State vs.Donald Middlebrooks

IN THE TENNESSEE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
AT NASHVILLE FILED
AUGUST 1997 SESSION
January 15, 1998
Cecil W. Crowson
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9606-CR-00230
Appellate Court Clerk
)
Appellee, ) DAVIDSON COUNTY
) (No. 87-F-1682 Below)
VS. )
) The Honorable Ann Lacy Johns
DONALD RAY MIDDLEBROOKS, )
) (RESENTENCING - DEATH PENALTY)
Appellant. )
FOR APPELLANT: FOR APPELLEE:
Lionel R. Barrett, Jr. John Knox Walkup
Washington Square Two, Suite 418 Attorney General & Reporter
222 Second Avenue North
Nashville, TN 37201 Michael E. Moore
Solicitor General
Richard McGee
601 Woodland Street Kathy Morante
Nashville, TN 37206 Deputy Attorney General
425 Fifth Avenue North
Cordell Hull Building, Second Floor
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
Victor S. Johnson III
District Attorney General
Roger D. Moore
Assistant District Attorney General
John C. Zimmerman
Assistant District Attorney General
Washington Square, Suite 500
222 Second Avenue North
Nashville, TN 37201-1649
OPINION FILED: _____________________________
SENTENCE OF DEATH AFFIRMED
CURWOOD WITT
Judge
OPINION
In this capital case, the appellant, Donald Ray Middlebrooks, was convicted
by a jury in September 1989 of felony murder and sentenced to death by electrocution.
The appellant’s conviction was upheld by our supreme court; however, his sentence was
reversed, and the case was remanded for a new sentencing hearing. See State v.
Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317 (Tenn. 1992), cert. dismissed, 510 U.S. 805, 114 S. Ct. 651,
(1993).
At a new sentencing hearing held upon remand, the jury found that the
murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture or depravity of
mind. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-203(I)(5)(1982) (repealed 1989). The jury found there
were no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to outweigh this aggravating
circumstance and sentenced the appellant to death by electrocution.
In this appeal, the appellant raises issues regarding alleged errors occurring
during the resentencing hearing and challenging the constitutionality of the death penalty
statutes. The Court having carefully considered the appellant’s contentions, we find that
none has merit. Accordingly, we affirm the appellant’s sentence of death.
I. BACKGROUND
The victim’s friend, Shannon Stewart, who was twelve years old at the time,
met the appellant on the Monday before the victim disappeared. The appellant called
himself “Debow.” The woman with the appellant, Tammy Middlebrooks, was introduced
as “Debowa.” The two were selling junk at a flea market in a vacant lot on Gallatin Road.
When Stewart and the victim saw the appellant and Tammy looking through a dumpster
on Sunday morning, April 26, 1987, Stewart introduced them to the victim.
Around 4:30 or 5:00 p.m. on that day, the victim, Kerrick Majors, walked with
1
his older brother, Kelly Vaden, to a friend’s house to shoot basketball. Around 7:00 p.m.,
Vaden and the victim were walking home when one of Vaden’s friends drove by and asked
him to go riding. The victim said that he was going back to play more basketball.
Later that evening, Stewart and the victim, along with some other friends,
went to the vacant lot where there was a table with some items set out on it. Stewart was
the last to get there because he was stopped by traffic while trying to cross Gallatin Road.
The woman who identified herself as Debowa shouted “Hey, ya’ll niggers leave our stuff
alone.” The appellant and Roger Brewington, who was selling junk with the appellant and
Tammy Middlebrooks, started chasing the boys. Two of the boys managed to run ahead
of the others. The three slower boys were Stewart, the victim, and Antonio Watson.
Stewart saw Brewington grab the victim in a head lock, and the victim said “Hey man, you
know me.” The appellant ran up and said, “Shut up, nigger.” He then smacked the victim.
Stewart and Watson ran away. Later they met up with the other boys and saw the
appellant walking around like he was looking for them, but they never found the victim.
Sometime after 9:00 p.m., three boys came to the home where the victim
lived with Vaden and his mother, Deborah Majors. The boys told Majors that a white man
had grabbed and slapped the victim on Gallatin Road. When Vaden then returned home
around 10:00 p.m., Majors called the police, who then came to the house. Vaden went out
looking for the victim’s friends to get information, but he was unsuccessful. The police told
Majors that the victim would probably be brought home for being out after curfew. If not,
the police instructed Majors to go to the Juvenile Department in the morning.
The next morning, Majors reported her son missing, and she and the family
continued to look for the victim. Vaden found one of the boys, Anthony Covington, who
was with the victim when he was abducted. They, along with Majors and her father, went
to the vacant lot on Gallatin Road where Covington had last seen the victim. Covington
told them about a pathway through a wooded area behind the YMCA. Vaden and
Covington walked up the path which came out at some railroad tracks, but they did not find
2
anything. As Vaden was walking back, he noticed a foam mattress and saw some hair
underneath it. When he raised the mattress, he saw the victim lying there.
Sergeant Robert Moore was in charge of the investigation into the victim’s
murder. In the area surrounding the victim’s body, he found a jacket and white tennis
shoes which were identified as belonging to the victim. Two beer cans were also located
nearby. The victim’s body was in a drainage ditch covered by a large piece of foam. A pair
of blue shorts were lying beside his head. The victim was completely nude. A woven belt
was wound tightly around his left wrist. Sergeant Moore also observed a large laceration
across the right wrist. Above the victim’s left eye was a gash, and it was bloody and
swollen. There were places about the nose where skin was missing, and it was burned.
