James Thomas Jefferson v. State

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED
OCTOBER 1998 SESSION
December 31, 1998
Cecil W. Crowson
Appellate Court Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
) C.C.A. No. 01C01-9711-CR-00538
Appellee, )
) Davidson County
V. )
) Honorable W alter C. Kurtz, Judge
)
JAMES THOMAS JEFFERSON, ) (Resentencing: First Degree Murder)
)
Appellant. )
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
Karl F. Dean John Knox Walkup
Metro Public Defender Attorney General & Reporter
Jeffrey A. DeVasher Timothy Behan
Assistant Public Defender Assistant Attorney General
1202 Stahlman Building 425 Fifth Avenue North
Nashville, TN 37201 Nashville, TN 37243-0493
Victor S. (Torry) Johnson III
District Attorney General
Roger Moore
Assistant District Attorney General
Washington Square, Suite 500
222 Second Avenue North
Nashville, TN 37201
OPINION FILED: ___________________
AFFIRMED
PAUL G. SUMMERS,
Judge
OPINION
The defendant was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated
murder; the same jury simultaneously sentenced him to forty years incarceration.
On direct appeal this Court affirmed the defendant's conviction but remanded the
matter for resentencing. See State v. Jefferson, 938 S.W.2d 1, 23 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1996). On remand the defendant was sentenced by a jury to life
imprisonment. In this direct appeal the defendant contends that the trial court
erred when it 1) denied his motion to impanel a jury to determine his guilt or
innocence; 2) admitted into evidence the minute entry from the prior trial which
showed the jury's verdict of guilty but from which had been redacted its
imposition of the forty year sentence; and 3) instructed the jury that the only
sentence it could impose was life imprisonment. Finding no merit in these
complaints, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The defendant first contends that because this Court previously found the
convicting jury's verdict “void,” he is entitled to a new trial on the issue of his guilt
or innocence. He argues, “Since the jury at [his] 1993 trial was exposed to
inaccurate sentencing information, its verdict as to both guilt and innocence is
void.” We disagree. In the initial direct appeal of this matter this Court held as
follows:
In this case, the verdict returned by the jury was void
because the punishment set by the jury was below
the minimum punishment for the offense of murder in
the first degree. The trial court did not have the
authority to change the jury's verdict from forty (40)
years to confinement for life in the Department of
Correction. Since the jury found the appellant guilty
of premeditated murder and the evidence contained
in the record supports the verdict, the verdict of the
jury finding the appellant guilty of premeditated
murder is affirmed. However, this case must be
remanded to the trial court for a new sentencing
hearing.
Jefferson, 938 S.W.2d at 23 (footnote omitted). Prior to so holding this Court
noted, but obviously declined to adopt, the defendant's argument that “if the
punishment was below the minimum punishment for murder in the first degree, .
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. . the judgment of the trial court [should be reversed] and remand[ed] for a new
trial.” Id. at 20. Clearly, then, this Court has already decided that the convicting
jury's verdict is not void in its entirety but only as to sentencing. Significantly, our
Supreme Court denied the defendant's application for permission to appeal from
this decision.
On resentencing, the trial court denied the defendant's motion for a jury to
determine his guilt or innocence on the basis of the judicial doctrine of “the law of
the case.” The trial court was correct. As noted by our Supreme Court in
Clements v. Pearson,
352 S.W.2d 236, 237 (Tenn. 1961) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary, Third Ed.).
The doctrine applies to issues that were actually before the court as well as to
issues that were necessarily decided by implication, see Ladd v. Honda Motor
Co., 939 S.W.2d 83, 90 (Tenn. App. 1996), and it applies to decisions that the
Supreme Court has declined to review. Id. at 91. Clearly the doctrine applies
here and this issue is therefore without merit.
The defendant next complains about the minute entry of the convicting
jury's verdict admitted into evidence at the resentencing. Upon the state's
motion and over the defendant's objection, the trial court ruled that the minute
entry should have redacted from it the jury's assessment of the defendant's
punishment at “forty years in the penitentiary.” The defendant claims that the
redacted document misled the sentencing jury and “falsely indicated” to it that
the convicting jury had not earlier sentenced the defendant. W e are
unpersuaded. The convicting jury's sentence of the defendant was clearly
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irrelevant in the context of his resentencing. “Evidence which is not relevant is
not admissible.” Tenn. R. Evid. 402. The only evidence of the prior jury's action
which was relevant in the context of the resentencing proceeding was its verdict
of guilt. The redacted minute entry accurately reflected that information. This
issue is without merit.
Finally, the defendant contends that the trial court erred when it instructed
the jury, “The sentence for murder in the first degree is the sentence of life
imprisonment.” We disagree and return to this Court's earlier opinion in this
matter: “In summary, this Court is bound by the Supreme Court's decision in
Miller [v. State, 584 S.W.2d 758 (Tenn. 1979),] that the only possible punishment
for first degree murder is life imprisonment.” See Jefferson, 938 S.W.2d at 21.
Thus, the trial court did not err in so instructing the resentencing jury. This issue
is without merit.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
__________________________
PAUL G. SUMMERS, Judge
CONCUR:
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_____________________________
JOSEPH M. TIPTON, Judge
_____________________________
JOE G. RILEY, Judge
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