State v. Ronald Tyler

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
OCTOBER SESSION, 1997
FILED
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) November 20, 1997
) No. 02C01-9706-CC-00216
Appellee ) Cecil Crowson, Jr.
) HENRY COUNTY Appellate C ourt Clerk
vs. )
) Hon. JULIAN P. GUINN, Judge
RONALD D. TYLER, )
) (Agg. assault; poss. of cocaine
Appellant ) over .5 grams with intent to sell;
) two counts possession of a
) schedule IV controlled substance;
) possession of marijuana; and
) possession of drug paraphernalia)
For the Appellant: For the Appellee:
Terry J. Leonard John Knox Walkup
Attorney at Law Attorney General and Reporter
9 North Court Square
P. O. Box 957 Kenneth W. Rucker
Camden, TN 38320 Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Justice Division
450 James Robertson Parkway
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
Robert "Gus" Radford
District Attorney General
24th Judicial District
P. O. Box 686
Huntingdon, TN 38344
OPINION FILED:
AFFIRMED
David G. Hayes
Judge
OPINION
The appellant, Ronald D. Tyler, appeals the sentencing decision of the Henry
County Circuit Court following entry of guilty pleas to two felony offenses and four
class A misdemeanor offenses. These offenses include possession of cocaine over
.5 grams with intent to sell, a class B felony, aggravated assault, a class C felony,
and the misdemeanor offenses of possession of marijuana, possession of drug
paraphernalia, and two counts of possession of a schedule IV controlled substance.
Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the appellant received a sentence of eight
years for the possession of cocaine conviction, three years for the aggravated
assault conviction, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for each of the
misdemeanor convictions. The plea agreement provided that all sentences were to
run concurrently for an effective eight year sentence. The issue of the manner of
service of the sentences was submitted to the trial court for its determination. At the
conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of split
confinement, with six months of continuous confinement in the jail followed by
supervised probation for the balance of the eight year term. The appellant now
appeals this decision contending that the sentence imposed by the trial court is not
in accordance with the principles of the Sentencing Act of 1989. Specifically, he
argues for full probation or a sentence of Community Corrections.
The proof at the sentencing hearing established that, following execution of a
search warrant at the appellant’s residence, he was found to be in possession of
42.2 grams of cocaine. The aggravated assault stems from the appellant’s aiming
of a nine millimeter pistol “at the team leader or the first [officer] in the door,” during
the execution of the warrant. At the time of the offenses, the appellant was thirty-
four years old, recently divorced, and the father of two minor children. Prior to his
arrest, he was employed at the local Farmer’s Co-Op. However, at the time of the
sentencing hearing, the appellant had been working on his family’s farm. He has no
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prior criminal history.
The record reflects that, at the sentencing hearing, the trial court properly
considered appropriate sentencing principles and all relevant facts and
circumstances. State v. Ashby, 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991). Thus, we
afford the trial court’s sentencing determination a presumption of correctness.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401(d) (1990). After performing a de novo review,
applying the presumption of correctness, we conclude that the record fully supports
the trial court’s determination.
The trial court found that “there is a decided and obvious lack of credibility in
the [appellant’s] testimony.” See, e.g., State v. Chrisman, 885 S.W.2d 834, 840
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (lack of candor sufficient to justify denial of alternative
sentence). Moreover, the court remarked that the circumstances leading to these
convictions had “all of the professional earmarks of a drug operation, the packaging,
the money, and the weapons. . . .” Accordingly, the trial court concluded that
total suspension would not be in the best interest of the public, . . . this
defendant, [and]. . .certainly [not] in the best interest of justice. I again
have considered the deterrent effect of someone who willingly and
knowingly involves themselves in drug trafficking and consider that in
rejecting it in its entirety. I am of the opinion that confinement is
necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offenses in this
case.
Moreover, the court correctly noted that, in view of the appellant’s conviction for a
class B felony, he was not entitled to the presumption favoring alternative
sentencing. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(6) (1996 Supp.). Notwithstanding,
this determination, the trial court nevertheless imposed an alternative sentence of
split confinement.
After consideration of the entire record and the controlling law, we conclude
that the sentence imposed was tempered with leniency and was clearly justified.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
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____________________________________
DAVID G. HAYES, Judge
CONCUR:
_______________________________
JOHN H. PEAY, Judge
_______________________________
PAUL G. SUMMERS, Judge
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