The victim’s lips were swollen, and there was bleeding inside the mouth, with lacerations
inside the mouth and around the lips. The nose was also bloody and red. Two lacerations
were made by a sharp instrument that went in an “X” shape across the victim’s chest.
There were also two deep stab wounds into the body a couple of inches apart. The
victim’s testicles were swollen, and there was a large amount of blood on the legs.
Bruises, scrapes, abrasions, and burns could be observed all over the victim’s body. A t-
shirt was tied in a hard knot around the victim’s throat. Blood on the t-shirt, which was
beginning to coagulate at the time Sergeant Moore investigated the scene, was consistent
with blood coming from the mouth. The t-shirt was soaked in urine and there were streams
of urine on top of the blood on the victim’s body. Beside the victim’s head was a stick with
blood on the end of it. Sergeant Moore did not find any evidence of drug use at the scene
of the murder.
Later that day, Sergeant Moore was notified that a person would meet him
at a donut shop with information about the person or persons who murdered the victim.
When Sergeant Moore arrived, Roger Brewington told him that he should be looking for
Donald and Tammy Middlebrooks. Based on the information Brewington was giving him
and because Brewington matched descriptions given of a third suspect, Sergeant Moore
determined that Brewington was probably involved in the murder. Brewington showed
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Sergeant Moore the murder weapon, a lock-blade knife with brass knuckles, which was
hidden in a planter in front of the donut shop.
Subsequently, Sergeant Moore interviewed Brewington at the police station
and obtained an arrest warrant for Donald and Tammy Middlebrooks. Brewington,
although six feet tall and approximately 170-175 pounds, was only sixteen years old, so
he was transported to juvenile court and charged with homicide.1
A search of a wooded area near Gallatin Road resulted in finding a small
shack where the appellant and Tammy Middlebrooks were living. Officer Allen Herald, with
the canine division, opened the door and saw the two subjects lying on a mat. He ordered
the two out of the shack, and Tammy Middlebrooks jumped up and started coming towards
Officer Herald, whose K-9 partner grabbed her. Sergeant Moore was then able to seize
Tammy Middlebrooks by the arm and pull her out. When the appellant did not respond to
the commands, Officer Herald sent his K-9 partner in to apprehend him. A kitchen knife
and a potato were laying next to the appellant. Both the appellant and Tammy
Middlebrooks sustained dog bites and had to be taken to the hospital for treatment. While
at the hospital, after being advised of his rights, the appellant told Sergeant Moore that he
stabbed the victim twice to put an end to the torture.
At 12:30 p.m. that day, the appellant gave a lengthy video-taped statement
at the police station about his involvement in the victim’s death. The appellant admitted
participating in the beating and mistreatment of the victim but described his role as minor
and depicted Brewington as the primary perpetrator of the offense. According to the
appellant, around dusk, five or six “colored boys” came by their table where they were
selling junk. The boys started breaking a “bunch of stuff,” so the appellant and Brewington
chased them. Brewington caught one of the boys in a head lock. After the victim was
1
Brew ington was eventually tried an as adult and convicted of first-degree murder, aggravated
kidnapping, and armed robbery, for which he was sentenced to consecutive sentences of life, 40 years, and
35 years, resp ective ly. See State v. Brewington, No. 89-232-III (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, June 20,
1990), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Oct. 1, 1990). Tamm y pled guilty to first-degree murder and was sentenced
to life impris onm ent.
4
caught, the appellant said Brewington suggested they "have some fun," and the three of
them took the victim back into the woods. The victim’s hands were tied, and Brewington
slapped him, beat him with brass knuckles, hit him with a stick, and urinated into his mouth,
making him swallow. Any time the victim would flinch, Brewington would hit him again.
When the victim started crying and begging, saying “all I want to do is go to school and get
my education,” Brewington responded “f_ you nigger” and hit him some more.
At one point, the appellant and Brewington left Tammy Middlebrooks with the
victim while they went out looking for the other boys. The appellant did not know what
would have happened if they had found the others.
The appellant admitted striking the victim with his open hand and on the leg
with a switch. Appellant said that Tammy slapped the victim and burned his nose with a
cigarette lighter as Brewington urged her on. Brewington hit the victim’s testicles with a
stick, threatened to cut “it” open, stuck a stick up the victim’s anus, hit him some more with
the brass knuckles, wiped the victim's blood on himself, beat the victim’s mouth and tongue
with a stick, dropped the knife on him, gagged him, and slashed his wrist. While dropping
the knife, Brewington told the victim he was taking him back to the days of “Roots.”
Finally, when the appellant asked Brewington to stop because the victim's
crying and pleading were getting on his nerves, Brewington gave the victim "the kiss of
death" on the forehead. He also told the victim that he was in the mafia and the “KKK.”
Brewington then covered the victim’s face with his clothes, handed the knife to the
appellant, and told him to stab the victim. According to the defendant’s statement, when
he refused, Brewington stabbed the victim. The appellant then reluctantly stabbed the
victim "to prove to Roger that I guess I was cooler" and to put the victim out of his misery.
The appellant admitted that in his previous statement at the hospital, he told police that he
had stabbed the victim twice. The appellant said he did not stop Brewington from “putting
the boy through hell” sooner because he was afraid of Brewington and because
Brewington had a knife. When asked why he did not stop it when Brewington gave him the
5
knife, the appellant said he was “scared to fight.” The victim's ordeal began around 7:30
p.m. and ended around 11:00 p.m. with the stabbing. The appellant admitted that before
beating and killing the victim, he and Brewington drank alcohol and smoked marijuana.
