State of Tennessee v. Jackie H. Martin

FILED
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON March 24, 2008
MAY SESSION, 1996
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate Court Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
) No. 02C01-9512-CR-00374
Appellee )
) SHELBY COUNTY
vs. )
) Hon. W. Fred Axley, Judge
JACKIE H. MARTIN, )
) (Petition For Discharge From
Appellant ) Involuntary Commitment)
For the Appellant: For the Appellee:
A. C. Wharton, Jr. Charles W. Burson
District Public Defender Attorney General and Reporter
Walker Gwinn Robin L. Harris
Asst. Public Defender Assistant Attorney General
201 Poplar, Suite 2-01 Criminal Justice Division
Memphis, TN 38103 450 James Robertson Parkway
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
: John W. Pierotti
District Attorney General
Ms. Edgar A. Peterson, IV
Asst. District Attorney General
Criminal Justice Complex
Third Floor, 201 Poplar
Memphis, TN 38103
OPINION FILED:
REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED
David G. Hayes
Judge
OPINION
The appellant, Jackie H. Martin, appeals the order entered by the Criminal
Court of Shelby County denying his petition for discharge from involuntary
commitment.1 On appeal, the appellant presents two issues for our review: (1)
whether the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that the
appellant is not eligible for mandatory outpatient treatment as an alternative to
commitment; and (2) whether the trial judge should have recused himself from
this case.
After a review of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the
evidence at the appellant's hearing preponderates against the decision of the
trial court. Accordingly, we remand this case to the trial court for entry of an
order discharging the appellant to mandatory outpatient treatment consistent with
the plan proposed by the superintendent of the mental health facility.
I. Background
On August 4, 1981, a Shelby County Grand Jury indicted the appellant for
one count of "throwing a missile calculated to produce death or great bodily harm
at an occupied vehicle" and three counts of assault.2 On October 19, 1981,
Judge James Beasley found the appellant not guilty by reason of insanity.
Accordingly, the appellant was involuntarily committed to Western Mental Health
Institute, WMHI, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-604 (1981 Supp.). On
December 27, 1985, the staff of WMHI recommended the appellant's discharge
1
This court has jurisdiction to entertain this appeal pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-6-
110(g) (1996 Supp.).
2
The indictm ent arose from an incident on June 23, 1981, when the appellant threw a
beer bottle, and then, a brick at a Mem phis Police Departm ent squad car. Following this action,
the appellant apparently engaged several police officers in a physical confrontation.
2
to a mandatory outpatient treatment program.3 However, while Judge W. Fred
Axley took this recommendation under advisement, staff members at WMHI
reexamined the appellant and determined that his condition had deteriorated to
the extent that the appellant required continued confinement.4
In 1989, Judge Axley approved the appellant's placement in a group
home in Trenton, pursuant to a mandatory outpatient treatment plan. Because
of the appellant's progress at the group home, Judge Axley permitted the
appellant to complete a two week stay at the training center in Smyrna for skills
evaluation. However, by early 1991, the appellant's mental condition had
regressed.5 Moreover, the appellant violated his treatment plan by having a knife
in his room and by drinking alcohol.6 In response to these violations, Judge
Axley returned the appellant to the hospital for inpatient care.
The appellant continued to meet the commitment standards imposed by
Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-6-104 (1994 Supp.) and § 33-7-303(c) (1994 Supp.)
throughout early 1994. However, in July 1994, staff members of WMHI notified
Judge Axley, that, after the required six month evaluation of the appellant, they
determined that, if "supportive community services [could] be worked out," the
3
Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-6-201 (1994 Supp.) provides that a patient involuntarily
com m itted, who, in addition to m eeting other enum erated requirem ents, rem ains m entally ill or is
suffering from a m ental illness in rem ission and whose condition is likely to rapidly deteriorate
without continued treatm ent shall be eligible for discharge subject to the obligation to participate in
a m edically appropriate outpatient treatm ent plan approved by the releasing facility and the
outpatient treating professional.
4
Judge Axley was the lead prosecutor in the appellant's 1981 crim inal case. The
appellant argues that Judge Axley's prior involvem ent in his case necessitates his recusal, see
infra, Section III.
5
The record indicates that the appellant was experiencing hallucinations and was
frequently agitated.
6
Apparently, the appellant indicated to staff m em bers that he needed the "knife for
protection." Moreover, the appellant's treatm ent records reflect that he "displayed a great deal of
paranoia in regard to the group hom e staff (who were all black . . . ) and in regard to the black
residents of the hom e."
3
appellant would not meet the necessary commitment standards.7 Again, in
September and December 1994, the staff advised Judge Axley that the appellant
would not meet commitment standards if placement in an outpatient treatment
program were available, however, such services were not available at the time.
