Wright v. State

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE FILED
SEPTEMBER 1998 SESSION
November 30, 1998
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
RAYMOND WRIGHT, )
)
Appellant, ) No. 03C01-9710-CR-00460
)
) Hamilton County
v. )
) Honorable Douglas A. Meyer, Judge
)
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) (Post-Conviction)
)
)
Appellee. )
For the Appellant: For the Appellee:
Robert N. Meeks John Knox Walkup
P.O. Box 8086 Attorney General of Tennessee
Chattanooga, TN 37414 and
Todd R. Kelley
Assistant Attorney General of Tennessee
425 Fifth Avenue North
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
William H. Cox, III
District Attorney General
and
C. Leland Davis
Assistant District Attorney General
600 Market Street, Suite 310
Chattanooga, TN 37402
OPINION FILED:____________________
AFFIRMED
Joseph M. Tipton
Judge
OPINION
The petitioner, Raymond Wright, appeals as of right from the judgment of
the Hamilton County Criminal Court denying him post-conviction relief. He was
convicted in January 1993 upon his guilty plea to second degree murder, a Class A
felony. Pursuant to his plea agreement, he was sentenced as a Range III, standard
offender to fifty years confinement to be served in the Department of Correction.1 He
contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel resulting in an
unknowing and involuntary guilty plea. We disagree.
At the evidentiary hearing, the petitioner testified that his trial attorney
never read any indictment to him. He said his attorney never explained the elements of
any of the crimes for which he was charged, nor did he explain the elements of second
degree murder. He said if he had understood the elements of second degree murder,
he would not have pled guilty.
The petitioner testified that his attorney discussed a possible defense of
insanity but told him the trial court would not accept a defense of temporary insanity.
He said his attorney told him he had to be insane at all times, and the petitioner said he
did not want to use insanity as a defense because he was not insane. He said that if he
had known that insanity and diminished capacity were available as defenses, he would
not have pled guilty. He said that he pled guilty because he thought he would be
reindicted for felony murder and the state would seek the death penalty. He also said
his attorney and the district attorney told him he would probably be released from jail in
ten to twelve years. He said he thought the trial judge may have explained the
elements of the offenses to him at the guilty plea hearing, but he was not positive. On
1
The record reflects that the petitioner was originally indicted for premeditated murder
and su bsequ ently for felony m urder. As part of his p lea agree men t, the petitioner agreed to plead gu ilty to
second degree murder in excha nge for a sentence as a Range III offender, thereby serving forty-five
percent of a fifty-year sentence before being eligible for parole.
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cross-examination, he admitted that at the guilty plea hearing, he said he had a week to
examine the plea agreement.
The petitioner’s trial attorney testified that he talked with the petitioner and
the petitioner’s sister numerous times. He said a psychological evaluation revealed that
the petitioner was competent and sane. He said he believed the petitioner understood
everything he told him. He said he showed the petitioner the indictment for felony
murder and discussed it with him. He said he explained all the elements the state
would have to prove to convict the petitioner of premeditated and felony murder. He
said the petitioner understood his options, and he accepted the plea agreement almost
immediately. He said he told the petitioner to think it over for a week before agreeing to
the plea. He said the petitioner readily accepted the plea, and he did not coerce or
persuade the petitioner to accept it. He testified that he never told the petitioner that he
would probably get out of jail in ten to twelve years.
The trial court denied the petitioner post-conviction relief. It found that the
petitioner freely, voluntarily, and knowingly entered his plea of guilty and that his trial
attorney’s performance was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in
criminal cases.
On appeal, the petitioner challenges his conviction based upon the claim
that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel that caused him to enter an
unknowing and involuntary guilty plea. In his brief, the petitioner presents two separate
claims. First, he argues that his plea was involuntary and unknowing because counsel
failed to explain the elements of second degree murder, and second, he argues that
counsel was deficient for failing to explain the elements. Because the petitioner’s
essential claim is that his attorney’s deficient performance resulted in an involuntary
and unknowing plea, we address his claims together.
3
Under the Sixth Amendment, when a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel is made, the burden is upon the petitioner to show (1) that counsel’s
performance was deficient and (2) that the deficiency was prejudicial in terms of
rendering a reasonable probability that the result of the trial was unreliable or the
proceedings fundamentally unfair. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.
Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); see Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 368-72, 113 S. Ct. 838,
842-44 (1993). The Strickland standard has been applied to the right to counsel under
Article I, Section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution. State v. Melson, 772 S.W.2d 417,
419 n. 2 (Tenn. 1989). When a petitioner claims that ineffective assistance of counsel
resulted in a guilty plea, the petitioner must prove that counsel performed deficiently
and that but for counsel’s errors, the petitioner would not have pled guilty and would
have insisted upon going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 464 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S. Ct. 366, 370
(1985).
In Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975), our supreme court
decided that attorneys should be held to the general standard of whether the services
rendered were within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal
cases. Further, the court stated that the range of competence was to be measured by
the duties and criteria set forth in Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir.
1974) and United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1202-04 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Also,
in reviewing counsel’s conduct, a “fair assessment of attorney performance requires
that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct
the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from
counsel’s perspective at the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065; see
Hellard v. State, 629 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982).
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We also note that the approach to the issue of the ineffective assistance
of counsel does not have to start with an analysis of an attorney’s conduct. If prejudice
is not shown, we need not seek to determine the validity of the allegations about
deficient performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.
In a post-conviction case, the burden is on the petitioner to prove his
grounds for relief by clear and convincing evidence. T.C.A. § 40-30-210(f). On appeal,
we are bound by the trial court’s findings unless we conclude that the evidence
preponderates against those findings. Black v. State, 794 S.W.2d 752, 755 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1990). The petitioner has the burden of illustrating how the evidence
preponderates against the judgment entered. Id. We conclude that the petitioner has
failed to meet this burden.
The petitioner argues that his trial attorney was deficient because he
never explained the elements of second degree murder, thereby resulting in an
unknowing and involuntary guilty plea. First, we note that although the petitioner claims
he was never instructed on the elements of second degree murder, at the evidentiary
hearing his trial attorney was never asked if he explained those elements to the
petitioner. Nevertheless, at the guilty plea hearing, the following colloquy took place
between the trial court and the petitioner:
COURT: Now, you’ve told your attorney all the facts and
circumstances surrounding the charge against you?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
COURT: And [your attorney] has counseled with you about
those charges, what those charges mean. He’s told you what
the possible punishment could be. He’s discussed with you
the possible defenses you might have, including the defense
of diminished responsibility.
DEFENDANT: Yes.
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COURT: Also, has he taken the time to answer your questions
that you might have?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
COURT: Has he done everything within reason you’ve asked
of him?
DEFENDANT: Yes, he has.
....
COURT: . . . And you understand that if you plead guilty, it has
the same effect as if a jury found you guilty, and that you’re not
going to have any further hearing in this court or any other
court about your guilt?
DEFENDANT: I’m aware of that.
The petitioner has failed to show how the trial court’s findings are
incorrect. We conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial
court’s findings that the petitioner knowingly and voluntarily entered his guilty plea
pursuant to a plea agreement and that his attorney’s performance was not ineffective.
In consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, the judgment of the trial
court is affirmed.
________________________________
Joseph M. Tipton, Judge
CONCUR:
_________________________
John H. Peay, Judge
_________________________
David G. Hayes, Judge
6