State v. Gary Cooper

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
AUGUST SESSION, 1997
FILED
GARY L. COOPER, ) September 10, 1997
) No. 02C01-9610-CC-00334
Appellant ) Cecil Crowson, Jr.
) LAKE COUNTY Appellate C ourt Clerk
vs. )
) Hon. JOE G. RILEY, JR., Judge
BILLY COMPTON, WARDEN, )
) (Writ of Habeas Corpus)
Appellee )
For the Appellant: For the Appellee:
GARY L. COOPER, Pro Se CHARLES W. BURSON
L.C.R.C.F., Rt 1, Box 330 Attorney General and Reporter
Tiptonville, TN 38079
CLINTON J. MORGAN
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Justice Division
450 James Robertson Parkway
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
C. PHILLIP BIVENS
District Attorney General
P. O. Box E
Dyersburg, TN 38024
OPINION FILED:
AFFIRMED PURSUANT TO RULE 20
David G. Hayes
Judge
OPINION
The appellant, Gary Cooper, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his pro
se petition for writ of habeas corpus. On April 25, 1994, the appellant pled guilty
to one count of rape in the Knox County Criminal Court and was sentenced to
eight years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The
appellant filed the instant petition on August 19, 1996, alleging that the judgment
entered against him is void because the indictment failed to allege the mens rea
of the offense charged. The trial court properly dismissed the petition on the
basis that "allegations concerning the sufficiency of the indictment are not the
proper subject of habeas corpus relief." See Haggard v. State, 475 S.W.2d 186,
187 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971); Brown v. State, 445 S.W.2d 669, 674 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1969); Barber v. State, No. 01C01-9408-CR-00281 (Tenn. Crim. App. at
Nashville, Feb. 23, 1995). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of the
petition.
Moreover, upon further review, we find the substance of the appellant's
claim without merit. In order for an indictment to satisfy both constitutional and
statutory guidelines, it must contain the material elements of the offense and
must sufficiently apprise the accused of the offense he is called upon to defend.
State v. Tate, 912 S.W.2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995); see also Tenn.
Code Ann. §40-13-202 (1990); State v. Perkinson, 867 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1992). As applicable to the present case, rape is defined as the "unlawful
sexual penetration of a victim by the defendant" and "force or coercion is used to
accomplish the act." Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-501(a)(1) (1991). No requisite
mental state is included in the definition of the offense. When the legislature
fails to define a specific mental state in the definition of an offense, proof of
either intent, knowledge, or recklessness suffices to establish the culpable
mental state. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-301(c)(1991). Accordingly, the
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accused's mental state is not a material element of the offense and need not be
included in the indictment. State v. Dison, No. 03C01-9602-CC-00051 (Tenn.
Crim. App. at Knoxville, Jan. 31, 1997). Other panels of this court have upheld
the validity of indictments under similar challenges. See e.g., Slagle v. State,
No. 03C01-9704-CR-00145 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, June 25, 1997);
State v. Vann, No. 03C01-9602-CC-00066 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, June
10, 1997); State v. James, No. 01C01-9601-CR-00016 (Tenn. Crim. App. at
Nashville, Mar. 27, 1997); State v. Burrell, No. 03C01-9404-CR-00157 (Tenn.
Crim. App. at Knoxville, Feb. 11, 1997).
The indictment in the present case, reads, in pertinent part:
. . . That Gary Cooper. . . unlawfully and feloniously did sexually
penetrate [the victim] . . .by force and coercion. . . .
(emphasis in original). Contrary to the appellant's assertions, the allegations in
the indictment sufficiently apprise the accused of the offense of rape.
Consequently, we find the indictment valid.
The trial court's dismissal of the appellant's petition for writ of habeas
corpus is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.
____________________________________
DAVID G. HAYES, Judge
CONCUR:
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___________________________________
JERRY L. SMITH, Judge
___________________________________
THOMAS T. WOODALL, Judge
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