Daniel L. Sanders v. State

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED
SEPTEMBER 1999 SESSION
October 12, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate Court Clerk
DANIEL LeMAY SANDERS, )
) C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9712-CC-00586
Appellant, )
) ROBERTSON COUNTY
VS. )
) HON. ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER,
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) JUDGE
)
Appellee. ) (Post-Conviction)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
GREGORY D. SMITH PAUL G. SUMMERS
One Public Square, Suite 121 Attorney General & Reporter
Clarksville, TN 37040
GEORGIA BLYTHE FELNER
Asst. Attorney General
John Sevier Bldg.
425 Fifth Ave., North
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
JOHN W. CARNEY
District Attorney General
DENT MORRISS
Asst. District Attorney General
500 South Main St.
Springfield, TN 37172
OPINION FILED:____________________
AFFIRMED
JOHN H. PEAY,
Judge
OPINION
Pursuant to plea negotiations, the petitioner pled guilty to first-degree
murder and received an agreed sentence of life without parole. He timely filed a petition
for post-conviction relief, arguing that his plea was unknowing and involuntary due to the
ineffective assistance of trial counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court found
that the petitioner received effective assistance of counsel and that his plea was
knowingly and voluntarily entered. The petitioner now appeals. Finding no merit to his
argument, we affirm the post-conviction court’s order.
The petitioner maintains that his trial attorneys gave him incorrect
information and “bad advice” about his case. At the post-conviction hearing, the
petitioner, who potentially faced the death penalty if convicted at trial, testified that his
attorneys advised him that the punishment of life without parole, the sentence to which
he agreed, might still allow him the opportunity for parole in ten or fifteen years because
the laws were always changing and prisons were overcrowded. He also testified that he
believed he would be executed immediately following trial, even though (as he later
discovered) the electric chair had not been used for decades. According to the petitioner,
he felt pressured by circumstance and by his attorneys into accepting the plea offer.
On nearly every point, the testimony of the petitioner’s trial attorneys
contradicted the petitioner’s testimony. Both attorneys denied advising the petitioner that
there was any real possibility he could eventually receive parole with a life-without-parole
sentence. Both attorneys also denied advising the petitioner that he would be executed
immediately upon a jury’s finding of guilt. According to them, they advised the petitioner
about the appellate process, and they tended to agree with the petitioner’s view that even
if he received the death penalty he would likely never be executed, but they also warned
him that there was a tremendous difference in the nature of incarceration for death row
2
inmates and for the general prison population. The post-conviction court specifically
discredited the petitioner’s testimony and found he was given “the best representation he
could get.” Because the evidence does not preponderate against these findings, the
court’s findings preclude the relief petitioner seeks. See State v. Tate, 615 S.W.2d 161,
162 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981)(factual findings of trial court have the weight of a jury verdict
and will not be set aside unless the evidence preponderates against them).
The evidence shows that the petitioner placed significance on family
visitation in prison and that visitation while on death row was much more limited than
general incarceration. The petitioner expressed that accepting the plea agreement was
his “only way out” to avoid the electric chair because his grandmother was on her death
bed at the time he was considering the plea offer. He also stated that his attorneys
pressured him into accepting the plea by telling him he “didn’t stand a chance” at trial
because his codefendant would be testifying against him. The attorneys testified that the
case against the defendant was very strong and that it was in the petitioner’s best interest
to enter a plea agreement. Despite this, they indicated that if the petitioner chose to
proceed to trial, they were ready. After considering the evidence, the post-conviction
court determined that there was “not one speck of evidence” to support allowing the
petitioner to withdraw his guilty plea.1 We agree. See Tate, 615 S.W.2d at 162. The
post-conviction court’s order is affirmed.
_______________________________
JOHN H. PEAY, Judge
1
At the conclusion of his findings, the post-conviction court judge also stated, “I apologize to the
Appeals Court for rambling on and on . . . .” Apology accepted.
3
CONCUR:
______________________________
DAVID H. WELLES, Judge
______________________________
JOHN EVERETT W ILLIAMS, Judge
4