State v. Reneau

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
SEPTEMBER SESSION, 1997 FILED
October 22, 1997
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) Appellate C ourt Clerk
) No. 03C01-9610-CC-00367
Appellee )
) BLOUNT COUNTY
vs. )
) Hon. D. KELLY THOMAS, JR., Judge
SUSAN RENEAU, )
) (Facilitation of Rape)
Appellant )
For the Appellant: For the Appellee:
Mack Garner Charles W. Burson
District Public Defender Attorney General and Reporter
419 High Street
Maryville TN 37804 Janis L. Turner
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Justice Division
450 James Robertson Parkway
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
Michael L. Flynn
District Attorney General
Kirk Andrews
Asst. District Attorney General
363 Court Street
Maryville, TN 37804
OPINION FILED:
REVERSED AND REMANDED
David G. Hayes
Judge
OPINION
The appellant, Susan Reneau, appeals the sentence imposed by the
Blount County Circuit Court upon her plea of guilty to the offense of facilitation of
rape, a class C felony. Pursuant to a negotiated plea, the appellant received a
sentence of three years as a range I offender. The manner of service of the
sentence was submitted to the trial court for determination. Following a sentencing
hearing, the trial court denied any form of alternative sentence and imposed a
sentence of incarceration in the Department of Correction. The appellant now
appeals this decision.
After a review of the record, we reverse the judgment of the trial court. The
appellant’s sentence is modified to reflect a sentence of probation.
I. Background
The facts of this case stem from the conduct of the appellant in permitting her
mentally retarded thirteen- year old daughter to cohabit, over a three month period,
with a twenty-nine year old man. The appellant, during this period, was thirty-five
years of age and the single parent of four teenage children. The victim possessed
the mental capabilities of a seven-year old. The appellant received various social
security disability and AFDC benefits which served as her sole source of income.
These benefits totaled approximately $900.00 per month, including $382.00
received on behalf of the victim.
The proof at the sentencing hearing established that, between March and
May of 1995, the appellant's neighbor introduced the victim to Christopher
Bernstein, who was twenty-nine years of age. The victim and Bernstein began
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dating, secretly meeting at this neighbor's residence, until the appellant's older
daughter informed her of the victim's relationship. The appellant instructed the
victim to end her involvement with Bernstein, but the victim continued to meet with
him. At this point, although not confirmed, the appellant suspected that the victim
was having sexual relations with Bernstein.
Subsequently, the victim informed the appellant that she intended to move
into a house with Bernstein and his parents. The appellant "knew [this relationship]
was wrong and had tried to talk [the victim] out of doing it, but [the victim] went
ahead and did it anyway." The appellant explained that, because she was afraid of
losing custody of her daughter, she did not seek help from the court or the
Department of Human Services to deal with her daughter's unruliness. Eventually,
the appellant agreed that the victim could live with Bernstein and his parents "until
school started in the fall." Soon thereafter, the victim told the appellant that she and
Bernstein were sharing the same bed and that she was pregnant.1 On two more
occasions, the appellant attempted to persuade her daughter to return home, but
the victim refused. The appellant explained that "she did not know [her actions]
were a crime or illegal, but she knew it wasn't right."
The appellant has no prior criminal history or convictions. She has no record
of drug or alcohol abuse.2 She cooperated with the Department of Human Services
after the facts of this case were developed. The appellant completed the eighth
grade, prematurely terminating her education to care for her two younger siblings
while her mother worked, and gave birth to her first child when she was seventeen
1
The victim resided with Bernstein from June to August 1995. T he victim’s child was born
on December 13, 1995. On August 10, 1995, Bernstein and his mother contacted the Department
of Human Services in an effort to obtain SSI benefits on behalf of the victim. In an attempt to get
the bene fits, Berns tein confe ssed to having s exual rela tions with the victim an d was a rrested.
The appellant was interviewed by law enforcement officials the following day and was
subsequently arrested on the present charge.
2
The presentence report indicates that the appellant tested positive for barbiturates in a
pre-interview drug screen. She stated, however, that the only drugs that she had take n were
ibuprofen and some "arthritis medicine" to relieve the pain of a toothache.
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years old. At the time of the sentencing hearing, the appellant had remarried. Her
current husband is employed as a shoe repairman.
