Grooms v. State

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE FILED
JANUARY 1997 SESSION
April 21, 1997
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
BILLY GROOMS, )
)
Appellant, ) No. 03C01-9603-CC-00136
)
) Cocke County
v. )
) Honorable W illiam R. Holt, Jr., Judge
)
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) (Post-Conviction)
)
Appellee. )
For the Appellant: For the Appellee:
Billy Grooms, Pro Se John Knox Walkup
# 101022 Attorney General of Tennessee
S.T.S.R.C.F. and
Route 4, Box 600 Eugene Honea
Pikeville, TN 37367-9243 Assistant Attorney General of Tennessee
450 James Robertson Parkway
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
Alfred C. Schmutzer, Jr.
District Attorney General
301 Sevier County Courthouse
Sevierville, TN 37862
and
James B. Dunn
Assistant District Attorney General
339A East Main Street
Newport, TN 37821
OPINION FILED:____________________
AFFIRMED
Joseph M. Tipton
Judge
OPINION
The petitioner, Billy Grooms, appeals as of right from the Cocke County
Circuit Court’s denial of his third petition for post-conviction relief which he filed in
September 1994. He is presently in the custody of the Department of Correction
serving concurrent life sentences resulting from his 1986 convictions on two counts of
first degree murder. The convictions and sentences were affirmed on appeal. State v.
Billy Grooms, No. 107, Cocke County (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 26, 1986), app. denied
(June 30, 1986). The petitioner contends (1) that his petition is not barred by the three-
year statute of limitations then existing for post-conviction claims and (2) that he may
still raise constitutional violations that were previously unknown to him at the time of his
earlier post-conviction litigation. We disagree.
In substance, the present petition contends (1) that his right to
confrontation was violated when hearsay statements of a nontestifying codefendant
were admitted at trial, (2) that due process was violated by the admission of his
statements by the codefendant after they unsuccessfully sought a severance because
of incompatible defenses, (3) that his trial, appellate and post-conviction counsel were
ineffective by failing to preserve and present various issues, and (4) that his removal
from safety valve early parole eligibility violated due process and constituted ex post
facto enhancement of punishment. His asserted reason for not raising the trial issues
before is his ignorance and reliance upon attorneys who were ineffective. The trial
court ruled that the petition seeking relief from his 1986 convictions was time barred
and that it had no jurisdiction over the petitioner’s parole complaints.
At the times in issue, there was a three-year statute of limitations for the
filing of post-conviction actions. See T.C.A. § 40-30-102 (repealed 1995). The
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exceptions were quite limited, essentially dealing with there being no reasonable
opportunity existing during the limitations period to file a claim on the ground raised.
See, e.g., Burford v. State, 845 S.W.2d 204 (Tenn. 1994); Watkins v. State, 903
S.W.2d 302 (Tenn. 1995) (petitioner insane during limitations period); Wooden v. State,
898 S.W.2d 752 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (delayed disclosure of exculpatory evidence
withheld by state). However, a petitioner’s mere claim of ignorance of the facts or
issues does not toll the statute of limitations even if that ignorance stems from reliance
upon counsel’s advice relative to post-conviction claims. See State v. Phillips, 904
S.W.2d 123 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). In any event, a claim of ineffective assistance of
prior post-conviction counsel presents no excuse for not raising existing constitutional
claims. See House v. State, 911 S.W.2d 705, 712 (Tenn. 1995). Thus, when viewed in
the context of having three previous reviews of his convictions, two being by means of
post-conviction actions, the petitioner’s claims of ignorance and reliance upon
ineffective counsel are for naught relative to tolling the statute of limitations. The
statute of limitations applies so as to bar the post-conviction petition in this case relative
to the murder convictions.
As for the petitioner’s claim that he was wrongfully stripped of his early
parole eligibility under the safety valve statute, the trial court was correct in concluding
that it was without jurisdiction to determine the claim. Issues involving Department of
Correction prisoner release computations are not cognizable in a post-conviction case
and must be pursued under the Administrative Procedure Act. See Slagle v. Reynolds,
845 S.W.2d 167 (Tenn. 1992). Moreover, we note that the early release eligibility issue
raised by the petitioner has been rejected relative to another prisoner. See Kaylor v.
Bradley, 912 S.W.2d 728 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). In any event, it is not a justiciable
issue in this case.
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In consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, the judgment
of the trial court is affirmed.
____________________________
Joseph M. Tipton, Judge
CONCUR:
__________________________
Gary R. Wade, Judge
__________________________
William M. Barker, Judge
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