Sammy J. Miller v. State

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE FILED
FEBRUARY 1999 SESSION
April 20, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
SAMMY J. MILLER, )
) C.C.A. No. 03C01-9807-CR-00262
Appellant, )
) Johnson County
v. )
) Honorable Lynn W . Brown, Judge
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
) (Habeas Corpus)
Appellee. )
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
Sammy J. Miller #85359, pro se John Knox Walkup
Northeast Correction Complex Attorney General & Reporter
P. O. Box 5000 425 Fifth Avenue North
Mountain City, TN 37683 Nashville, TN 37243-0493
R. Stephen Jobe
Assistant Attorney General
425 Fifth Avenue North
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
OPINION FILED: ____________________________________
AFFIRMED
L. T. LAFFERTY, SENIOR JUDGE
OPINION
The appellant, Sammy J. Miller, herein referred as “the petitioner,” appeals the
Johnson County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his pro se petition for habeas corpus relief.
After a jury trial in Hamilton County in December, 1977, the petitioner was found guilty of
murder first degree and sentenced to death. On direct appeal, the petitioner’s conviction
for murder first degree was affirmed, but the Supreme Court modified the sentence of
death to reflect a sentence of life imprisonment. Miller v. State, 584 S.W.2d 758 (Tenn.
1979).
The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging certain jury
instructions given at his trial violated his constitutional rights. The trial court denied relief
and this Court affirmed that dismissal. Sammy J. Miller v. State, Hamilton County, No.
1100 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, May 17, 1989), per. app. denied (Tenn. 1989).
The instant habeas corpus petition was filed May 20, 1998.1 In seeking relief via the
petition, the petitioner contends: (1) he suffered from ineffective assistance of counsel; (2)
he is innocent of the crime; (3) he was tried and convicted under an unconstitutional and
repealed law or statute; and (4) it is unclear what law was in effect at the time the petitioner
allegedly committed his crime. The trial court dismissed the petition in that the relief sought
is not available by habeas corpus.
After a review of the entire record, briefs of the parties, and appropriate law, we
affirm the trial court’s dismissal.
I.
1
On May 1, 1997, the petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in the
Hamilton County Criminal Court, while an inmate at the Northeast Correction Complex in
Mountain City, Tennessee. The trial court dismissed the petition pursuant to Tenn. Code
Ann. § 29-21-105, “[t]he application should be made to the Court or Judge most convenient
in point of distance to the applicant unless a sufficient reason be given in the petition for
not applying to such court or judge.” This Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the
petition. Sammy J. Miller v. State, No. 03C01-9710-CR-00444 (Tenn. Crim. App.,
Knoxville, May 6, 1998).
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GROUNDS FOR HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF
It is well recognized in Tennessee that habeas corpus relief is only available when
a conviction is void because the convicting court was without jurisdiction or authority to
sentence a defendant, or that a defendant’s sentence has expired, and the petitioner is
being illegally restrained. Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993); see also
Passarella v. State, 891 S.W.2d 619, 626 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). A void judgment is one
which shows “upon the face of the judgment or the record of the proceedings upon which
the judgment is rendered” that the convicting court was without jurisdiction. Archer, 851
S.W.2d at 161; Potts v. State, 833 S.W.2d 60, 62 (Tenn. 1992).
In the case at bar, the petitioner presents two central arguments. First, the
petitioner contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Second, the
petitioner contends that he was convicted pursuant to an unconstitutional or repealed
statute.
II.
CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is not applicable to petitions for habeas
corpus relief. Such a claim, if sustainable, would only make the petitioner’s conviction
voidable, not void. Our post-conviction process, set out in Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-201,
et seq. (§ 40-30-101, et seq. repealed), provides for challenges to convictions that are
alleged to be void or voidable because of the abridgment of constitutional rights. A
petitioner cannot collaterally attack a facially valid conviction in a habeas corpus
proceeding. Potts, 833 S.W.2d at 62; State ex rel. Holbrook v. Bomar, 211 Tenn. 243,
247, 364 S.W.2d 887, 889 (Tenn. 1963). Consideration of such claim was ripe for
determination in the petitioner’s claim for post-conviction relief in 1989. We find the trial
court was correct in holding this claim was not a ground for habeas relief, and the petition
could not be treated as a petition for post-conviction relief, as it is time barred.
III.
UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE
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In this complaint, the petitioner contends that the indictment in his cause should
have contained the law, rule, statute, or regulation in effect when the alleged offense was
committed. Also, the petitioner contends (a) the Tennessee legislature repealed all
statutes (murder first degree) for a period of two weeks, and during such hiatus the alleged
crime of murder was committed and (b) there was no law in place at the time the jury
verdict was returned. The state argues the substance of this claim has been previously
determined on direct appeal. Miller v. State, 584 S.W.2d 758, 762 (Tenn. 1979).
We believe the petitioner is confused when he claims there was no murder statute
in effect at the time of the alleged offense, April 7, 1976. However, there arose a
controversy over the constitutionality of the death penalty under the murder statutes, Tenn.
Code Ann. § 39-2405 and § 39-2406. In Miller, the Supreme Court found, after a review
of the record, the defendant was convicted upon legally sufficient evidence in a fair and
error-free trial, and affirmed the conviction without hesitation. The controversy over the
application of the death penalty did not have the effect of invalidating the provisions in
defining murder first degree or the convictions obtained thereunder. It is clear from the
analysis applied by the Supreme Court in its opinion that the statutes under which the
petitioner was convicted for murder first degree and eventually sentenced were
constitutional. There is no merit to this claim.
The trial court’s order of dismissal is affirmed.
________________________________________
L. T. LAFFERTY, SENIOR JUDGE
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CONCUR:
___________________________________
JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
___________________________________
THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
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