In June 1995, the staff informed Judge Axley that a structured supervised
community placement was available for the appellant, that they had developed a
mandatory outpatient treatment plan for the appellant, and that they had
informed the appellant of his legal obligation to comply with the terms of the
outpatient program. On July 5, 1995, Judge Axley heard the appellant's petition
requesting discharge from inpatient hospitalization into an outpatient treatment
program.
The only witness to testify at the discharge hearing was Dr. Pickering, a
psychologist at Western Mental Health Institute. He testified that he has been
involved with the appellant's treatment since 1991. He stated that the appellant
is mentally ill. "[The appellant] continues to show some of the negative signs of
schizophrenia, but . . . he is not actively psychotic at this time and is in partial
remission as a result of his treatment." Commenting on the appellant's progress,
Dr. Pickering explained that the appellant remained on a "plateau" for the first
several years, but, beginning in 1992, when given new medication, the appellant
exhibited "steady improvement."8 The doctor also stated that, indicative of his
current behavior, the appellant recently, voluntarily "walked away from" a
potential physical confrontation initiated by another patient. Furthermore, the
appellant has retained full privileges at the center and has not displayed any
aggressive behavior. When questioned about the failure of prior outpatient
treatment, Pickering asserted that they have redesigned the appellant's
7
The staff recom m ended that hospitalization of the appellant continue until they could
provide such outpatient services.
8
The appellant began treatm ent with Clozaril, an atypical antipsychotic drug that becam e
available in 1992.
4
proposed outpatient treatment plan to account for the appellant's treatment with
Clozaril.9 He added that case managers would be available to the appellant on a
twenty-four hour basis.
Dr. Pickering maintained that the appellant does not meet the
commitment standards of Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-6-104. However, he did
concede that the appellant could be "unable to avoid severe impairment or injury
from specific risk," if he does not comply with his medication and treatment, and
that the appellant has a history of noncompliance. Moreover, he acknowledged
that, without continued treatment, the appellant's mental illness is likely to
depreciate to the "point that the patient will pose a likelihood of serious harm."
Dr. Pickering agreed that his answers relating to the appellant's condition
focused on his observations of the appellant "at this time," and that there were
no guarantees that the appellant would comply with the program, or that the
appellant would not pose "substantial harm to the community."
Judge Axley denied the appellant's petition, stating:
The personnel involved in Mr. Martin's life, other than this Court,
really have no idea of his history. Before Mr. Martin committed the
assault on the officers . . . he had a history of violence. It's
something that's been ongoing in his life.
. . . What we're saying . . . is that he has been stabilized
emotionally by medication, but he, also, has a history of
noncompliance.
He does possess the propensity to become a danger to others and
quickly in Mr. Martin's case. Mr. Martin functions well at the
hospital. He does not appear to this Court to be in a position to
function well because he needs very, very close supervision.
An outpatient treatment plan is not sufficient to meet Mr. Martin's
needs because of what has been shown through prior occasions of
his release in group home settings or boarding house settings.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
9
He stated that Clozaril requires weekly m onitoring and blood tests of a patient.
5
The appellant argues that the evidence preponderates against the trial
court's decision denying his discharge to legal mandatory outpatient treatment as
specified in Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-6-201 (1994 Supp.). Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-
6-110(c), (f) (1994 Supp.), sets forth the procedure concerning the discharge of
one involuntarily committed. The provision states:
When the superintendent determines that the patient is eligible for
discharge under § 33-6-109 or § 33-6-201, he shall notify the
committing court of that conclusion, the basis for it, and, if
discharge is pursuant to § 33-6-201, the outpatient treatment plan
approved by the releasing facility for the patient. Such
determination by the superintendent shall constitute a rebuttable
presumption of correctness thereof. . . .
. . .[I]f the court finds by clear, unequivocal, and convincing
evidence that the patient is not eligible for discharge . . . it shall
order his return to the hospital . . . . If the court finds otherwise, it
shall order the patient's release from involuntary commitment in
accordance with the recommendations of the superintendent.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-6-110(c),(f) (emphasis added). See also State v. Tripp,
754 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988).
The appellant asserts that the record is replete with reports supporting his
discharge. Moreover, the appellant adds that the trial court's decision cannot be
afforded a presumption of correctness, because it is not based on evidence at
the hearing. Appellate review of a lower court's denial of discharge is "de novo
upon the record of the trial court with a presumption of correctness of the finding,
unless the evidence preponderates otherwise." State v. Groves, 735 S.W.2d
843, 844 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987) (citing Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d)); see also
Tripp, 754 S.W.2d at 94; State v. Woolard, No. 03C01-9510-CC-00296 (Tenn.
Crim. App. at Knoxville, July 25, 1996). After a review of the record, we
conclude that the evidence does not support a denial of the appellant's discharge
from involuntary confinement.
