State of Tennessee v. Robert Willis Chance, Jr.

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
OCTOBER SESSION, 1996
FILED
December 4,
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) 2001
) No. 02C01-9605-CC-00178
Appellee ) Cecil Crowson, Jr.
) HARDIN COUNTY Appellate Court Clerk
vs. )
) Hon. C. Creed McGinley, Judge
ROBERT WILLIS CHANCE, JR., )
) (Second Degree Murder;
Appellant ) Attempted First Degree Murder)
For the Appellant: For the Appellee:
James T. "Jim" Sanderson Charles W. Burson
& Associates, P.C. Attorney General and Reporter
Stephen L. Hale
William G. Hatton William David Bridgers
Attorneys for Appellant Assistant Attorney General
P. O. Box 331 Criminal Justice Division
Bolivar, TN 38008 450 James Robertson Parkway
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
G. Robert Radford
District Attorney General
John Overton
Asst. District Attorney General
601 Main Street
Savannah, TN 38372
OPINION FILED:
AFFIRMED
David G. Hayes
Judge
OPINION
The appellant, Robert Willis Chance, pled guilty to one count of second
degree murder and one count of attempted first degree murder. Pursuant to the
plea agreement, the sentences were to be served concurrently. The Hardin
County Circuit Court imposed a sentence of twenty-three years for each
conviction. In his sole issue, the appellant contends that the trial court erred in
imposing twenty-three year sentences because of the misapplication of Tenn.
Code Ann. § 40-35-210 (1995 Supp.), regarding the presumptive sentence of a
class A felony.
Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I. Background
On the night of July 9, 1995, the appellant walked into the woods near his
family's home armed with an SKS assault rifle and with the intention of
committing suicide. Later, when his parents could not locate him, they began
searching the woods. Hidden by the foliage, the appellant heard his father
"belittling" him to his mother. Inflamed by these remarks, the appellant emerged
from the woods and stated "Daddy, you've hurt mama around thirty years. And
you're not going to hurt no [sic] more." The appellant then began firing his
weapon. His mother was hit once in the leg. His father was shot four times,
which resulted in his death. Concerned for his mother's welfare, the appellant
telephoned 911 to obtain assistance. He informed the operator that he and his
parents were "under fire" by an "unknown" assailant. The appellant later
abandoned this story and admitted his guilt. The appellant was indicted on one
count of first degree murder and one count of attempted first degree murder.
2
On December 4, 1995, the appellant pled guilty to one count of second degree
murder and to one count of attempted first degree murder. A sentencing
hearing was held on January 11, 1996.
At the sentencing hearing, the proof revealed that the appellant had a
troubled relationship with his father that had stemmed from years of physical and
emotional abuse. Moreover, the appellant's psychiatric history involved chronic
depression, relationship difficulties, sleeping problems, a variety of neurological
complaints, "suicidal ideations," and borderline personality disorder. The trial
court found two enhancement factors and one mitigating factor applicable to the
appellant's second degree murder conviction and three enhancement factors
and one mitigating factor applicable to his attempted first degree murder
conviction.1 To determine the appropriate length of the appellant's sentence, the
trial court began at the midpoint of the applicable range.2 Applying this
procedure, the trial court imposed twenty-three year sentences for each
conviction.
II. Analysis
1
Specifically, the trial court found that (1) the appellant has a history of criminal
convictions or criminal behavior; (9) the appellant employed a firearm during the commission of
the offense; and, applicable only to the attempted first degree murder conviction, that (6) the
personal injuries inflicted upon the victim were particularly great. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114(1995 Su pp.). The only mitigating factor applied was Tenn . Code A nn. § 40-35-11 3(8) (1990),
that the app ellant was s uffering fro m a m enta l cond ition that s ignificantly reduced his cu lpability.
In his appeal, the appellant does not contest the applicability of these factors.
2
The trial court stated,
As I read the law on a class A sentence, the court is to start with a
pres um ptive sente nce at the m idpoint of the rang e. . . . That's as opp ose d to
Class B, C, D, and E where you start at the minimal sentence and work up and
then down. On a class A felony, the sentence, pursuant to the terms of Section
40-35-210, Subsection C, the presumptive sentence starts at the midpoint of the
range. And then the Court applies enhan cing factors and then m itigating factors
from there.
. . . And th e m idpoint of his rang e, it wou ld be fifteen to twenty-five. [See
Tenn. C ode Ann. § 40-35-112(a)(1) (1990).] So obviously, the m ath em atic ally
equation lends itself to a twenty year sentence to start with.
