State v. William Parker

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON FILED
JUNE 1998 SESSION August 13, 1998
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
WILLIAM CHARLES PARKER, )
) NO. 02C01-9711-CC-00432
Appellant, )
) HENRY COUNTY
VS. )
) HON. JULIAN P. GUINN,
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) JUDGE
)
Appellee. ) (Post-Conviction)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
TERESA McCAIG MARSHALL JOHN KNOX WALKUP
308 W. Washington Street Attorney General and Reporter
P.O. Box 459
Paris, TN 38242-0459 CLINTON J. MORGAN
Assistant Attorney General
Cordell Hull Building, 2nd Floor
425 Fifth Avenue North
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
G. ROBERT RADFORD
District Attorney General
STEVEN L. GARRETT
Assistant District Attorney General
111 Church Street
P.O. Box 686
Huntingdon, TN 38344-0686
OPINION FILED:
AFFIRMED
JOE G. RILEY,
JUDGE
OPINION
The petitioner, William Charles Parker, appeals the trial court’s denial of
his petition for post-conviction relief. He received a life sentence after pleading
guilty to first degree murder and now claims the plea was the result of ineffective
assistance of counsel. The judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
I.
The petitioner, accompanied by two (2) uncles, presented himself at the
Henry County jail and stated he wished to confess to a murder. The petitioner
had previously admitted to his uncles his involvement in the murder. The officers
present instructed the petitioner not to make any statement until counsel had
been obtained.
The petitioner’s appointed counsel arrived at the jail a short time later.
The attorney was informed by the officers that they had been told by several
persons that the defendant had admitted his involvement in the murder, and that
the defendant had been seen with the victim within hours of the murder. The
petitioner informed counsel that he was worried about his “soul” and wished to
confess to clear his conscience. Counsel informed the petitioner that he could
not be forced to give a statement or testify against himself, and that the state
would be forced to prove their case against him without that evidence. Counsel
also discussed possible defenses with petitioner, including presenting evidence
of diminished capacity. Counsel testified that he advised the petitioner that if he
gave a statement, he should tell the truth.
The petitioner insisted upon making a statement and admitted
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involvement in the murder after being read his Miranda rights by the officers.1
After giving the statement, the petitioner was formally arrested and later pled
guilty to first degree murder. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the petitioner was
sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole.
II.
The petitioner contends that his guilty plea was the result of ineffective
assistance of counsel. The petitioner claims his counsel should not have
allowed him to give a statement to the police without an investigation to
determine whether such a statement was in the petitioner’s best interests.
A.
This Court reviews a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the
standards of Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930 (Tenn. 1975), and Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). The
petitioner has the burden to prove that (1) the attorney’s performance was
deficient, and (2) the deficient performance resulted in prejudice to the defendant
so as to deprive him of a fair trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687,
104 S.Ct. at 2064; Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 1996); Overton v.
State, 874 S.W.2d 6, 11 (Tenn. 1994); Butler v. State, 789 S.W.2d 898, 899
(Tenn. 1990).
The test in Tennessee in determining whether counsel provided effective
assistance is whether his performance was within the range of competence
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d at 936.
The petitioner must overcome the presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within
1
Unfortunately, the statement given by the defendant is not in the record.
Based upon the entire record, we assume the statement was incriminating.
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the wide range of acceptable professional assistance. Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065; Alley v. State, 958 S.W.2d 138, 149 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1997); State v. Williams, 929 S.W.2d 385, 389 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1996). Therefore, in order to prove a deficiency, a petitioner must show that
counsel’s acts or omissions were so serious as to fall below an objective
standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2065; Henley v. State, 960 S.W.2d
572, 579 (Tenn. 1997); Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d at 369.
In reviewing counsel's conduct, a "fair assessment . . . requires that every
effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the
circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct
from counsel's perspective at the time." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at
689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. The fact that a particular strategy or tactic failed or hurt
the defense, does not, standing alone, establish unreasonable representation.
However, deference to matters of strategy and tactical choices applies only if the
choices are informed ones based upon adequate preparation. Goad v. State,
938 S.W.2d at 369; Hellard v. State, 629 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982); Alley v.
State, 958 S.W.2d at 149; Cooper v. State, 847 S.W.2d 521, 528 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1992).
In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985), the
Supreme Court applied the two-part Strickland standard to ineffective assistance
of counsel claims arising out of a guilty plea. The Court in Hill modified the
prejudice requirement by requiring a defendant to show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. at 370.
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B.
The petitioner’s counsel did not specifically advise the petitioner against
making a statement. The failure to do so at least raises the question of the first
Strickland prong, deficient performance. However, counsel’s performance must
be judged in the light of the circumstances at the time, not from hindsight.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065.
Counsel was summoned to the jail on a Sunday afternoon and informed
he had been appointed to represent a person who wished to confess to a murder
in order to clear his conscience. Counsel had been apprised by the officers of
other evidence implicating the petitioner in the murder. Counsel fully explained
to the petitioner his constitutional right against self-incrimination, yet the
petitioner insisted upon making a statement. Counsel advised the petitioner that
if he insisted upon making a statement, to be truthful in doing so as it would inure
to his benefit in sentencing. Counsel realized that petitioner faced the possibility
of the death penalty.
In his excellent findings of fact, Judge Julian P. Guinn noted the following:
Some five days following the killing that gave
rise to the underlying case, petitioner revealed his
involvement to two of his uncles. Following
discussion, the uncles took him to the county jail for
questioning. It was during this questioning that
petitioner indicated that he wanted “get it off (his)
conscience” by admitting guilt. Questioning was
halted at that time and counsel contacted. Petitioner
was not under arrest at that time. Counsel
immediately came to the jail and conferred with both
petitioner and his uncles. Petitioner was insistent
upon admitting guilt and did so after being fully,
properly and completely informed of his constitutional
right against self-incrimination. An investigation that
revealed every iota and scintilla of evidence available
at that time would have been of no avail in view of the
petitioner’s adamant insistence upon admitting guilt.
This Court is bound by these findings unless the evidence preponderates
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otherwise. Henley v. State, 960 S.W.2d at 578; Dixon v. State, 934 S.W.2d 69,
72 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).
Based upon the circumstances surrounding the petitioner’s statement, we
are reluctant to find counsel’s performance deficient. Counsel was faced with a
client who, according to the trial court, was “adamant” in confessing to the
murder. Under the totality of the circumstances, we are unable to determine that
counsel was deficient.
This issue is without merit.
C.
In addition, the petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that he would
not have entered a plea of guilty had he not given the statement. See Hill v.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. at 320. The substance of petitioner’s
argument in this regard is that the statement was given before his cooperation
could be used as a bargaining tool for a lighter sentence.
Petitioner’s cooperation was apparently helpful in securing evidence
against his co-defendant. The defendant was offered and, in fact, received a life
sentence with the possibility of parole. Considering the evidence against the
defendant at the time of his statement and the possibility of the death penalty if
he went to trial, the petitioner has failed to show that he would not have pled
guilty absent this statement.
This issue is without merit.
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CONCLUSION
The evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that
counsel was not deficient. Further, petitioner has failed to demonstrate
prejudice. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
_________________________
JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
CONCUR:
_________________________
PAUL G. SUMMERS, JUDGE
_________________________
DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
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