Jerome Williams v. State

FILED
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
October 23, 1998
SEPTEMBER 1998 SESSION
Cecil W. Crowson
Appellate Court Clerk
JEROME WILLIAMS, )
)
Appellant, ) C.C.A. No. 01C01-9709-CR-00441
)
vs. ) Davidson County
)
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) Hon. J. Randall Wyatt, Jr., Judge
)
Appellee. ) (Post-Conviction)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
JEROME WILLIAMS JOHN KNOX WALKUP
Pro Se Attorney General & Reporter
CCA/SCCC
P.O. Box 279 GEORGIA BLYTHE FELNER
Clifton, TN 38425 Counsel for the State
425 Fifth Ave. N., 2d Floor
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
VICTOR S. JOHNSON, III
District Attorney General
KATY NOVAK MILLER
Asst. District Attorney General
Washington Square, Suite 500
222 Second Ave. North
Nashville, TN 37201-1649
OPINION FILED:________________
AFFIRMED
CURWOOD WITT, JUDGE
OPINION
The petitioner, Jerome Williams, appeals the Davidson County
Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The
petitioner is currently serving an effective 55 year sentence for his convictions of
armed robbery and aggravated rape. State v. Jerome Williams, No. 86-86-III (Tenn.
Crim. App., Nashville, Feb. 12, 1987). He filed an unsuccessful post-conviction
petition challenging his convictions. See Jerome Williams v. State, No. 01C01-
9105-CR-00152 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Nov. 14, 1991), perm. app. denied
(Tenn. 1992). In the present action, he seeks to reopen his previous post-conviction
action by alleging that a jury instruction given at his trial equating moral certainty
with reasonable doubt violated his constitutional rights. Following a review of the
record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of the
defendant's petition.
A petitioner is entitled to bring only one post-conviction action
attacking a given judgment. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-202(c) (1997). However, a
petitioner may seek to reopen a previously determined post-conviction action if his
new claim is based upon an appellate decision establishing a new constitutional
right which had not been recognized at the time of trial, provided the right is to be
applied retrospectively. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-217(a)(1) (1997).
In his pro se petition, Williams asserts that unconstitutional jury
instructions were given regarding reasonable doubt and moral certainty which
"allowed the conviction on less than what is required by the Due Process Clause to
the United States Constitution." Furthermore, the petition sought "the application
of the principles announced in [ ] Rickman v. Dutton, 864 F. Supp. 686 (M.D. Tenn.
1994)." Although not clearly stated in the petition, we glean that Williams' complaint
is that the jury was improperly instructed on an ambiguous definition of reasonable
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doubt which impermissibly lowered the state's burden of proof via usage of the
phrases "moral certainty" and "let the mind rest easily."1 See Rickman v. Dutton,
864 F. Supp. 686, 708-09 (M.D. Tenn. 1994), aff'd on other grounds, 131 F.3d 1150(6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 118 S. Ct. 1826, 1827 (1998).
This court and the Tennessee Supreme Court have consistently
rejected challenges to jury instructions using phraseology similar to that which we
infer is the basis of Williams' complaint. See, e.g., State v. Bush, 942 S.W.2d 489,
520-21 (Tenn.1997) (appendix), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 118 S. Ct. 376 (1997);
State v. Nichols, 877 S.W.2d 722 (Tenn. 1994); State v. Sexton, 917 S.W.2d 263(Tenn. Crim. App. 1995); accord Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 114 S. Ct. 1239(1994) (moral certainty instructions may pass constitutional scrutiny if used with
further modifying instructions that lend meaning to the phrase). Additionally, the
Sixth Circuit has cast grave doubt on the viability of the district court's ruling in
Rickman by upholding the constitutionality of the reasonable doubt/moral certainty
instruction given at a Tennessee death-row inmate's trial in Austin v. Bell, 126 F.3d
843, 846-47 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 118 S. Ct. 1526, 1547 (1998).
In any event, Rickman is of no precedential value. This court is bound
by the previous rulings of the Tennessee Supreme Court despite the adverse
holdings of the federal district court. See, e.g., Sexton, 917 S.W.2d at 266. As an
inferior appellate court we are bound to follow the precedent of our state's highest
1
The jury instructions do not appear in the record, although the petitioner
alleged he did not have access to the record of his direct appeal. He filed a
motion that the transcript of trial be provided to him, but the motion was never
ruled upon. In light of these unique facts, we elect to excuse Williams from his
Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(g) burden of preparing a complete
record which allows this court to review the issues. See Tenn. R. App. P. 2
(suspension of rules for good cause). We are able to do this because even if the
instruction given at the petitioner's trial was identical to the one given in Rickman,
no basis for relief has been stated.
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court. See Barger v. Brock, 535 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tenn. 1976).
As a result, Williams has not established a new constitutional right
which is to be retroactively applied. Therefore, he is not entitled to reopen his post-
conviction claim, and this appeal must fail. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-217(a)(1)
(1997).
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of the petitioner's
claim.
_______________________________
CURWOOD WITT, JUDGE
CONCUR:
_____________________________
GARY R. WADE, JUDGE
_____________________________
THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
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