Johnnie Lamont Dalton v. State of Tennessee

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
JANUARY 2000 SESSION
FILED
February 1, 2000
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate Court Clerk
JOHNNIE LAMONT DALTON, )
) M1999-00369-CCA-R3-PC
Appellant, )
) Davidson County
v. )
) Honorable Seth Norman, Judge
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
) (Post Conviction Relief)
Appellee. )
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
THOMAS A. LONGABERGER PAUL G. SUMMERS
69 Arcade Attorney General & Reporter
Nashville, Tennessee 37219
DAVID H. FINDLEY
Assistant Attorney General
425 Fifth Avenue North
2nd Floor, Cordell Hull Building
Nashville, Tennessee 37243-0493
AFFIRMED
L. T. LAFFERTY, SENIOR JUDGE
OPINION
The appellant, Johnnie Lamont Dalton, appeals the Davidson County Criminal
Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. On May 5, 1997, the defendant
entered a plea of guilty to murder second degree during the voir dire of a jury, wherein he
was charged with the offense of murder first degree. The petitioner, collaterally, attacks
his guilty plea and conviction for murder second degree upon the grounds of ineffective
assistance of counsel. More specifically, he contends that trial counsel failed to (a)
adequately investigate and prepare for trial; (b) failed to interview and subpoena state
witnesses; and (c) failed to subpoena potential witnesses, including one witness who the
defendant contends would have established that the defendant was not the murderer. The
petitioner asserts that were it not for the above actions, he would not have pled guilty on
the mistaken advice of counsel.
After a review of the record, we AFFIRM the trial court’s denial of post-conviction
relief.
ANALYSIS
On May 8, 1998, the petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief
alleging that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel, and therefore, he did not
knowingly and voluntarily enter his guilty plea. The trial court appointed counsel on May
12, 1998. An evidentiary hearing was held on March 26, 1999. On March 30, 1999, the
trial court entered an order denying the petition for post-conviction relief.
In dismissing the petition, the trial court found, in parts pertinent to this appeal:
The transcript of the guilty plea in this case clearly shows that
the petitioner was advised of these rights. There is no proof in
that transcript that would lead the Court to believe the contrary.
In addition, at the time of the entry of the plea the petitioner
told the Court that he was satisfied with his lawyers....
***
In the case at hand, there is no proof that would indicate that
the representation of the petitioner was anything other than
excellent. He had three very fine attorneys. Each of the three
are experienced and knowledgeable. This Court can find no
proof that would substantiate a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel.
To succeed in a post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the
petitioner must show, by clear and convincing evidence that the services rendered by trial
counsel were deficient and that, but for the deficient performance, the results of the
proceeding would have been different. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-210(f) (1997). Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). When this Court undertakes
review of a lower court’s decision on a petition for post-conviction relief, the lower court’s
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finding of facts are given the weight of a jury verdict and are conclusive on appeal absent
a finding that the evidence preponderates against the judgment. See Davis v. State, 912
S.W.2d 689, 697 (Tenn. 1995). Unfortunately, the record does not contain a transcript of
the guilty plea hearing. However, after reviewing the record, we conclude that the evidence
does not preponderate against the dismissal entered by the trial court.
At the evidentiary hearing, Ms. Wendy Tucker, Assistant Public Defender, testified
that she and the defendant had a good working relationship, but on one occasion he
wanted her replaced by another attorney. Ms. Tucker stated that she filed a number of
motions prior to trial. She had also subpoenaed two alibi witnesses, Shandell Booker and
Barbara Booker. On the day of trial, Ms. Tucker described the defendant as being nervous
as one would be going to trial on murder first degree. Ms. Tucker testified that, prior to the
luncheon break of the voir dire of the jury, she was approached by Ms. Mary Hausman,
Assistant District Attorney General, that a witness, whom Ms. Tucker had subpoenaed,
peeked in the courtroom door and saw the defendant. The witness then became hysterical
and definitely identified the petitioner as the shooter. During Ms. Tucker’s investigation,
this witness had informed Ms. Tucker, through an investigator, that he could not identify
the petitioner in a lineup. Thus, Ms. Tucker had subpoenaed this witness. Ms. Tucker
stated that she advised Mr. Mike Engle, a co-attorney in the Public Defender’s Office,
about what had happened. Mr. Engle had represented the petitioner in the past on his first
murder conviction. Ms. Tucker and Mr. Engle, and Ms. Tucker's co-counsel, Ms. Sheila
Jones, talked to the petitioner. That is when the petitioner learned about the new
development of the witness.
As to the witness, Vanessa Green, Ms. Tucker testified that she decided not to
subpoena this witness. The witness had testified at the preliminary hearing that the
petitioner was the shooter. She had testified that she knew the petitioner from school, but
the petitioner was in prison during this school period. Ms. Tucker believed it was not
strategically feasible to call a witness just to prove that her identification of the defendant
in a lineup was not credible.
Joseph M. Engle, Assistant Public Defender, testified that he had represented the
petitioner in the past for criminal offenses. During the course of Ms. Tucker’s
representation, Mr. Engle and Ms. Tucker had talked many times about the merits of the
petitioner’s case. As to Ms. Tucker’s representation, Mr. Engle testified that Ms. Tucker
has always properly prepared for trial. He had reviewed her file and believed she was
exceptionally well prepared. On the day of the guilty plea, Mr. Engle described the
petitioner as nervous, anxious, and frustrated. The petitioner was able to articulate
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questions that both went to the nature of the plea bargaining offer and to Ms. Tucker’s
appraisal of his prospects of the trial. The petitioner was able to listen to the answers and
able to debate those questions. In Mr. Engle’s opinion, the petitioner was coherent and
competent.
As to his guilty plea, the petitioner testified that his testimony before the judge was
not voluntarily and knowingly, because he did not understand the law. As to Ms. Tucker’s
representation, the petitioner testified that she did not interview any state witnesses in
preparation for trial, especially Patrick Elrat. The petitioner testified that he took the plea
upon advice of counsel after a lack of investigation and preparing for a murder case. The
petitioner wanted Ms. Tucker to subpoena Vanessa Green, because he felt this was a
potential witness who could help his case. The petitioner did not call any other witnesses
in support of his petition.
The totality of the circumstances in this case indicates that the petitioner’s plea of
guilty was given both voluntarily and knowingly. Although the petitioner testified at the
post-conviction hearing that he did not understand the law and pleading procedure at the
time he pled guilty, the petitioner had apparently been through this process before. He
admitted to pleading guilty to another murder charge in 1992 under nearly identical
circumstances and had accepted his punishment. At the time this plea was entered on
May 5, 1997, the petitioner stated under oath that he was satisfied with his representation
by Wendy Tucker, Sheila Jones, and Mike Engle. The court also advised him of his rights
and the consequences of a guilty plea. As a result, we find no error of law requiring
reversal. The judgment of the trial court in dismissing the petitioner’s petition for post-
conviction relief is affirmed.
L. T. LAFFERTY, SENIOR JUDGE
CONCUR:
JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
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