The appellant testified that three of her children, her husband's son, and two
grandchildren currently reside with her and her husband. She has no behavioral
problems with these children. After the victim's relationship with Bernstein was
revealed to authorities, the victim was placed in a foster home, where she remains
with her baby. Expressing remorse over her actions, the appellant avers that she
never intended to hurt her daughter. She states that, despite this incident, she
maintains a healthy and happy relationship with the victim, visiting her twice a month
at her foster home. The appellant also has completed a three month program
involving counseling and parenting classes and she is not being monitored by the
Department of Human Services or any other governmental agency regarding the
care of her children. Moreover, she stated that she would abide by any and all
conditions imposed in connection with an alternative sentence.
In denying an alternative sentence, the trial court found that a sentence of
"[c]onfinement is necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense."
He stated that
I just can't think that the legislature intended for a mother to do this to
their child and not be punished by incarceration. There's no other
punishment. I mean, her child has been removed, but having a
conviction and being on probation is no punishment to this lady. She
doesn't work.
Additionally, the court found that
her potential or lack of potential for rehabilitation or treatment is
questionable. What needs to be rehabilitated is questionable. And
how it could be done is questionable.
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II. Analysis
When a defendant challenges the manner of service of her sentence,
this court must conduct a de novo review with the presumption that the
determination made by the trial court is correct. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-
401(d)(1990). This presumption only applies, however, if the record shows that the
trial court properly considered relevant sentencing principles. State v. Ashby, 823
S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991).
In determining the appellant's suitability for an alternative sentence, we first
decide whether the appellant is entitled to the statutory presumption that she is a
favorable candidate for alternative sentencing. State v. Bingham, 910 S.W.2d 448,
453 (Tenn. Crim. App.), perm. to app. denied to appeal denied, (Tenn. 1995) (citing
State v. Bonestel, 871 S.W.2d 163, 167 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993)). To be eligible for
the statutory presumption, a defendant must meet three requirements. The
defendant must be convicted of a class C, D, or E felony. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-
102(6) (1994 Supp.). She must be sentenced as a mitigated or standard offender.
Id. And, the defendant cannot have a criminal history evincing either a "clear
disregard for the laws and morals of society" or "failure of past efforts at
rehabilitation." Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(5). The appellant satisfies these
criteria. Accordingly, she is entitled to the presumption favoring alternative
sentencing.
This presumption may be rebutted by "evidence to the contrary."
Guidance as to what constitutes "evidence to the contrary" may be found in the
sentencing considerations codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103 (1990). Such
evidence may be found in the presentence report, the evidence presented by the
State, the testimony of the accused, or any other source provided that it is part of
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the record. Bonestel, 871 S.W.2d at 167; see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-
102(6).
In the present case, the trial court denied alternative sentencing based upon
the seriousness of the offense. A trial court's denial of an alternative sentence on
this ground can only be upheld if there is evidence in the record that indicates that
the circumstances of the offense, as committed, were especially violent, horrifying,
shocking, reprehensible, offensive, or otherwise of an excessive or exaggerated
degree, and the nature of the offense outweighs all factors favoring a sentence
other than confinement. Bingham, 910 S.W.2d at 454 (citations omitted). Although
we do not condone the appellant's behavior, we find the record absent of any proof
to support the conclusion that the appellant's actions were "especially violent,
horrifying, shocking, reprehensible, offensive, or otherwise of an excessive or
exaggerated degree." See, e.g., State v. Mitchell, No. 03C01-9411-CR-00418
(Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, July 24, 1995).
We are unable to conclude that the appellant falls within that class of
“convicted felons committing the most severe offenses, possessing criminal histories
evincing a clear disregard for the laws and morals of society and evincing failure of
past efforts at rehabilitation . . . “ Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(5). Indeed, the
appellant has no criminal history and has never been placed in a rehabilitative
program. Accordingly, we conclude that the State has failed to present sufficient
proof to overcome the presumption that "a sentence other than confinement would
result in successful rehabilitation." Mitchell, No. 03C01-9411-CR-00418 (citations
omitted). Under the facts of this record, the appellant and society would best be
served by granting a sentence other than total confinement. See Mitchell, No.
03C01-9411-CR-00418. The trial court's order imposing a sentence of incarceration
in the Department of Correction is reversed. The appellant’s sentence is
suspended and she is placed on intensive probation for three years. The
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appellant’s household is to be monitored for review of appropriate parenting skills
and for imposition of any other conditions reasonably related to the purpose of this
sentence including community service. This case is remanded for entry of judgment
consistent with this opinion.
___________________________________
DAVID G. HAYES, Judge
CONCUR:
____________________________________
JOHN H. PEAY, Judge
____________________________________
WILLIAM M. BARKER, Judge
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