Neither side entered any objection to this procedure.
3
In his only issue, the appellant contends that, in arriving at twenty-three
year sentences, the trial court misapplied Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210 by
setting the presumptive sentence for a class A felony, with applicable
enhancement and mitigating factors, at the midpoint of the range. He insists that
the "plain language" of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210 directs sentencing courts
to set the presumptive sentence for a class A felony at the midpoint of the range
only if there are no enhancement factors and no mitigating factors. The State
contends that such application of this section leads to a result that is clearly
contrary to the legislature's intent in amending Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210(c).
We agree.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210 provides, in parts pertinent to this issue:
(c) The presumptive sentence for a Class B, C, D, and E felony
shall be the minimum sentence in the range if there are no
enhancement or mitigating factors. The presumptive sentence for
a Class A felony shall be the midpoint of the range if there are no
enhancement or mitigating factors.
(d) Should there be enhancement but no mitigating factors, then the
court may set the sentence above the minimum in that range but
still within the range.
(e) Should there be enhancement and mitigating factors, the court
must start at the minimum sentence in the range, enhance the
sentence within the range as appropriate for the enhancement
factors, and then reduce the sentence within the range as
appropriate for the mitigating factors.
When read alone, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210(e) sets the presumptive
sentence for a class A felony, where both enhancement and mitigating factors
apply, at the minimum sentence within the range. However, when construing the
meaning of a statutory provision, courts must ascertain and give effect to the
intent of the legislature. Roseman v. Roseman, 890 S.W.2d 27, 29 (Tenn. 1994)
(citation omitted); Lyons v. Rasar, 872 S.W.2d 895, 897 (citation omitted). To
determine legislative intent, courts must look to the entire statute and to the
overall purpose of the legislation. Lyons, 872 S.W.2d at 897; see also West
4
American Ins. Co. v. Montgomery, 861 S.W.2d 230, 231 (Tenn. 1993) (citation
omitted).
In 1995, the Tennessee legislature amended Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-
210(c) by adding that "[t]he presumptive sentence for a Class A felony shall be
the midpoint of the range if there are no enhancement or mitigating factors." No
similar change was made to subsections (d) and (e). Thus, applying the
appellant's "plain language" reading of the statute, a class A felon who commits
an offense where the trial court finds only enhancement factors or both
enhancement and mitigating factors applicable may very well receive a shorter
sentence than a felon committing a class A offense involving no enhancement or
mitigating factors. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210(c), (d), (e). This would
produce an absurd result. We presume that the legislature did not intend such
an absurdity in enacting this statute. See McClellan v. Bd. of Regents of State,
921 S.W.2d 684, 689 (Tenn. 1996); Epstein v. State, 366 S.W.2d 914, 918
(Tenn. 1963). Accordingly, "such a result will be avoided if the terms of the
statute admit of it by a reasonable construction." Epstein, 366 S.W.2d at 918.
(emphasis added).
With consideration of the public's growing concern over violent crimes,
defendants committing class A felonies should not be entitled to a presumptive
sentence at the minimum of the sentencing range. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-
35-210(c) (retaining the presumptive sentence for class B, C, D, and E felonies
at the minimum but increasing the presumptive sentence for class A felonies to
the midpoint of the range). Moreover, it is difficult to conceive that the legislature
would have intended a longer sentence for a class A felony without an
enhancement factor than for a class A felony with an enhancement factor.
Thus, we conclude that the presumptive sentence for all class A felonies is the
5
midpoint of the applicable sentencing range.3 Accordingly, the trial court's
imposition of twenty-three year sentences, in the instant case, are appropriate.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
____________________________________
DAVID G. HAYES, Judge
CONCUR:
____________________________
JOHN H. PEAY, Judge
____________________________
PAUL G. SUMMERS, Judge
3
Although this issue has never specifically been addressed by the courts of this state, our
courts have s tated that, effective July 1, 1995, the presum ptive sentence for all class A felonies
sha ll be within th e m idpoint in the ra nge . See, e.g., State v. Sm ith, 926 S.W .2d 267, 271 (Tenn.
Crim . App . 1995); State v. Johnson, No. 01C01-9507-CC-00242 at note 4 (Tenn. Crim. App. at
Na shville, Sept. 30, 1996); State v. Boshears , No. 01C01-9412-CR-00402 (Tenn. Crim. App. at
Na shville, Nov. 15, 1995).
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