Pehlman v. Pehlman

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
FILED
February 27, 1998
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
PATRICIA ANNE PEHLMAN, ) KNOX CIRCUIT
)
Appellant ) NO. 03A01-9708-CV-00339
)
v. ) HON. WILLIAM K. SWANN, III
) JUDGE
GREGORY LAWRENCE )
PEHLMAN, )
)
Appellee )
)
and )
)
SOBIESKI, MESSER & )
ASSOCIATES, )
) VACATED and
Intervenor ) REMANDED
Robert L. Crossley, Knoxville, for Appellant.
Wanda G. Sobieski, Knoxville, for Intervenor.
OPINION
INMAN, Senior Judge
At the outset we think it well to observe what this case is not about: the
enforcement of a lien for attorney fees.
What the case is about is whether the motion of the plaintiff-wife
[hereafter Wife], to discharge the purported lien claimed by the erstwhile
attorney for Husband should have been granted, and specifically whether
Husband should have the opportunity to “resolve his dispute” with the
Intervenor, as provided for in the judgment.
Intervenor Sobieski represented the defendant/husband [hereafter
Husband] in this divorce case during pre-trial procedures. She then
withdrew, with approval of the Court. Husband engaged other counsel and
the case was ultimately settled, with the residence of the parties, owned by
them as tenants by the entirety, being awarded to the Wife.
Before the case was settled and judgment entered, the Intervenor filed a
Notice of Attorney’s Lien, pursuant to T.C.A. § 23-2-102, against “the
property located at 1947 Grenada Boulevard, Knoxville, Tennessee, 37922 in
the amount of $34,555.15 for unpaid legal fees and expenses.” This property
was owned by the parties as tenants by the entirety.
After the final decree was entered, Wife filed a motion to discharge the
lien, asserting its invalidity. We note that only a statutory lien was asserted.
The settlement was announced in open Court, approved by the judge
and thereafter reduced to judgment duly entered, which provides, as pertinent
here, that
“Husband shall be solely responsible for immediately resolving
his dispute with Wanda Sobieski so that her attorney lien is
removed from the residence.”
After argument of counsel, with no evidentiary hearing, the trial judge
declined to discharge the lien, holding that it was both statutory and
equitable, and emphasizing that Wife had knowledge of it and stressing the
reference to it in the final decree.
Wife appeals, insisting that the lien is invalid under well-settled
principles, one being that the lien described in T.C.A. § 23-2-102 applies only
to the amount the attorney recovers for his client, see, Hudson v. Elk, 1989
WL 11875, and that Intervenor recovered nothing for her erstwhile client.
Intervenor responds that her fees were contractual, and that any
property owned by her then client was subject to a lien, but that in any event
Wife waived any objections to the legality of the lien by entering into the
settlement which recognized it.
Intervenor also claims that her lien extends to the interest of Wife,
whom she did not, of course, represent.
Our review of the findings of fact made by the trial Court is de novo
upon the record of the trial Court, accompanied by a presumption of the
correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is
otherwise. TENN. R. APP. P., RULE 13(d).
We think these arguments and the judgment below overlook a crucial
point: the judgment ordered Husband to resolve his dispute with his former
attorney.1 Whether the dispute concerned the amount of the fee, or the
purported lien, or both, does not appear, but in any event we think that
Husband should be accorded the opportunity, as the judgment provides, to
resolve his dispute with Intervenor, not only as to the amount of the fee, but
as to the validity of the lien.
The language “resolve his dispute” is vague and uncertain, to a marked
extent. Intervenor interprets the words to mean, simply put, payment of the
fee, in which event she will release the lien. But we think the words are
susceptible of a larger meaning; otherwise the Court would simply have
ordered Husband to pay the fee. We think that, in view of the attorney-client
relationship, the husband must be given the benefit of any reasonable doubt
as to the meaning of the words because the cases clearly hold that such
matters must be closely scrutinized. See, Alexander v. Inman, 903 S.W.2d
686 (Tenn. 1986); Adams v. Mellon, 616 S.W.2d 485 (Tenn. App. 1981).
The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded for an evidentiary
resolution of the reasonableness of the fee and the validity of the asserted
1
The assets of the parties consisted principally of a mortgaged residence and some term life insurance
policies. Intervenor’s fees are nearly $35,000.00. Inquiry at argument revealed that this unusually high
amou nt was br ought a bout ov er custod y squab bling.
lien. Costs are assessed to the Intervenor.
____________________________
William H. Inman, Senior Judge
CONCUR:
_______________________________
Houston M. Goddard, Presiding Judge
_______________________________
Herschel P. Franks, Judge