The appellant said that, the next morning, he covered the victim with a piece
of Styrofoam. Then, he and Tammy met Brewington at the Holy Name Church for
breakfast. Brewington commented on how much fun they had the night before, and he
asked the appellant to help him go after an entire family. Brewington and the appellant
sharpened their knifes on the railroad tracks, and Brewington showed the appellant the
potential victims’ house, but eventually, the appellant said he would not do it.
During the time the appellant was in custody, Sergeant Moore testified that
he did not observe any signs that the appellant was under the influence of drugs or alcohol.
The appellant’s demeanor never changed, he did not appear delusional, nor did he give
inappropriate responses.
The autopsy of the victim indicated that the victim was 4 feet, 11 inches tall,
and weighed approximately 112 pounds. There was a large abrasion on the left side of the
forehead, a contusion on the outside corner of the left eye, and a contusion on the left
corner of the mouth. The two stab wounds to the anterior chest occurred within a short
period of time. The murder weapon had been plunged a depth of 3.3 inches. There were
superficial linear incisions on the anterior chest that crisscrossed each other. There was
an incision of the right wrist that was 1.7 inches in length. The cause of death was a stab
wound to the chest, which punctured the left lung and pulmonary artery. The victim died
from blood loss. The superficial linear incisions on the victim’s chest were made before
the stab wounds. The minimum time from infliction of the stab wounds to the time of death
was estimated at between five to six minutes, although the victim could have lived up to
30 minutes. The linear incisions would have been painful wounds; however, it was
impossible to say with medical certainty whether the victim was conscious at the time they
were inflicted.
6
Both Majors and Vaden described the victim, who was fourteen years old at
the time of the murder, as being a “B” and “C” student who loved school. He was small for
his age and was the smallest in his group of friends. The victim was not violent in nature
and did not carry a weapon.
Since the murder of her son, Majors’ health has deteriorated. She has been
on medication and will not leave the house except for doctor appointments. She has had
a nervous breakdown, suffers from panic attacks, and has not been able to sleep at night
since the murder. Vaden testified that since the murder he has suffered from mood swings
and blames himself for his brother’s death.
For the defense, the appellant’s cousins, James and Carol Sue Little, and the
appellant’s half-sister, Sharon Fuchs, testified concerning the appellant’s difficult childhood.
The appellant grew up around several small towns in Texas. His father died of a heart
attack when the appellant was four years old. After that, the appellant’s mother remarried,
and Fuchs was born. Eventually, the appellant’s step-father had a nervous breakdown and
was committed to a mental institution, and the appellant’s mother divorced him. After the
divorce, the appellant’s mother worked and went out regularly in the evenings. During the
evenings, the children would either stay with relatives or go with their mother to bars.
Sometimes their mother would leave the children by themselves at a bar while she left with
a man for a couple of hours. Men often spent the night at the house, and the children
could sometimes hear their mother having sexual relations with them. The mother would
not stop if the children came in the room, and Fuchs was sometimes forced to participate
while her mother watched.
An uncle, who was a pedophile, sometimes babysat the children. The
appellant’s mother continued to let the uncle babysit even though she knew this. One time,
Fuchs saw the uncle rape the appellant. She went to get her mother, but the incident was
never discussed. The mother would sometimes grab the appellant between his legs and
7
would watch him use the bathroom.
After being raped by his uncle, the appellant always appeared angry and
would get in trouble. He started running away from home and walking the streets.
Eventually, the appellant was sent to a home for children and was later sent to prison on
two different occasions. After the appellant returned from prison, he was more angry and
strange. He started having seizures about every three days, and he lived in a shack
behind the house. The appellant was sent to a state mental institution after he climbed
a water tower and threatened suicide.
The appellant met Tammy Middlebrooks when she was seventeen years old.
They dated for two or three months and got married in early 1986. The relationship was
strange, and both seemed to be unstable. For a brief time, the couple lived with Fuchs and
the appellant’s mother. The appellant did not have a job, so he and Tammy would
sometimes spend the day having sex or walking around town. Fuchs identified a document
titled “Debow’s Revenge” as being in the appellant’s handwriting. The document was
found in the appellant’s room, and Fuchs turned it over to the police at their request. This
handwritten document told in detail how “Debow” would seek revenge against certain
people.
A psychologist, Dr. Jeffrey L. Smalldon, testified that he performed a
psychological and neuropsychological evaluation on the appellant at the request of defense
counsel. From his interviews and testing of the appellant and his review of numerous
records documenting the appellant’s contact with a wide variety of mental health
professionals, the appellant’s educational records, and his records from the Texas
Department of Correction, Dr. Smalldon determined that the appellant had a severe
borderline personality disorder, which is marked by an inconsistency in behavior. Dr.
Smalldon found that the characteristics of borderline personality disorder, including
instability of mood, seeing either the best or the worst in others, marked identity
disturbance, impulsive and reckless behavior, poor control over anger, recurring suicidal
8
or self-destructive gestures, and intense fear of abandonment, were either observed or
documented in the appellant’s historical records.
Dr. Smalldon also found significant antisocial and schizotypal traits, a history
of mixed substance and alcohol abuse, an organic personality change, and a seizure
disorder. The appellant also has a mild functional brain impairment, which would cause
the appellant to have a greater degree of impulsivity and an inability to delay some of his
responses. A significant number of mental health professionals who examined the
appellant found signs of malingering. Dr. Smalldon testified that this was not necessarily
inconsistent with having a mental illness, describing the appellant as a chronic liar.
