State v. Christopher Eacholes

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON FILED
JANUARY 1999 SESSION January 29, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
) NO. 02C01-9803-CR-00065
Appellee, )
) SHELBY COUNTY
VS. )
) HON. BERNIE WEINMAN,
CHRISTOPHER J. EACHOLES, ) JUDGE
)
Appellant. ) (Second Degree Murder)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
ROBERT C. BROOKS PAUL G. SUMMERS
707 Adams Avenue Attorney General and Reporter
P.O. Box 771558
Memphis, TN 38105 CLINTON J. MORGAN
Assistant Attorney General
Cordell Hull Building, 2nd Floor
425 Fifth Avenue North
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
WILLIAM L. GIBBONS
District Attorney General
C. ALANDA HORNE
KEVIN R. RARDIN
Asst. District Attorneys General
201 Poplar Ave, Suite 301
Memphis, TN 38103-1947
OPINION FILED:
AFFIRMED
JOE G. RILEY,
JUDGE
OPINION
The defendant, Christopher J. Eacholes, appeals as of right his conviction
for second degree murder by a Shelby County jury. He received a sentence of
twenty-one years in the Department of Correction. On appeal he contests the
sufficiency of the evidence and whether the trial court erred in failing to apply
certain mitigating factors in sentencing. Finding no error below, the judgment of
the trial court is AFFIRMED.
FACTS
The defendant resided in Memphis with Sharon Nunnally and her sister,
Melissa Stewart. Shortly after the defendant moved in with the sisters, he and
Stewart began a romantic relationship. That relationship ended sometime
around the first part of September 1996. Stewart and the victim, Montsho
Jimerson, also had a previous relationship. Stewart resumed her relationship
with the victim in early October 1996.
Stewart and the victim were watching television in Nunnally's residence on
the evening of October 17, 1996. The defendant returned to the residence and
entered through a side door. Stewart proceeded to the bedroom to speak with
the defendant. The defendant then walked into the living room, drew a small
pistol, and shot the victim four (4) times from the side as he watched television.
The victim subsequently died from these wounds.
Stewart testified that the defendant had previously argued with the victim
about the victim’s presence in the residence. Apparently, the defendant was
unhappy that Stewart continued to have contact with her ex-boyfriend. At one
point the defendant told the victim if he continued to visit the residence, his
mother would "be wearing a black dress."
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The defendant testified that he, in fact, did not approve of the victim's
presence at the residence. Defendant testified that the victim previously
threatened him and appeared to be reaching for a gun when he shot him. No
weapon was found on the victim.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
The defendant contends the evidence adduced at trial is insufficient to
support his conviction for second degree murder.
In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court does not reweigh
or reevaluate the evidence. State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn.
1978). A jury verdict approved by the trial judge accredits the state's witnesses
and resolves all conflicts in favor of the state. State v. Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d 797,
803 (Tenn. 1994); State v. Harris, 839 S.W.2d 54, 75 (Tenn. 1992). On appeal,
the state is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all
legitimate or reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom. Id. This
Court will not disturb a verdict of guilt due to the sufficiency of the evidence
unless the defendant demonstrates that the facts contained in the record and the
inferences which may be drawn therefrom are insufficient, as a matter of law, for
a rational trier of fact to find the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Brewer, 932 S.W.2d 1, 19 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). Accordingly, it is
the appellate court's duty to affirm the conviction if the evidence, viewed under
these standards, was sufficient for any rational trier of fact to have found the
essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Tenn. R. App. P.
13(e); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 317, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d
560 (1979); State v. Cazes, 875 S.W.2d 253, 259 (Tenn. 1994).
The state’s proof revealed that defendant knowingly shot and killed the
victim. Although the defendant contended the shooting was in self-defense, the
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jury rejected this and found him guilty of a “knowing killing of another.” Tenn.
Code Ann. § 39-13-210(a)(1). Self-defense is a jury question. State v. Ivy, 868
S.W.2d 724, 727 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). The jury was within its prerogative in
rejecting self-defense.
This issue is without merit.
SENTENCING
The defendant’s second issue addresses the trial court’s failure to apply
any mitigating factors. This Court’s review of the sentence imposed by the trial
court is de novo with a presumption of correctness. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-
401(d). This presumption is conditioned upon an affirmative showing in the
record that the trial judge considered the sentencing principles and all relevant
facts and circumstances. State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991). If
the trial court fails to comply with the statutory directives, there is no presumption
of correctness and our review is de novo. State v. Poole, 945 S.W.2d 93, 96
(Tenn. 1997).
The defendant received a twenty-one (21) year sentence. The
presumptive sentence for the Class A felony of second degree murder is the
midpoint within the range; namely, twenty (20) years. See Tenn. Code Ann. §
40-35-210(c). The trial court considered statutory enhancing factors and found
that the offense was committed with a firearm. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-
114(9). Based upon this factor, the trial court enhanced defendant’s sentence
one (1) year. The trial court noted the mitigating factors submitted by defendant:
(1) defendant acted under strong provocation, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-113(2);
and (2) defendant was a first-time offender, had a high school education, had a
good work record, came from a good family, and was deeply remorseful, Tenn.
Code Ann. § 40-35-113(13). The trial court rejected these factors. The
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sentence of twenty-one (21) years, one year above the presumptive sentence,
was well within the discretion of the trial court. Thus, the sentence was proper.
This issue is without merit.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
_________________________
JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
CONCUR:
______________________________
DAVID G. HAYES, JUDGE
______________________________
JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, JUDGE
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