State v. Christopher Prentiss

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
JANUARY 1997 SESSION
FILED
May 19, 1997
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
) Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
APPELLEE, )
) No. 02-C-01-9604-CR-00112
)
) Shelby County
v. )
) Joseph B. Brown, Jr., Judge
)
) (Sentencing)
CHRISTOPHER A. PRENTISS, )
)
APPELLANT. )
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
Terry D. Smart John Knox Walkup
Attorney at Law Attorney General & Reporter
371 Carroll Avenue 500 Charlotte Avenue
Memphis, TN 38105 Nashville, TN 37243-0497
Clinton J. Morgan
Assistant Attorney General
450 James Robertson Parkway
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
William L. Gibbons
District Attorney General
201 Poplar Avenue, Suite 3-01
Memphis, TN 38103
John W. Campbell
Assistant District Attorney General
201 Poplar Avenue, Suite 3-01
Memphis, TN 38103
OPINION FILED:_____________________________________
AFFIRMED
Joe B. Jones, Presiding Judge
OPINION
The appellant, Christopher A. Prentiss, (defendant), was convicted of vehicular
homicide, a Class C felony, leaving the scene of an accident involving death, a Class E
felony, and driving a motor vehicle after revocation of license, following his pleas of guilty
to these offenses. The trial court imposed the following sentences pursuant to the plea
bargain agreement between the State of Tennessee and the defendant: a fine of $500 and
confinement for three (3) years in the Shelby County Correctional Center for vehicular
homicide; confinement for one (1) year in the Shelby County Correctional Center for
leaving the scene of an accident involving death; and a fine of $150 for driving after the
revocation of driver's license. The sentences are to be served concurrently.
There was no agreement regarding alternative sentencing. A sentencing hearing
was conducted. The trial court refused to impose an alternative sentence. Thus, the
defendant raises the following issues for review:
I. The trial judge erred in not considering sentencing principles
and all relevant facts and circumstances in determining the
manner of service of defendant's sentence[s].
II. Whether the manner of service of the sentence[s] imposed
by the trial court [are] appropriate.
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs submitted by the parties, and the law
governing the issues presented for review, it is the opinion of this Court the judgment of the
trial court should be affirmed.
The defendant was 28 years of age when he was sentenced. He left school in the
ninth grade. He made an effort to obtain a GED, but he failed the test. He was living with
his parents. He was employed by a farm equipment company in the parts department. He
has a prior conviction for driving without a license.
On the evening of September 24, 1993, the defendant visited his girlfriend in a
trailer park in Millington. When an argument ensued between the defendant and his
girlfriend, the defendant left the trailer at a high rate of speed. Witnesses estimated the
defendant reached a speed of sixty miles per hour in a thirty mile per hour speed zone.
The defendant struck the victim, a child three and one-half years of age. The impact
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knocked the child approximately 168 feet. The defendant did not stop after striking the
child.
The defendant went to the Millington Police Department approximately two hours
after striking the child. The officers observed that the defendant had been drinking. The
defendant refused to submit to a chemical breath test or field sobriety tests. Two officers
expressed the view the defendant's ability to operate a motor vehicle was not impaired.
The trial court refused to impose an alternative sentence. The court found the
defendant was less than candid when he testified at the sentencing hearing, and
confinement was necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offenses. The
court also noted the defendant was not serious regarding the remorse he expressed. The
defendant testified how the incident had affected him. The defendant did not offer to make
restitution.
This Court has conducted a de novo review of the record with a presumption that
the determinations made by the trial court are correct. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401(d).
Before an accused is entitled to relief, the accused has the burden of overcoming the
presumption of correctness. In this case, the defendant has failed to overcome the
findings of the trial court.
The defendant's lack of candor at the sentencing hearing is sufficient to justify the
denial of an alternative sentence. State v. Chrisman, 885 S.W.2d 834, 840 (Tenn. Crim.
App.) per. app. denied (Tenn. 1994); State v. Smith, 735 S.W.2d 859, 863 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1987). In vehicular homicide cases, the avoidance of depreciating the seriousness
of the offenses is a valid consideration. Thus, the trial court in the exercise of its discretion
properly refused to grant an alternative sentence.
_____________________________________________
JOE B. JONES, PRESIDING JUDGE
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CONCUR:
______________________________________
PAUL G. SUMMERS, JUDGE
______________________________________
DAVID G. HAYES, JUDGE
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