From his review of the appellant’s social history, Dr. Smalldon noted as
significant the lack of parental supervision while the appellant was growing up and sexual
and physical abuse by his mother and other relatives. Dr. Smalldon observed that the
appellant exhibited many of the characteristics seen in adults who were sexually abused
as children.
As to the appellant’s account of his involvement in the murder, Dr. Smalldon
testified that the appellant claimed more responsibility in his interview with him than the
appellant did in his video-taped statement to the police. The appellant never expressed
any remorse to Dr. Smalldon.
In rebuttal, the state presented the testimony of Dr. Michael McElroy, the
Director of Psychological Services for the State of Tennessee at Middle Tennessee Mental
Health Institute (MTMHI). Dr. McElroy testified that based on the results of the Minnesota
Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) administered on the appellant by Dr. Smalldon,
it was his opinion that the appellant was exaggerating his mental state. While Dr. Smalldon
testified that the appellant may have been overreporting some of his symptoms, he did not
believe that the profile was obviously invalid. Dr. McElroy acknowledged that borderline
personality disorder is a mental illness and that all of the appellant’s records indicate he
9
has some form of personality disorder.
Dr. Willis Marshall testified that he examined the appellant while he was at
MTMHI in 1987 and determined that the appellant was competent to stand trial, that he did
not have an insanity defense, and that he was not committable. Dr. Marshall further stated
that there was no finding of mental illness and that he generally did not consider
personality disorder as a mental illness. Dr. Marshall found several indications that the
appellant was trying to convince them he had more of a mental problem than he really did.
On cross-examination, Dr. Marshall admitted that the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Revised Edition, includes borderline
personality disorder as a diagnosable form of mental illness. He also admitted that every
mental health professional who examined the appellant found some form of diagnosable
mental illness.
Based on this proof, the jury sentenced the appellant to death for the murder
of Kerrick Majors.
II. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF “HEINOUS, ATROCIOUS, AND CRUEL”
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE
The appellant contends that the trial court’s instruction on the heinous,
atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance was unconstitutional. Relying primarily on
Houston v. Dutton, 50 F.3d 381 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 116 S. Ct. 272 (1995),
Rickman v. Dutton, 854 F. Supp. 1305 (M.D. Tenn. 1994), and Maynard v. Cartwright, 486
U.S. 356, 108 S. Ct. 1853 (1988), the appellant argues that the term “heinous” is
unconstitutionally vague on its face, and this vagueness was not cured either through the
use of the qualifier “especially” or by the use of “depravity of mind.”
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court charged the jury on this aggravating
10
circumstance as it is set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-2-203(i)(5)(1982),2
which provided that the murder was heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture
or depravity of mind. The trial court gave the following jury instruction:
No death penalty shall be imposed unless you unanimously find that
the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt the following specified
statutory aggravating circumstance:
The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, in that it
involved torture or depravity of mind.
In determining whether or not the State has proved the aggravating
circumstance, you are governed by the following definitions:
Heinous means grossly wicked or reprehensible, abominable, odious,
vile.
Atrocious means extremely evil or cruel, monstrous, exceptionally
bad, abominable.
Cruel means disposed to inflict pain or suffering, causing suffering,
painful.
Torture means the infliction of severe physical or mental pain upon the
victim while he remains alive and conscious.
Depravity means moral corruption, wicked or perverse act.
Our supreme court has consistently held that the language of Tennessee
Code Annotated section 39-2-203(I)(5)(1982) (repealed 1989) is not unconstitutionally
vague or overbroad. State v. Dicks, 615 S.W.2d 126, 131-32 (Tenn. 1981). See also
State v. Black, 815 S.W.2d 166, 181 (Tenn. 1991); State v. Barber, 753 S.W.2d 659, 670
(Tenn. 1988).
In State v. Williams, 690 S.W.2d 517 (Tenn. 1985), our supreme court
reversed the sentence of death and remanded for a new sentencing hearing after finding
"that the court did not instruct the jury concerning the legal significance of the words
'heinous,' 'atrocious,' 'cruel,' 'torture,' or 'depravity of mind' as those terms are used in the
2
Tennessee Code annotated section 39-13-204(I)(5), effective November 1, 1989, states that the
murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond
that necessary to produce death. Although the sentencing hearing was held in 1995, the murder was
committed in 1987. Accordingly, the jury was properly charged as to the “torture or depravity of mind”
standard in existence at the time of the crim e. See State v. Cazes, 875 S.W.2d 253, 267 (Tenn . 1994), cert.
denied, 513 U.S . 1086, 11 5 S. Ct. 74 3 (1995 ); State v. Sm ith, 893 S.W .2d 908, 9 20 (Te nn. 1994 ), cert. denied,
--- U.S.---, 116 S. Ct. 99 (1995).
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aggravating circumstance defined in T.C.A. § 39-2-203(i)(5)." Id. at 532. The court found
the statute to be constitutional "so long as the abstract terms employed therein are
construed and interpreted as we have done in this opinion and other opinions of this
Court." Id. at 533. Jury instructions on the definitions are necessary to preclude "a
basically uninstructed jury" that "cannot lawfully impose the death penalty," Id. (citing
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 429, 100 S. Ct. 1759, 1765 (1980)). In the present
case, the trial court clearly instructed the jury in accordance with Williams.
Furthermore, the appellant’s reliance on federal case law is unfounded. In
Houston v. Dutton, the trial court did not instruct the jury on the definitions of any of the
terms set forth in the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance. Houston, 50
F.3d at 387. In Rickman v. Dutton, the trial court defined the terms “heinous,” “atrocious,”
and “cruel” for the jury but did not define the terms “torture” or “depravity of mind.”
