Hudson v. State

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
FEBRUARY SESSION, 1997
FILED
July 16, 1997
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
JEFFREY ALLEN HUDSON ) C.C.A. NO. 03C01-9605-CC-00200
)
Petitioner/Appellant, ) BLEDSOE CO UNTY
)
)
V. ) HON. THOMAS W. GRAHAM,
) JUDGE
JAMES BOWLEN, WARDEN, )
) (HABEAS CORPUS/
Appellee. ) AGGRAVATED RAPE)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
JEFFREY ALLEN HUDSON, (pro se) JOHN KNOX WALKUP
STSRCF, Route 4 Box 600 Attorney General & Reporter
Pikeville, TN 37367
SARA M. BRANCH
Assistant Attorney General
450 James Robertson Parkway
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
JAMES MICHAEL TAYLOR
District Attorney General
JAMES W. POPE, III
Assistant District Attorney General
265 Third Avenue, Suite 300
Dayton, TN 37321
OPINION FILED ________________________
AFFIRMED
THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
OPINION
This is an appeal as of right by Jeffrey Allen Hudson from the trial
court’s order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Circuit Court
of Bledsoe County, Tennessee dismissed the petition without an evidentiary
hearing based upon a finding that the judgment of conviction was facially valid.
W e note that the fifty (50) year sentence imposed upon Petitioner in 1987 has not
yet expired. The Petitioner raises two (2) issues in his appeal. He argues that
the trial court erred by ruling the judgment of conviction was voidable rather than
void and that the trial court erred by treating his writ of habeas corpus as a
petition for post-conviction relief. W e find no merit in either one of the Appellant’s
issues, and affirm the trial court.
Appellant was convicted in the Criminal Court of Shelby County in
1987 for the aggravated rape of a twelve (12) year old child. He filed a direct
appeal from his conviction to this court. On his direct appeal, he did not
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction, but alleged
reversible error caused by the admission into evidence of “other crimes”
evidence. This court found no reversible error and affirmed the conviction. State
v. Jeffrey Allen Hudson, No. 12, Shelby County (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, filed
November 16, 1988). Subsequently, Appellant filed a petition for post-conviction
relief in the Criminal Court of Shelby County, attacking his conviction for
aggravated rape. In his petition for post-conviction relief, he alleged ineffective
assistance of counsel during the prior proceeding. The trial court dismissed the
petition for post-conviction relief and this court affirmed. Jeffrey A. Hudson v.
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State, No. 02C01-9308-CR-00183, Shelby County (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson,
filed December 7, 1994), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. 1995).
In his petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the Circuit Court of
Bledsoe County, Appellant did not allege that his sentence had expired. He did
allege that the conviction was void because the Shelby County Court lacked
jurisdiction to enter the judgment because the crime “petitioner stands convicted
of did not occur in Shelby County, Tennessee, but in all actuality occurred in
Desoto County, Mississippi.” (Emphasis in original).
Appellant requests relief by writ of habeas corpus based upon
allegations that the convicting court in Shelby County lacked venue and
jurisdiction to hear the case. In Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157 (Tenn. 1993),
the court held:
Habeas corpus relief is available in Tennessee only when “it
appears upon the face of the judgment or the record of the
proceedings upon which the judgment is rendered” that a convicting
court was without jurisdiction or authority to sentence a defendant,
or that a defendant’s sentence of imprisonment or other restraint
has expired.
Archer, 851 S.W .2d at 164.
All that is contained in the record on appeal in this case is the
Petition for W rit of Habeas Corpus, without any attachments thereto, the trial
court’s order dismissing the petition, and the Appellant’s Notice of Appeal.
However, from the opinion of this court in the direct appeal by Appellant from his
conviction, we note that he was convicted following a jury trial in the Shelby
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County Criminal Court. W e may therefore presume that venue of the offense in
Shelby County was satisfactorily proven, and jurisdiction was also proven that the
crime had occurred in the State of Tennessee and not in Mississippi. In Bomar
v. State, ex rel. Stewart, 201 Tenn. 480, 300 S.W .2d 885 (1957), a defendant
pled guilty to kidnapping, armed robbery, and grand larceny in the Criminal Court
of Montgom ery County for offenses which were committed when the defendant
was a juvenile. There was no hearing in juvenile court to transfer the case for the
defendant to be tried as an adult. However, at the defendant’s arraignment in
criminal court, he informed his attorney, the district attorney, and the trial court
that he was eighteen (18) years of age. The defendant subsequently filed a
petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging that the criminal court was without
jurisdiction to enter a judgment of conviction when he was not an adult. He
specifically alleged that the judgments were void on their face. The trial court
sustained the petition after hearing the proof of the defendant’s age at the time
of the offenses. The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed and denied the petition
for writ of habeas corpus. In so doing, that court held:
In the present case the jurisdiction of the criminal court over Stewart
depended, in so far as pertinent here, upon a certain fact, to-wit, his
age. The Trial Court made inquiry as to that fact, and found that
Stewart was eighteen years old. This finding was based upon
Stewart’s own statement to his Court appointed attorney and to the
district attorney. Such being the situation, the Court’s finding in the
matter is conclusive on collateral attack, according to the weight of
authority.
Bomar, 300 S.W .2d at 889.
W e conclude that the original trial of Appellant which led to his
conviction of aggravated rape necessarily included a finding by the trial court and
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the jury that venue, and by necessity jurisdiction, of the offense was appropriately
in Shelby County, Tennessee. This issue is without merit.
In his other issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by
treating the petition for habeas corpus as a petition for post-conviction relief and
thereby dismissing it due to being filed after the statute of limitations had expired.
The record itself reflects that this issue is totally without merit. In its
order, the trial court found that at most, the judgment of conviction was not void,
but voidable, and therefore the petition for writ of habeas corpus should be
denied. The trial court merely noted that it had authority under Tennessee Code
Annotated section 40-30-205 to treat the habeas corpus petition as a petition for
post-conviction relief under proper circumstances. However, the trial court
specifically found that it could not treat the Appellant’s petition as one for post-
conviction relief because it was not filed within the statute of limitations period
and it was not filed in the court of the county of conviction.
Finding both of Appellant’s issues to be without merit, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
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____________________________________
THOMAS T. W OODALL, Judge
CONCUR:
___________________________________
JOSEPH M. TIPTON, Judge
___________________________________
JERRY L. SMITH, Judge
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