Andrew Arnold v. State

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED
JULY 1998 SESSION
August 25, 1998
Cecil W. Crowson
Appellate Court Clerk
ANDREW M. ARNOLD, )
) C.C.A. No. 01C01-9712-CC-00581
Appellant, )
) Montgomery County
V. )
) Honorable Robert W. W edemeyer, Judge
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
) (Post-Conviction)
Appellee. )
)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
Gregory Smith John Knox Walkup
Attorney at Law Attorney General & Reporter
One Public Square
Suite 321 Timothy F. Behan
Clarksville, TN 37040 Assistant Attorney General
450 James Robertson Parkway
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
John Wesley Carney, Jr.
District Attorney General
Arthur Bieber
Assistant District Attorney General
204 Franklin Street, Suite 200
Clarksville, TN 37040
OPINION FILED: ___________________
AFFIRMED--RULE 20
PAUL G. SUMMERS,
Judge
OPINION
The appellant, Andrew M. Arnold, appeals the dismissal of his petition for
post-conviction relief. On August 21, 1995, the appellant pled guilty to one
count of aggravated sexual battery. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief
on March 25, 1997, and on May 12, 1997, the trial court conducted a hearing on
the petition. On October 27, 1997, the trial court dismissed the petition, stating
that the petition was not timely filed.
The appellant’s primary issue for review then is whether the trial court
properly dismissed his petition for post-conviction relief. We affirm.
The appellant contends that the post-conviction court erred by dismissing
his petition for post-conviction relief. He argues that he entered a guilty plea
based upon his attorney’s advice that he would be out of jail in one year and two
months. He contends that had he been given correct advice, he would have
asked for a jury trial. Therefore, he asserts that because his attorney gave
incorrect advice regarding his parole eligibility, his petition is governed by
Burford v. State, 845 S.W.2d 204 (Tenn. 1992).
The state argues that the post-conviction court properly dismissed the
appellant’s petition. The state contends that because the appellant’s conviction
became final on August 21, 1995, his filing of a post-conviction petition on March
25, 1997, was time barred. The state asserts that the appellant’s challenge to
his parole eligibility “is not based on a new constitutional right, new scientific
evidence, or an enhanced sentence due to an invalid conviction.” Therefore,
Burford is not applicable.
The trial court properly dismissed the appellant’s petition for relief. We
agree with the court’s determination that the appellant’s petition was time barred.
Also, Burford is not applicable in this case. Therefore, we affirm the denial of the
petition pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.
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_____________________________
PAUL G. SUMMERS, Judge
CONCUR:
_____________________________
DAVID G. HAYES, Judge
_____________________________
JERRY L. SMITH, Judge
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