Rickman, 854 F. Supp. at 1309-10. The district court held that the “especially heinous”
instruction, even as limited by the definition of heinous as “extremely wicked or shockingly
evil,” was unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 1310. The district court also held that the
instruction was vague despite the inclusion of the term “depravity of mind,” which it also
found to be unconstitutionally vague. Id. In contrast to the facts of these cases, the trial
court in the present case instructed the jury on all the definitions required under Williams.
Regardless, this court is not bound by these federal rulings. Instead, we are
only required to follow the applicable constitutional rulings of the United States Supreme
Court. See State v. Bush, 942 S.W.2d 489, 521 n.11 (Tenn. 1997); State v. McKay, 680
S.W.2d 447, 450 (Tenn. 1984); State v. Bowers, 673 S.W.2d 887, 889 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1984); see also State v. Vickers, 159 Ariz. 532, 768 P.2d 1177, 1188 n.2 (1989) (Arizona
Supreme Court refuses to follow Ninth Circuit's invalidation of Arizona death penalty
statute).
Finally, although not raised by the appellant, the jury’s application of this
aggravating circumstance is clearly supported by the record. The appellant admitted in his
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statement to police that the victim was slapped, beaten with brass knuckles, and hit with
a stick in his mouth and on his testicles. A stick was jabbed into the victim’s anus, his nose
was burned with a cigarette lighter, a knife was dropped on his chest, his wrist was
slashed, and he was forced to swallow urine. Superficial linear incisions in the form of an
“X” were slashed across the victim’s chest before the fatal stab wound. According to the
medical examiner, the victim could have lived from 5 to 30 minutes after being stabbed.
From the victim’s capture to the time of the fatal stab wound, approximately four hours
elapsed.
Based on these facts, the proof of torture is gruesome and overwhelming,
depicting acts that are abhorrent and unspeakably cruel. In essence, the facts of this case
define torture. Cf. State v. Smith, 868 S.W.2d 561, 579-80 (Tenn. 1993) (multiplicity of
wounds, infliction of gratuitous violence on victims, and needless mutilation); State v.
McNish, 727 S.W.2d 490, 494 (Tenn. 1987) (victim beaten several times and remained
alive and at least partially conscious throughout ordeal); State v. Zagorski, 701 S.W.2d
808, 814 (Tenn. 1985) (infliction of gratuitous violence and needless mutilation of victims
who were already helpless from fatal wounds).
III. INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE OF VICTIM’S RACE
AS A MOTIVE FOR THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME
The appellant contends that the state was improperly allowed to introduce
irrelevant and inflammatory evidence tending to exploit its belief that the murder of the
victim was based upon the appellant’s racist beliefs. Specifically, the appellant objects to
the testimony of Shannon Stewart, who testified that he had conversations with the
appellant on the morning of the crime in which the appellant expressed racial animosity.
The appellant contends that the prosecutor’s closing argument also improperly called on
the jury to impose the death penalty because of the appellant’s racist beliefs. We find this
issue to be without merit.
Prior to the sentencing hearing, the appellant filed a motion in limine seeking
13
exclusion of this evidence of racial belief. At the hearing on the motion, the appellant
argued that while this testimony was relevant at the first trial to show premeditation, the
state was not required to prove the elements of first-degree murder at the resentencing
hearing, and the prejudicial impact of this testimony would be extreme. The trial court took
the matter under advisement until Stewart was called as a witness, at which time it made
the following ruling:
What I needed to do and did do is read the transcript so I could understand
exactly what the questions and answers were, and it appears to me that it is
relevant, and I have conducted the requisite balancing test and find it to be
admissible, if the State chooses to introduce it.
In response to your argument that the stated basis of admissibility previously
was to prove premeditation. You have to put that in the context. That was
in a case where both phases were being tried, and the proof was being
introduced in the guilt or innocence phase, so the State would not have been
addressing that at sentencing. For purposes of this hearing, where this jury
is just hearing all this for the first time, the evaluation has to be made
independent of that totally, which, you know, for the reason I just stated, did
not address before, but it is relevant and admissible for sentencing. That is
the evaluation I have conducted, not based on what was done the last time,
because it is apples and oranges.
Stewart then testified before the jury about his conversations with the
appellant prior to the night of the murder:
[The appellant] was telling me stuff, you know, that I really didn’t, you know,
care to listen to at that age, you know, telling me like he was KKK and he
said a nigger walked up to him and said, Hi, and he hit him in his mouth and
he had a little ring on, a tiger head, and he showed me some blood in the
creases of his ring, and stuff.
Based on this proof, the state made the following argument during the final
closing argument:
The testimony in this case tells you more about Donald Middlebrooks from
the days it happened, from Shannon Stewart, than all the psychologists that
you can bring in this courtroom, from 1989 to the present. Shannon Stewart
told you more about this man than any Ph[.]D. could ever do.
****
And when we found out from his psychologist that the psychologist had
conveniently neglected to dictate on the transcription words such as we [sic]
used racial epithets. The complexity of this murder dealt with race.
****
You decide this case on evidence. W e’ve said that, and there are some
pretty ugly things in this case that are embarrassing and frightening to many
of you on the jury. What happened in this case is every mother’s worst
14
nightmare, but even so, in this case, because, no doubt, Kerrick Majors had
been told that there were a small group of people in this world who will never
like you, no matter what you do, what you become, or how you treat them.
They will only see your skin.
