Maurice Booker v. State

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED
MAY 1997 SESSION
June 30, 1997
Cecil W. Crowson
Appellate Court Clerk
MAURICE BOOKER, )
) C.C.A. No. 01C01-9606-CC-00271
Appellant, )
) Williamson County
V. )
) Honorable Donald P. Harris, Judge
)
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) (Post-Conviction)
)
Appellee. )
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
John H. Henderson Charles W. Burson
District Public Defender Attorney General & Reporter
C. Diane Crosier Lisa A. Naylor
Assistant District Public Defender Assistant Attorney General
407-C Main Street Criminal Justice Division
P.O. Box 68 450 James Robertson Parkway
Franklin, TN 37065-0068 Nashville, TN 37243-0493
Joseph D. Baugh, Jr.
District Attorney General
Derek K. Smith
Assistant District Attorney General
Williamson County Courthouse, Suite G-6
P.O. Box 937
Franklin, TN 37065-0937
OPINION FILED: ___________________
AFFIRMED
PAUL G. SUMMERS,
Judge
OPINION
The appellant, Maurice Booker, was convicted of the sale of cocaine and
conspiracy to sell or deliver cocaine. He received an effective sentence of
twenty years. The appellant filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that
the reasonable doubt instruction used at his trial was unconstitutional. After a
hearing, his petition was denied. He appeals challenging the constitutionality of
the reasonable doubt jury instruction. Upon review, we affirm.
The appellant contends that the trial court's reasonable doubt jury
instruction violated his constitutional rights. The jury instruction at issue reads as
follows:
Reasonable doubt is that doubt engendered by an investigation of
all the proof in the case and an inability, after such investigation, to
let the mind rest easily as to the certainty of guilt. Reasonable
doubt does not mean a captious, possible or imaginary doubt.
Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict of
any criminal charge, but moral certainty is required, and this
certainty is required as to every proposition of proof requisite to
constitute the offense.
The appellant alleges that this instruction unconstitutionally lowers the state's
burden of proving every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
Specifically, he avers that the language "let the mind rest easily" and "moral
certainty" taken together suggest to a reasonable juror a lower burden of proof
than what is constitutionally required. In support of his argument, the appellant
cites Rickman v. Dutton, 864 F. Supp. 686 (M.D. Tenn. 1994). In Rickman, the
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee found a similar
reasonable doubt instruction unconstitutional.
The Court first points out that it is not bound by rulings of the lower federal
courts or those of sister states. State v. Jones, 598 S.W.2d 209 (Tenn. 1980).
Moreover, this Court and the Tennessee Supreme Court have specifically
addressed and upheld the constitutionality of very similar reasonable doubt
instructions. State v. Nichols, 877 S.W.2d 722 (Tenn. 1994); Pettyjohn v. State,
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885 S.W.2d 364, 365 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). We find that the reasonable
doubt instruction given at the appellant's trial properly reflects the evidentiary
certainty required by the state and federal constitutions. The instruction clearly
conveyed the jury's responsibility to decide the verdict based on the facts and the
law. The appellant's contention is without merit. The judgment dismissing his
petition is affirmed.
________________________________
PAUL G. SUMMERS, Judge
CONCUR:
_____________________________
DAVID G. HAYES, Judge
_____________________________
JERRY L. SMITH, Judge
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