evidently troubled and that the defendant knew that the girls had run away
from state custody at the time of the offenses. In reaching its decision, though, the
court rejected the prosecutor’s claim that the defendant should not receive diversion
because he was charged with an offense requiring registration under the Sex Offender
Registration and Monitoring Act. The court also concluded that based on the record
before it, the factor about the defendant’s lack of remorse was not entitled to much
weight.
The decision to grant or deny an application for pretrial diversion is in the
discretion of the prosecuting attorney. T.C.A. § 40-15-105; State v. Hammersley, 650
S.W.2d 352, 353 (Tenn. 1983); Carr, 861 S.W.2d at 855. On a petition for certiorari,
the hearing conducted by the trial court is limited to two issues:
(1) whether the accused is eligible for diversion; and
(2) whether there was an abuse of discretion by the
prosecuting attorney in refusing to divert the accused.
State v. Watkins, 607 S.W.2d 486, 488 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980).
In making the initial determination, the prosecuting attorney must consider
(1) the circumstances of the offense, (2) the accused’s criminal record, (3) the
accused’s social history, (4) the accused’s physical and mental condition, (5) the
deterrent effect of punishment upon other criminal activity, (6) the accused’s
amenability to correction, (7) the likelihood that pretrial diversion will serve the ends of
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justice and the best interests of the accused and the public, (8) the accused’s attitude,
behavior since arrest, home environment, current drug usage, emotional stability, past
employment, general reputation, family stability and attitude of law enforcement. State
v. Washington, 866 S.W.2d 950, 951 (Tenn. 1993). Thus, the nature and
circumstances of the alleged offenses are not the only appropriate factors to be
considered upon application for diversion, but they may provide a sufficient basis for
denial. Carr, 861 S.W.2d at 855; State v. Sutton, 668 S.W.2d 678, 680 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1984).
The decision of a prosecuting attorney to grant or deny pretrial diversion is
presumptively correct and it will not be set aside absent a “patent or gross abuse of
prosecutorial discretion.” Hammersley, 650 S.W.2d at 356 (quoting Pace v. State, 566
S.W.2d 861, 870 (Tenn. 1978) (Henry, C.J., concurring)). Thus, on appeal, the record
must be void of any substantial evidence in support of the decision before this court
may find an abuse of discretion by the prosecuting attorney. Hammersley, 650 S.W.2d
at 356; Carr, 861 S.W.2d at 856.
The defendant contends that the prosecutor abused her discretion by
denying his request for pretrial diversion because she failed to state in the letter of
denial that she considered evidence showing that the defendant is amenable to
correction. The defendant argues that his lack of a criminal record and his admissions
of his acts indicate that he is not likely to offend again. He correctly points out that the
denial letter does not specify that any of his favorable traits were considered. Instead,
the letter summarily states, “In making this decision we have considered all of the
factors set forth by the Tennessee Supreme Court in [State v. Herron, 767 S.W.2d 151(Tenn. 1989)] and subsequent cases.”
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We agree with the defendant that the summary statement is an
inadequate explanation on the record of the prosecutor’s consideration of all the
relevant factors. However, we also note that the defendant had the initial burden of
submitting information in support of his request for diversion.
The burden is on the [defendant], in the first instance, to
provide the prosecuting attorney with sufficient background
information and data to enable that officer to make a reasoned
decision to grant or deny the relief sought. Of course this
information may be supplemented by the pretrial investigation
authorized by T.C.A. § 40-15-104, but the investigation does
not lessen the obligation of an applicant to endeavor to show
beforehand he is an appropriate subject for diversion.
Herron, 767 S.W.2d at 156; see also State v. Baxter, 868 S.W.2d 679 (Tenn Crim. App.
1993). The record before us does not contain the defendant’s request for pretrial
diversion and does not reflect that the defendant submitted any evidence in support of
his request. Thus, we could question the sufficiency of the record to support the
defendant’s entitlement to diversion regardless of the prosecutor’s level of compliance.
In any event, the record the prosecuting attorney considered in denying
the defendant’s request for pretrial diversion contains the defendant’s statement
admitting his actions and the investigative report that shows that the defendant has no
criminal record. The trial court considered these facts but concluded that sufficient
evidence in the record supported the prosecuting attorney’s decision to deny pretrial
diversion. We agree with the trial court’s conclusion.
The record before us demonstrates that the defendant knew that the
fourteen-year-old victim had run away from state custody at the time of the offense.
Although the defendant claimed in his statement that he tried to convince the victim to
return to the youth center, the victim stated that the defendant played with her mind and
convinced her to run away. The defendant is ten years older than the victim and
penetrated the victim three different ways. Based upon the circumstances of this case,
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we conclude that the prosecutor did not abuse his discretion by denying the defendant’s
request for pretrial diversion.
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
______________________________
Joseph M. Tipton, Judge
CONCUR:
Jerry L. Smith, Judge
Thomas T. Woodall, Judge
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