We note that on direct appeal, the supreme court held that Stewart’s
testimony was admissible:
The testimony is clearly relevant to show premeditation and a motive for the
victim’s brutal slaying. The testimony is also relevant to contradict the
defendant’s statement that Roger Brewington was the leader in the
commission of the offense. In addition, given the relevancy of the
statements, we find that the prejudicial effect did not substantially outweigh
their probative value. State v. Banks, 564 S.W.2d 947, 951 (Tenn. 1978).
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court correctly admitted Shannon Stewart’s
testimony about these statements.
Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d at 330.
Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-2-203 has been interpreted as only
permitting introduction of evidence relevant to punishment at the sentencing phase.
Evidence is relevant to punishment only if it is relevant to a statutory aggravating
circumstance or to a mitigating circumstance raised by the defendant. Cozzolino v. State,
584 S.W.2d 765, 767-68 (Tenn. 1979); see also State v. Adkins, 653 S.W.2d 708, 715-16
(Tenn. 1983).
Regardless, at a resentencing hearing, both the state and the defendant “are
entitled to offer evidence relating to the circumstances of the crime so that the sentencing
jury will have essential background information ‘to ensure that the jury acts from a base of
knowledge in sentencing the defendant.’” State v. Adkins, 725 S.W.2d 660, 663 (Tenn.
1987) (quoting State v. Teague, 680 S.W.2d 785, 788 (Tenn. 1984)); see also State v.
Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d 797, 813 (Tenn. 1994); State v. Nichols, 877 S.W.2d 722, 731 (Tenn.
1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1114, 115 S. Ct. 909 (1995).
In State v. Teague, 897 S.W.2d 248 (Tenn. 1995), the supreme court held
that “[e]vidence that is admissible as being relevant to the issue of guilt or innocence may
also be admissible at a resentencing hearing in support of a mitigating circumstance.” Id.
15
at 253. The issue raised on appeal in Teague was whether the defendant should be
allowed to present proof of innocence at a resentencing hearing. The supreme court noted
that the “test for admissibility is not whether the evidence tends to prove the defendant did
not commit the crime, but, whether it relates to the circumstances of the crime or the
aggravating or mitigating circumstances.” Id. at 252.
In the present case, Stewart’s testimony at the resentencing hearing was
relevant to the nature and circumstances of the murder, especially to show the appellant’s
motive and intent. From the record, it is clear that race was an integral dynamic of the
circumstances surrounding this murder, and the jury was entitled to have this base of
knowledge in sentencing the appellant.
Moreover, Stewart’s testimony was relevant to rebut the statutory mitigating
circumstances raised by the appellant. Among others, the appellant raised these statutory
mitigating circumstances: (1) the appellant acted under extreme duress or under the
substantial domination of another person, and (2) the capacity of the appellant to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct, or to conform his conduct to the requirements
of the law was substantially impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or intoxication,
which was insufficient to establish a defense to the crime, but which substantially affected
his judgment. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-203(j)(6), (8)(1982) (repealed). These mitigating
circumstances were raised to offer an explanation for the appellant’s participation in the
murder. Therefore, although Stewart’s testimony was presented during the state’s case-in-
chief rather than in rebuttal, it was still relevant to rebut the mitigating circumstances.
Stewart testified after the jury was shown the appellant’s video-taped statement to the
police. In this statement, the appellant depicted Brewington as the primary perpetrator of
the offense and attributed the racist remarks to Brewington. Clearly, Stewart’s testimony
was offered to rebut these claims by the appellant in his statement to the police.
The state was also properly allowed to address this proof during closing
arguments. It is well established that closing argument must be temperate, must be
16
predicated on evidence introduced during the trial of a case, and must be pertinent to the
issues being tried. State v. Sutton, 562 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Tenn. 1978). The prosecutor
may state an ultimate conclusion which would necessarily follow if the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses were believed by the jury. State v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530, 552
(Tenn. 1992). Moreover, both parties must be given the opportunity to argue not only the
facts in the record but any reasonable inferences therefrom. See Russell v. State, 532
S.W.2d 268, 271 (Tenn. 1976).
Based in great measure upon the role of the prosecutor in the criminal justice
system, more restrictions are placed on the state than the defendant. Coker v. State, 911
S.W.2d 357, 368 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). Accordingly, “the state must refrain from
argument designed to inflame the jury and should restrict its commentary to matters in
evidence or issues at trial.” Id. Here, the prosecutor’s argument was based on proof of the
appellant’s racial animosity and the reasonable inference that it played a significant role
in the appellant’s participation in this murder.
Finally, even if it was error to admit Stewart’s testimony and to allow the state
to address this proof during closing argument, such error was harmless in that the proof
was cumulative of other admissible evidence. See Hartman v. State, 896 S.W.2d 94, 100-
101 (Tenn. 1995). The appellant made several racial comments during his videotaped
statement to the police, which was viewed by the jury. Furthermore, Dr. Smalldon, the
defense’s expert witness, admitted that the appellant used several racial epithets while
being interviewed by him. Dr. Smalldon also testified that the appellant told him all three,
“[the appellant] and Roger and Tammy, made racial taunting remarks at the victim.”
IV. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT3
3
Although not affecting the sentence in this case, based on our review of the record, we encourage
prosecutors to refrain fro m us ing antiqua ted and in approp riate terms when referring to those who are m enta lly
ill or challen ged. W e offer this suggestion in light of our supreme court’s appointment of the Commission on
Racial and E thnic Fairness in 1995. Terms s uch as “ crazy” and “retarded,” especially when used by officers
of the court in a derisive context, reflect poorly on the entire judicial system.