At the hearing, Dr. Pickering stated that the appellant satisfies the
standards for discharge to an outpatient treatment program as outlined in Tenn.
6
Code Ann. § 33-6-201. Dr. Pickering testified that the appellant is suffering from
a mental illness, Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-6-201(b)(1)(A); that the patient's
condition is likely to deteriorate rapidly unless treatment is continued, Tenn.
Code Ann. §33-6-201(b)(1)(B); that the patient would continue treatment if legally
required to do so, Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-6-201(b)(1)(C); that the patient is not
likely to participate in continued treatment without the legally required mandate,
Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-6-201(b)(1)(D); and that mandatory outpatient treatment
is a less drastic alternative to commitment, Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-6-201(b)(1)(E).
Dr. Pickering's testimony indicates that the appellant qualifies for discharge
under Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-6-201 and § 33-6-110.
Dr. Pickering testified that, although he could not guarantee the
appellant's future behavior, since his recommitment in 1991, the appellant has
shown considerable improvement and has not exhibited any aggressive
behavior. He also indicated that the appellant's improvement is connected to his
treatment with Clozaril, which only became available in 1992, after the
appellant's recommitment. Further, when questioned about the appellant's prior
failure to comply with mandatory outpatient treatment, Dr. Pickering explained
that significant safeguards have been implemented to aid the appellant's
compliance with the proposed treatment plan, including case management
services, which were previously unavailable,10 and weekly blood tests performed
at the Mental Health Center, which include testing for drug and alcohol abuse.
The trial judge correctly considered the appellant's history of violent and
aggressive behavior and noncompliance with a previous outpatient program.
Additionally, we share the trial court's apprehension concerning the appellant's
ability to successfully complete the prescribed outpatient treatment program.
10
Pickering explained that case m anagers are available on a twenty-four hour basis. Their
duties include visiting the patient frequently, ensuring that the patient is taking m edication, and
ensuring that the patient keeps appointm ents.
7
Nonetheless, our review is limited to the proof in the record and the applicable
law. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the appellant's past behavior,
untreated by Clozaril, provides clear and convincing evidence supporting a denial
of outpatient treatment. The record indicates that the appellant's condition has
improved since his recommitment in 1991. Moreover, as Dr. Pickering testified,
the appellant's prior noncompliance was considered in formulating a new plan for
outpatient treatment, which provides closer monitoring of the appellant. Despite
this evidence, the State offered no proof to rebut the expert medical testimony of
Dr. Pickering. We conclude that these facts, accompanied by a presumption of
correctness, preponderate against the decision of the trial court. In the
appellant's case, mandatory outpatient treatment is a suitable less drastic
alternative to commitment. Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-6-201(b)(1)(E). Accordingly,
the appellant is entitled to discharge from involuntary commitment.
III. Recusal of Judge Axley
The appellant also contends that he was denied a fair hearing because
"Judge Fred Axley is biased against [him] as a matter of fact and presumptively
biased because Judge Axley was the State lawyer who prosecuted the
indictments against Martin. . . ." Because we have determined that the evidence
preponderates against the trial court's decision, we need not address the
appellant's final issue. However, due to the ongoing nature of this proceeding
and the potential for future proceedings in this case before Judge Axley, we
conclude that the circumstances of this case do not mandate his recusal.
Initially, we note that the appellant raises Judge Axley's recusal for the
8
first time in this appeal.11 The failure of the appellant to raise this issue prior to
his hearing amounted to a waiver of his right to question the trial judge's
qualifications to hear the case. Woodson v. State, 608 S.W.2d 591, 593 (Tenn.
Crim. App.), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 1980); see also State ex rel.
Roberts v. Henderson, 442 S.W.2d 629, 631 (Tenn. 1969) (holding that the right
of a defendant to waive the disqualification of a judge exists in both civil and
criminal cases). Accord Hawkins v. State, 586 S.W.2d 465, 466 (Tenn. 1979).
Accordingly, the appellant has waived this issue. Nonetheless, a further
discussion of this issue is warranted.
The appellant argues that Article 6, Section 11 of the Tennessee
Constitution prohibits Judge Axley from presiding over his case. This
constitutional provision provides:
No judge . . . shall preside on the trial of any cause in the event of
which he may be interested, or where either of the parties shall be
connected with him by affinity or consanguinity, within such
degrees as may be prescribed by law, or in which he may have
been of counsel, or in which he may have presided in any Inferior
Court, except by consent of all the parties.
