Alonzo C. Williams v. State

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
FILED
AT KNOXVILLE August 10, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
MARCH 1999 SESSION Appellate C ourt
Clerk
ALONZO C. WILLIAMS, * C.C.A. # 03C01-9806-CR-00203
Appellant, * KNOX COUNTY
VS. * Hon. Mary Beth Leibowitz, Judge
STATE OF TENNESSEE, * (Post-Conviction)
Appellee. *
For Appellant: For Appellee:
Alonzo C. Williams, pro se John Knox Walkup
c/o B.M.C.X. Attorney General and Reporter
P.O. Box 2000
Wartburg, TN 37887 Ellen H. Pollack
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Justice Division
425 Fifth Avenue North
Nashville, TN 37243
Randall E. Nichols
District Attorney General
City-County Building
Knoxville, TN 37902
OPINION FILED:__________________________
AFFIRMED
GARY R. WADE, PRESIDING JUDGE
OPINION
The petitioner, Alonzo C. Williams, appeals the trial court's dismissal of
his petition for post-conviction relief, his third in the last fourteen years. In this
appeal of right, the single issue presented for review is whether the petition was
barred by the statute of limitations.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
On November 22, 1983, the petitioner was convicted of two counts of
third degree burglary after an alarm led to his discovery in an elevator shaft utilized
by both the Southern Railway Salvage Company and the Southern Kitchen Supply
Company in Knoxville. Because the petitioner had several prior felony convictions, 1
including at least one offense in South Carolina which was relied upon by the state
as one of the three requisite predicate offenses, he was declared a habitual criminal.
In consequence, each of the burglary sentences was enhanced to life terms. On
direct appeal, the conviction was affirmed. State v. Alonzo Clinton Williams, No.
980 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Nov. 20, 1984).
In 1985, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging
the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After a full evidentiary hearing, the trial
court denied relief. This court affirmed. Alonzo Williams v. State, No. 1100 (Tenn.
Crim. App., at Knoxville, Mar. 4, 1987). Application for permission to appeal was
denied. See Alonzo Clinton Williams v. State, No. 1283 (Tenn. Crim. App., at
Knoxville, Feb. 27, 1990).
1
The record indicates that four Tennessee convictions were utilized by the state in the habitual
criminal proceeding.
2
A second petition filed in 1988 in which the petitioner challenged the
validity of a 1980 guilty plea to larceny in excess of $200 was also denied. Alonzo
Clinton Williams v. State, No. 03C01-9110-CR-00331 (Tenn. Crim. App., at
Knoxville, Apr. 23, 1992). Application for permission to appeal was denied July 6,
1992. The third petition was filed on April 1, 1998. The trial court dismissed the
petition as barred by the statute of limitations.
The original Post-Conviction Procedure Act of 1967 did not include a
statute of limitations. Effective July 1, 1986, the General Assembly adopted a
three-year statute of limitations. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102 (repealed 1995). In
consequence, any petitioner whose judgment had become final before July 1, 1986,
had only three years thereafter to file a petition for post-conviction relief. State v.
Masucci, 754 S.W.2d 90 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988).
In 1995, our legislature passed the new Post-Conviction Procedure Act
which is applicable to all petitions filed after May 10, 1995. It shortened the statute
of limitations to one year:
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c), a
person in custody under a sentence of a court of this
state must petition for post-conviction relief under this
part within one (1) year of the date of the final action of
the highest state appellate court to which an appeal is
taken or, if no appeal is taken, within one (1) year of the
date on which the judgment became final, or
consideration of such petition shall be barred. The
statute of limitations shall not be tolled for any reason,
including any tolling or saving provision otherwise
available at law or equity. ... Except as specifically
provided in subsections (b) and (c), the right to file a
petition for post-conviction relief or a motion to reopen
under this chapter shall be extinguished upon the
expiration of the limitations period.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-201(a).
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Under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-202(b), courts may not consider a
petition for post-conviction relief if it is filed outside the one-year statute of limitations
unless "(1) [t]he claim in the petition is based upon a final ruling of an appellate
court establishing a constitutional right that was not recognized at the time of trial, if
retrospective application of that right is required ...; (2) [t]he claim in the petition is
based upon new scientific evidence establishing that such petitioner is actually
innocent of the offense or offenses for which the petitioner was convicted, or (3)
[t]he claim asserted in the petition seeks relief from a sentence that was enhanced
because of a previous conviction and such conviction in the case in which the claim
is asserted was not a guilty plea with an agreed sentence, and the previous
conviction has subsequently been held to be invalid...."
The issues raised by the petitioner in his third petition pertain to
whether he was properly found to be a habitual criminal. He claims that the state
improperly relied upon one or more of the South Carolina offenses which were more
than ten years old; that he was not represented by effective counsel in one or more
of the prior proceedings which resulted in convictions; that he was denied juvenile
transfer hearings in 1963 and 1964 convictions; and that he was denied his
constitutional right to due process and equal protection.
The trial court dismissed the petition because the grounds raised had
been previously determined and because the statute of limitations barred further
post-conviction review.
In 1983, when the petitioner was found to be a habitual criminal, the
definition was as follows:
Any person who has either been three (3) times
convicted within this state of felonies, not less than two
4
(2) of which are among those specified in §§ 39-2-103,
39-605 [repealed], 39-2-111, 39-2-112, 39-2-640, 39-6-
417(a)(1)(A), 40-20-112 or were for a crime punishable
by death under existing law, but for which the death
penalty was not inflicted, or who has been three (3) times
convicted under the laws of any other state, government
or country of crimes, not less than two (2) of which, if
they had been committed in this state, would have been
among those specified ... shall be considered, for the
purposes of this part, and is declared to be an habitual
criminal, provided that petit larceny shall not be counted
as one of such three (3) convictions, but is expressly
excluded; and provided, further that each of such three
(3) convictions shall be for separate offenses, committed
at different times, and on separate occasions.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-1-801 (1982 Repl.).
Here, the petition is clearly time-barred under both the three-year and
one-year statutes of limitations. Furthermore, there are other procedural obstacles
which would restrict any review of the merits of the petitioner's claims. See
generally, State v. Prince, 781 S.W.2d 846 (Tenn. 1989) (a petitioner must establish
the invalidity of the predicate offenses before he can attack a habitual criminal
sentence); and House v. State, 911 S.W.2d 705 (Tenn. 1995) (concepts of waiver
and previous determination under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-112(a), repealed in
1995, may constitute procedural bars in a post-conviction claim). Finally, there is no
time limit on the underlying convictions which would support a determination of
habitual criminality. State v. Sullivan, 644 S.W.2d 429 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982).
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
________________________________
Gary R. Wade, Presiding Judge
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CONCUR:
_____________________________
Norma McGee Ogle, Judge
_____________________________
Cornelia A. Clark, Special Judge
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