17
The appellant contends that his right to due process as guaranteed by both
the Tennessee and United States Constitutions was violated because the prosecutor
argued that the victim’s family and the district attorney’s office wanted a death sentence
imposed and because the prosecutor argued that the Bible supported imposition of the
death penalty. We find that any improper closing argument was harmless error.
The standard of review in determining whether counsel was allowed too much
latitude during closing argument is abuse of discretion. Sutton, 562 S.W.2d at 823. As
previously stated, closing argument must be temperate, must be predicated on evidence
introduced during the trial of a case, and must be pertinent to the issues being tried. Id.
Based in great measure upon the role of the prosecutor in the criminal justice system, the
most restrictions are placed on the state. Coker, 911 S.W.2d at 368. Accordingly, “the
state must refrain from argument designed to inflame the jury and should restrict its
commentary to matters in evidence or issues at trial.” Id.
In reviewing the propriety of argument in a capital sentencing proceeding, the
reviewing court must determine whether the prosecutor's comments affected the
sentencing decision. State v. Irick, 762 S.W.2d 121, 131 (Tenn. 1988). "If the Court
cannot say the comments had no effect on the sentencing, then the jury's decision does
not meet the standard of reliability required by the Eighth Amendment." Id. (citing Caldwell
v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 341, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 2646 (1985)). This court has set forth
five factors to consider in determining whether any improper conduct was prejudicial:
(1) the conduct complained of viewed in the context and in light of the facts
and circumstances of the case, (2) any curative measures undertaken by the
court and the prosecution, (3) the intent of the prosecutor in making the
improper statement, (4) the cumulative effect of the improper conduct and
any other errors in the record, and (5) the relative strength or weakness of
the case.
Judge v. State, 539 S.W.2d 340, 344 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976). The adoption of these
considerations was approved by our supreme court in State v. Buck, 670 S.W.2d 600, 609
(Tenn. 1984).
While the prosecutor’s comments during closing argument were improper,
18
we find that such error did not affect the jury’s decision.
The prosecutor made the following comment, without objection, during his
final closing argument concerning the desire of the victim’s family and the district attorney
general’s office for the jury to impose the death penalty:
His family asks you to impose the death penalty. The State asks you to
impose the death penalty. The facts support it. He deserves it. Justice
demands it on the facts and the law.
Overruling the decisions in Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S. Ct. 2529,
and South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 109 S. Ct. 2207 (1989), the Supreme Court
held in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991), that if a state “chooses
to permit the admission of victim impact evidence and prosecutorial argument on that
subject, the Eight Amendment erects no per se bar. A State may legitimately conclude that
evidence about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the victim’s family is
relevant to the jury’s decision as to whether or not the death penalty should be imposed.”
Payne, 501 U.S. at 827, 111 S. Ct. at 2609. The holding in Payne was adopted by our
supreme court in State v. Brimmer, 876 S.W.2d 75, 86 (Tenn.1994).
The Supreme Court in Payne stated in a footnote:
Our holding today is limited to the holdings of Booth v. Maryland, 482
U.S. 496, 107 S. Ct. 2529, 96 L. Ed. 2d 440 (1987), and South Carolina v.
Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 109 S. Ct. 2207, 104 L. Ed. 2d 876 (1989), that
evidence and argument relating to the victim and the impact of the victim's
death on the victim's family are inadmissible at a capital sentencing hearing.
Booth also held that the admission of a victim's family members'
characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the
appropriate sentence violates the Eighth Amendment. No evidence of the
latter sort was presented at the trial in this case.
Payne, 501 U.S. at 830, n.2, 111 S. Ct. at 2611, n.2.
Here, the prosecutor improperly argued that the victim’s family members were
asking the jury to impose the death penalty. No objection was made, and therefore, no
curative measures were taken. Accordingly, the appellant has waived this issue. See
Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a). In any event, under Judge, there was no prejudice to the
appellant. There was no testimony presented during the resentencing hearing concerning
the opinion of the victim’s family as to the appropriate sentence. Moreover, this was the
19
only such comment made by the state. Accordingly, in light of the overwhelming strength
of the state’s case, the prosecutor’s statement, albeit improper, was not prejudicial. See
also State v. Ricky Thompson, No. 03C01-9406-CR-00198 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 24,
1996), perm. app. denied concurring in results only (Tenn. July 1, 1996).
As to the prosecutor’s argument that his office was asking the jury to impose
a death sentence, this type of argument has also been held improper. See Brooks v.
Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383, 1410 (11th Cir. 1985). In Brooks, the prosecutor argued that it was
the practice of the district attorney general’s office to seek the death penalty in only a few
cases. Here, the prosecutor merely stated that his office was asking for a death sentence.
As pointed out by the state, the jury already knew that the district attorney general’s office
was seeking the death penalty. Because the prosecutor did not further qualify his
argument by indicating that his office only sought the death penalty in a limited number of
cases, as in Brooks, this argument was not error. Applying the criteria set forth in Judge,
this single statement did not affect the jury’s decision.
Finally, the appellant complains about the prosecutor’s references to the
Bible:
Mr. Barrett has asked you to consider something else. He has asked you to
consider the book where the words of our Lord are written, vengeance is
mine.
This lady has come to this courtroom, not for vengeance, but to turn
this over to you, the law. If she was after vengeance, this case would have
never made it here.
The same book that says vengeance is mine says whoever sheddeth
man’s blood, whoever sheddeth man’s blood, then by man shall his blood be
shed. The Lord meant for the system of laws and justice to govern societies
wherever they are, and you are that tool of the Lord, that part of justice--
At this point, defense counsel objected. The trial judge did not agree with
defense counsel that the state had gone beyond the scope of rebuttal; however, she stated
“I do believe that I’ll ask the General to move on to something else.”
