State of Tennessee v. Anthony P. Geanes

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON FILED
MAY SESSION, 1998 June 8, 1998
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
STATE OF TE NNE SSE E, ) C.C.A. NO. 02C01-9709-CC-00373
)
Appellee, )
) HARDEMAN COUNTY
V. )
)
) HON. JON KERRY BLACKWOOD,
ANTHONY P. GEANES, ) JUDGE
)
Appe llant. ) (DEL IVERY OF SCHEDULE II DRUG)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
JOHN C. MASK, JR. JOHN KNOX WALKUP
P.O. Box 611 Attorney General & Reporter
Bolivar, TN 38008
CLINTON J. MORGAN
Assistant Attorney General
2nd Floor, Cordell Hull Building
425 Fifth Avenu e North
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
ELIZABETH T. RICE
District Attorn ey Ge neral
JERRY W. NORWOOD
Assistant District Attorney General
302 M arket Stre et
Somerville, TN 38068
OPINION FILED ________________________
AFFIRMED
THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
OPINION
The Defen dant, An thony P . Gean es, app eals as o f right from his conviction
in the Circuit Court of Hardeman County. Following a jury trial, Defendant was
convicted of delivery of a Sche dule II con trolled sub stance . He was senten ced to
serve fifteen (15) years as a Range II Offender. In this appeal, Defendant
challenges the sufficien cy of the ev idence and the length of his sentence. We affirm
the judgm ent of the tria l court.
When an accused challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, the
stand ard is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyon d any re ason able doubt. Jack son v. V irginia, 443 U.S. 30 7, 319 (1979 ).
On appeal, the State is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and
all inference s therefro m. State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W .2d 832, 83 5 (Tenn. 19 78).
Because a verdict of guilt removes the presumption of innocence and replaces it with
a presumption of guilt, the accused has the burden in this court of illustrating why the
evidence is insuffic ient to s uppo rt the ve rdict retu rned b y the trie r of fact. State v.
Tug gle, 639 S.W .2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982); State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476
(Tenn. 19 73).
Questions concerning the credibility of the witnes ses, the w eight and value to
be given the evidence, as well as all factual issues raised by th e evidence, are
resolved by the trier of fa ct, not this co urt. State v. Pappas, 754 S.W.2d 620, 623
(Tenn. Crim. A pp.), perm. to appeal denied, id. (Tenn. 198 7). Nor ma y this court
reweigh or reevalu ate the ev idence . Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d at 835. A jury verd ict
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approved by the trial judg e accre dits the Sta te’s witnesse s and re solves all co nflicts
in favor of the State. Grace, 493 S.W .2d at 476 .
Sylvester Island worked with the Drug T ask Forc e in 1996 and w as pa id
$100.00 each day he served as a confidential informant. He knew the Defendant as
“Money G.” On A ugust 1 5, 1996 , he saw the Defe ndant at Defenda nt’s bro ther’s
home and told Defendant that he needed a “sixteen th.” A “s ixteent h” refe rs to a b ig
rock of crack cocaine. T hey dis cuss ed m eeting the ne xt day a t Defe ndan t’s
brothe r’s home . On Au gust 16, 1996, Investigator Barrett Stevens put a video
camera in Island’s c ar and p rovided h im with $100.00 to purchase the cocaine.
Jarhonda Parker, the Defendant’s girlfriend, accompanied him to purchase the
cocaine from the Defen dant.
Island and Parker drove to Defendant’s brother’s home and Defendant
approached their car. Island asked him, “You got that sixteenth for me?” Defendant
stated that he had it, reach ed in h is pock et and gave Is land a n obje ct wrap ped in
paper while Island gave Defendant $100.00. Island drove to me et Stevens an d gave
the objec t wrappe d in pape r to him. N o one e lse hand led the ob ject.
Investigato r Barrett Stevens with the Bolivar Police Department worked with
Sylvester Island several times per week. On Augus t 16, 1996 , before Isla nd left to
meet with the Defendant, Stevens searched him and his car and then put a video
camera in his car to videotape the transaction. After Island completed the
transaction, he met Steven s at the Nationa l Guard Arm ory. Island gave Stevens a
white piece of paper, and when Stevens unfolded it, there appeared to be a large
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rock of crack cocaine. Stevens put the substance in a sealed envelope and then
delivered it to the crime lab.
Kay Sheriff is a fo rensic scientist for the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation
and works in the crime lab. She received and tested this object and determined that
the substance was six-tenths (0.6) of a gram of a Schedule II cocaine base
substa nce.
Jarhonda Parker testified that she accom panied Island to m eet with
Defendant. Parker knew the Defendant and recognized him when he handed the
object to Island. A vide otape of the trans action was sh own to the jury.
The Defendant testified that Island approached him o n Aug ust 16 , 1996 at his
brothe r’s home. Defendant gave him so me “s peed ” pills for w hich Is land p aid
Defendant $50.00. Defendant stated that these pills were not cocaine and that he
has ne ver sold co caine.
Defendant conte nds th at the e videnc e is insu fficient a s there was re ason able
doubt regarding the d rug transaction and whether the Defendant actually handed the
cocaine to Island. It is an offense to kn owingly deliver a controlled substance. Tenn.
Code Ann. § 39-17-417(a)(2). In the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier
of fact could have determined that Defendant delivered the controlled Sched ule II
substance of cocain e to Island . This de livery was te stified to by Island and Parker,
in addition to a videota pe of the d rug trans action. Any questions concerning the
credibility of witnesses and th e factu al issue s have previo usly been determined by
the trier of fact, and we will not reevalua te the evide nce. Th is issue is w ithout me rit.
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Defendant also cha llenges th e length o f his sente nce, arg uing that th e trial
court failed to apply appropriate mitigating factors. When an accused challenges the
length, range or the manner of service of a sentence, this court ha s a duty to
conduct a de novo review of the sentence with a presumption that the determinations
made by the trial court are correct. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35 -401( d). Th is
presumption is “con ditione d upo n the a ffirmativ e sho wing in the record that the trial
court considered the sentencing principles and all relevant fa cts and c ircums tances .”
State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991). The Defendant failed to include
the transcript from the sentencing hearing for our review, and it is his duty to prepare
an adeq uate re cord in order to allow fo r a me aning ful revie w on appeal. Tenn. R.
App. P. § 24(b ); State v. Bunch, 646 S.W .2d 158 , 160 (T enn. 19 83); State v.
Robe rts, 755 S.W .2d 833, 836 (Tenn. Crim . App. 1988 ). In absence o f that record
which is essential for our review, we m ust presu me th at the tria l court’s ruling is
correct and we are precluded from co nsidering the issue . State v. Richardson, 875
S.W .2d 671, 674 (Tenn. Crim . App. 1993 ).
We affirm the ju dgme nt of the trial co urt.
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____________________________________
THOMAS T. W OODALL, Judge
CONCUR:
___________________________________
JOHN H. PEAY, Judge
___________________________________
PAUL G. SUMMERS , Judge
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