TENN . CONST ., Art. VI, § 11 (emphasis added). See also Tenn. Sup. Ct. Rule
10, Canon 3(C)(1)(a), (C)(1)(b). Although Art. 6, Sec. 11 appears to disqualify
Judge Axley from this matter, since he was the lead prosecutor in the original
cause, case law has held that the disqualifying provision is limited to "the cause
on trial . . . and not prior concluded trials. . . ." See State v. Smith, 906 S.W.2d
6, 12 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (citing State v. Warner, 649 S.W.2d 580, 581
(Tenn. 1983) (holding trial judge not disqualified on grounds that he was the
prosecuting attorney in an earlier case against the appellant)). This
interpretation, likewise, applies to the present case. The appellant also contends
11
Appellate counsel (an assistant public defender) insists that the appellant's trial counsel
(also an assistant public defender) "did not know Judge Axley prosecuted the case." The record
am ply provides m aterial (orders, stipulations, etc.) noting Judge Axley as the lead prosecutor in
the State's case against the appellant. Additionally, appellate counsel's argum ent suggesting that,
even if trial counsel was aware of Judge Axley's form er position, this would am ount to a denial of
due process via State action, is without m erit.
9
that he never consented "for his former prosecutor to judge him." However, the
appellant clearly gave his implied consent by failing to raise the issue of recusal
prior to this present appeal. Judge Axley has presided over various matters
relating to the appellant's involuntary confinement since 1983.
Regardless of whether the appellant consented to Judge Axley's hearing
of the matter, the record does not support the appellant's allegation that Judge
Axley's ruling was due to his personal bias against the appellant. A trial judge
should recuse himself whenever he has any doubt as to his ability to preside
impartially in a criminal case or whenever his impartiality can reasonably be
questioned. State v. Hines, 919 S.W.2d 573, 578 (Tenn. 1995) (citing State v.
Cash, 867 S.W.2d 741, 749 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993); Lackey v. State, 578
S.W.2d 101, 104 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978)); see also State v. Smith, 906 S.W.2d
6, 11 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (citing Tenn. Sup. Ct. Rule 10, Canon 3(C); State
v. Dillingham, No. 03C01-9110-CR-00319 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, Feb. 3,
1993), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 1993)). As a general principle, the trial
judge retains discretion over his recusal when questioned on the basis of bias or
prejudice. Smith, 906 S.W.2d at 11(citing Caruthers v. State, 814 S.W.2d 64, 67
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1991)). Unless the evidence in the record indicates that the
trial judge abused his discretion by not disqualifying himself, this court will not
interfere with his decision. Id. (citing Caruthers, 814 S.W.2d at 67).
In the present case, although Judge Axley was the lead prosecutor in the
appellant's original case, we cannot conclude that this prior involvement caused
him to rule impartially and prejudicially. In fact, the record shows that Judge
Axley previously ruled favorably on the appellant's behalf. Additionally, the
record indicates that Judge Axley did not use the benefit of prior knowledge
arising from his dealings as State prosecutor in his decision denying the
appellant's discharge. Rather, Judge Axley's knowledge of the appellant's
10
background arises from his prior involvement as a judge in the appellant's cause.
Nonetheless, the appellant suggests that Judge Axley's interruption of the Dr.
Pickering's direct examination and his comments during the doctor's cross-
examination were affirmative indicators of his preconceived decision to deny the
appellant's discharge.12 We conclude that these comments were not prejudicial
in nature, nor do they reflect bias for the State's position. Rather, these
comments were necessary in making a determination whether to discharge the
appellant into the community. Accordingly, Judge Axley did not abuse his
discretion in failing to recuse himself from presiding over the appellant's hearing.
This issue is without merit.
IV. Conclusion
After finding that the evidence presented at the discharge hearing is not
sufficient to deny the appellant's release from involuntary commitment, we
remand this case to the trial court for entry of an order, consistent with the
procedure set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-6-110, discharging the appellant
from involuntary confinement into the mandatory outpatient treatment program
proposed by the superintendent. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-6-201(d)(2)(A),
(B). However, with forethought that the appellant's condition may have changed
since the trial court's denial in July 1995, we advise that, prior to any release of
the appellant, the superintendent must again provide a current report supporting
his recommendation that the appellant be discharged to a mandatory outpatient
treatment program. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-6-110(c), (f). Additionally, we
note that, if the appellant does not comply with the terms of his outpatient
12
During Dr. Pickering's direct exam ination, Judge Axley com m ented that the hospital had
not kept good records due to the frequency of em ployee turnover. However, he added that the
court did keep good records relating to the appellant's condition. Additionally, Judge Axley
questioned Dr. Pickering about the appellant's "history of noncom pliance while being placed in a
group hom e" and about where the appellant would be placed if discharged (Selm er, rather than
Mem phis).
11
program, statutory measures exist by which to recommit the appellant to
involuntary hospitalization. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-6-202 (1996 Supp.).
____________________________________
DAVID G. HAYES, Judge
CONCUR:
___________________________________
JOE B. JONES, Presiding Judge
___________________________________
PAUL G. SUMMERS, Judge
12