Previously, during defense counsel’s closing argument, he had argued:
20
We do not apologize for asking for mercy, asking for leniency or sympathy
for Donald Middlebrooks. Our life is given by our creator, and it is not to be
taken lightly by man or our government using the guise of due process and
the judicial system as a thinly veiled guise for vengeance; vengeance, which
I think our creator says is his and not ours.
****
What is the reason you are here? It is to decide, very simply, whether this
man is going to live or die, and I submit to you, ladies and gentlemen of the
jury, that when Donald Middlebrooks arrives at his inevitable rendezvous with
death, even in a prison cell, it should be at the time and discretion of his
maker, in whose image we are all made, and not at the artificial time selected
by the State of Tennessee, when a lever is pulled and the sanctity of human
life, in this day and time, is even further diminished by an action of the State
of Tennessee, and I submit to you, based upon all the evidence and facts in
this case, the only verdict that can be returned consistent with the law and
consistent with what the views of our society should be is that this young
man should meet his maker in a cell by the Cumberland River, Riverbend
Prison, and not at the artificial time when the State of Tennessee chooses
to usurp the prerogative of our Lord.
It is well established that it is inappropriate to make references to Biblical
passages or religious law during a criminal trial. See State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d
530, 541 (Tenn.1994) (judge's references to Biblical passage); State v. Harrington, 627
S.W.2d 345, 350 (Tenn. 1981) (foreman read biblical passages to other jury members);
Kirkendoll v. State, 198 Tenn. 497, 521-22, 281 S.W.2d 243, 254 (1955) (prosecutor's
reference to Mosaic law). Such references, however, do not constitute reversible error
unless the appellant can clearly establish that they had some effect on the verdict.
Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d at 541; Kirkendoll, 198 Tenn. at 522, 281 S.W.2d at 254.
In Kirkendoll, the prosecutor referred to the Mosaic Law during the voir dire
examination. The supreme court commented that unless such a remark clearly would have
had some effect on the verdict it did not constitute reversible error, particularly where the
trial judge remonstrated with the district attorney general and told him not to use a
reference of that kind again. Kirkendoll, 198 Tenn. at 522, 281 S.W. 2d at 254; see also,
State v. Keen, 926 S.W.2d 727, 736 (Tenn. 1994) (prosecutor’s quote from Bible and
interjection of religious law was trivial, at most, in relationship to remainder of argument
and did not effect verdict).
Upon examining the above-quoted remarks in light of the entire closing
21
argument, defense counsel’s religious references, the facts and circumstances surrounding
the case, and the overall strength of the state's case, this court finds that the improper
comments made during the state's argument did not affect the verdict to the prejudice of
the appellant.
V. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE DEATH PENALTY STATUTES
The appellant raises several challenges to the constitutionality of Tennessee
Code Annotated section 39-2-203 and -205 (1982) (repealed 1989). As acknowledged by
the appellant, our Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected these arguments. See, e.g.,
Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d at 813-14; Brimmer, 876 S.W.2d at 87-88; Cazes, 875 S.W.2d at
268-69; State v. Hutchison, 898 S.W.2d 161, 173-74 (Tenn. 1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S.
___, 116 S. Ct. 137, 133 L. Ed. 2d 84 (1995); State v. Bane, 853 S.W.2d 483, 488-89
(Tenn. 1993); State v. Smith, 857 S.W.2d 1, 21-24 (Tenn. 1993); Black, 815 S.W.2d 166,
181, 185; State v. Melson, 638 S.W.2d 342, 366-68, (Tenn. 1982).
As an intermediate appellate court, it is beyond our statutory function to
overrule the holdings of our supreme court. See Reimann v. Huddleston, 883 S.W.2d 135,
137 (Tenn. App. 1993), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 1994). Thus, we decline the invitation
to revisit these issues which have previously been decided.
VI. PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW4
Although not raised by the parties, this court is required to review death
sentences in the manner mandated by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-
206(c)(1). Here, the sentence was not imposed in an arbitrary manner. Additionally, the
evidence presented in support of the valid aggravating circumstance outweighed the
4
While the trial court filed a report with the supreme court clerk in Nashville as required by Rule 12,
Tennessee Sup rem e Co urt R ules , after the a ppe llant’s first tria l, it failed to file a new report with the Clerk or
include one in the technical record after the appellant was resentenced. H owever, our suprem e court has h eld
that the absence of this report does not necessarily preclude adequate appe llate and comparative
proportio nality review. Sm ith, 893 S.W.2d at 927.
22
evidence introduced to establish any mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.
"No two cases are alike, and no two defendants are alike." Barber, 753
S.W.2d at 665. However, a comparative proportionality review, which considers both the
nature of the crimes and of the defendant, reveals that the death sentence in this case was
neither excessive nor disproportionate. Irick, 762 S.W.2d 121; State v. O’Guinn, 709
S.W.2d 561 (Tenn. 1986); State v. Coe, 655 S.W.2d 903 (Tenn. 1983).
VII. CONCLUSION
We have carefully considered the issues raised by the appellant as to the
resentencing hearing and have determined that none has merit. Accordingly, we affirm the
appellant’s sentence of death. The sentence of death will be carried out as provided by
law on the 27th day of April, 1998, unless otherwise ordered by our supreme court.
_________________________________
CURWOOD WITT, JUDGE
CONCUR:
_________________________________
JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
_________________________________
JOE H. WALKER, III, SPECIAL JUDGE
23