Mike G. Pauley v. Madison County, Madison County Penal Farm, David Woolfork, Madison County Sheriff, Penal Farm Superintendent, Captain Jackson

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN SECTION AT JACKSON
______________________________________________
MIKE G. PAULEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Madison Chancery No. 51128
Vs. C.A. NO. 02A01-9607-CH-00161
MADISON COUNTY, MADISON COUNTY
PENAL FARM, DAVID WOOLFORK,
Madison County Sheriff, Penal Farm
Superintendent, CAPTAIN JACKSON,
Penal Farm Head Controller (Acting Warden),
SGT. JERED, 1st Shift Sergeant, SGT. EVANS,
3rd Shift Sergeant, OFFICER STEVE HORNER,
OFFICER CLEO KING,
Defendants-Appellees,
____________________________________________________________________________
FROM THE MADISON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
THE HONORABLE JOE C. MORRIS, CHANCELLOR
Mike G. Pauley, Pro Se
James I. Pentecost; Waldrop & Hall, P.A., of Jackson
For Defendants-Appellees
REVERSED AND REMANDED
Opinion filed:
W. FRANK CRAWFORD,
PRESIDING JUDGE, W.S.
CONCUR:
HOLLY KIRBY LILLARD, JUDGE
HEWITT P. TOMLIN, JR., SENIOR JUDGE
Plaintiff, Mike G. Pauley, an inmate at the Madison County Penal Farm (Penal Farm),
appeals from an order of the trial court dismissing his pro se complaint against the defendants,
which include Madison County, the Penal Farm, and several of the Penal Farm’s personnel.1
In the complaint filed in the chancery court, the plaintiff alleges that, on April 24, 1995,
while he was incarcerated at the Penal Farm, he sustained injuries when another prisoner
attempted to escape through the ceiling area above his bed. At that time, the plaintiff was
serving a sentence for his fourth D.U.I. conviction. The plaintiff alleges that while he was
sleeping in his cell, the other prisoner caused a ceiling panel to fall and strike the plaintiff in the
lower back area. The plaintiff further alleges that the defendants were aware of his pre-existing
spinal condition and that he suffered injuries that aggravated this condition.
The plaintiff avers that the defendants failed to properly supervise his living area and that
they showed gross negligence and deliberate indifference by not taking him to a hospital
immediately after discovering that he suffered injuries. The plaintiff also avers that the
defendants violated his civil rights and that plaintiff sustained personal injuries and aggravation
of his preexisting condition as a result of the defendants’ negligence and violations of his civil
rights.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Tenn. R.
Civ. P. 12.02(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6)
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The trial court granted the
defendants’ motion and dismissed the case with prejudice. The trial court’s order dismissing the
plaintiff’s complaint does not specify the grounds for dismissal. Defendants assert in their brief
that the case was dismissed on both grounds, although they make no argument in their brief as
to plaintiff’s failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In any event, from our
examination of the complaint we find that the complaint does state a cause of action for recovery
of damages for alleged personal injuries sustained as a result of alleged negligence and violations
of civil rights on the part of defendants. Dismissal under Tenn.R.Civ.P. 12.02(6) is warranted
only when no set of facts will entitle the plaintiff to relief. Pemberton v. American Distilled
Spirits Co., 664 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tenn. 1984). A complaint should not be dismissed no matter
how poorly drafted if it states a cause of action. Dobbs v. Guenther, 846 S.W.2d 270, 273
(Tenn. App. 1992). Tenn.R.Civ.P. 8.06 provides that “[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as
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Plaintiff filed suit against Madison County, Madison County Penal Farm, David
Woolfork, the Madison County Sheriff and Penal Farm Superintendent, Captain Jackson, the
Penal Farm’s Head Controller and Acting Warden, Sergeant Jered, the first shift sergeant,
Sergeant Evans, the third shift sergeant, Officer Steven Horner, and Officer Cleo King in
their official and individual capacities.
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to do substantial justice,” and Tenn.R.Civ.P. 1 mandates that the rules should “be construed to
secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.” Although we conclude
that the allegations of the complaint state a cause of action, we do not mean to imply that we are
considering any defenses that might inure to any individual entity named as a defendant.
The plaintiff’s appeal presents only one issue for review: whether the chancery court
erred in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction instead of transferring the case to the
appropriate circuit court.
The plaintiff’s negligence claim against the governmental entities and the governmental
employees is controlled by the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA), T.C.A. §
29-20-101 et seq. (1980 & Supp. 1994). Because the circuit court has exclusive jurisdiction over
GTLA claims under T.C.A. § 29-30-307, the defendants assert that the chancery court lacks
jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s case. The defendants also argue that because the plaintiff’s civil
rights action seeks unliquidated damages, the chancery court lacks jurisdiction over this case
pursuant to T.C.A. § 16-11-102(a) (1994). In addition, the defendants argue that the chancery
court may, but is not required to, transfer the case to the proper circuit court under T.C.A. § 16-
11-102(b) (1994).
T.C.A. § 16-11-102 provides:
Jurisdiction of civil causes – Transfer to circuit court. –
(a) The chancery court has concurrent jurisdiction, with the circuit
court, of all civil causes of action, triable in the circuit court,
except for unliquidated damages for injuries to person or
character, and except for unliquidated damages for injuries to
property not resulting from a breach of oral or written contract;
and no demurrer for want of jurisdiction of the cause of action
shall be sustained in the circuit court, except in the cases
excepted.
(b) Any suit in the nature of the cases excepted above brought in
the chancery court, where objection has not been taken by a plea
to the jurisdiction, may be transferred to the circuit court of the
county, or heard and determined by the chancery court upon the
principles of a court of law.
T.C.A. § 16-11-102. Because this section provides that the chancery court “may” transfer a case
over which it has no jurisdiction to the appropriate circuit court, the defendants assert that
transfer is discretionary and that the chancery court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the
plaintiff’s case.
We must respectfully disagree with the defendants’ assertions. This case is controlled
by our Supreme Court’s decision in Flowers v. Dyer County, 830 S.W.2d 51 (Tenn. 1992),
where the Court was faced with the issue of whether a complaint, which asserts a claim under
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the Governmental Tort Liability Act filed in the Chancery Court of Dyer County, must be
dismissed upon the motion by the defendant on the grounds that the court does not have subject
matter jurisdiction. The movant relied upon the provisions of T.C.A. § 16-11-102 and, in
holding that the trial court should not have dismissed the case but should have transferred the
case to the circuit court, our Supreme Court said:
Implicit in the provisions of T.C.A. § 16-11-102 is the positive
inference that, where a jurisdictional objection has been made,
such a transfer is mandated. See Muse v. Sluder, 600 S.W.2d
237 (Tenn.App. 1980).
Id. at 53.
We see no significant difference between Flowers and the case at bar, except perhaps that
the case at bar involves, in addition to a GTLA claim, a claim for unliquidated damages for
violations of civil rights. In the latter instance, the case still involves a claim for unliquidated
damages for which the chancery court has no jurisdiction. See T.C.A. § 16-11-102(a).
The defendants point out that, subsequent to the decision in Flowers, the legislature
passed T.C.A. § 16-2-107 in 1991, which provides:
Transfer of cause of action. — In judicial districts
which have a separate circuit and chancery court or in
districts which have more than one (1) division of
circuit or chancery court, if a civil cause of action is
filed in the improper court or the improper division of
court within the judicial district, upon the motion of
either party, or upon the court’s own motion, such
cause of action may be transferred to the proper court
or proper division within such district.
T.C.A. § 16-2-107 (1994). The defendants argue that the language of this statute makes the
transfer to the appropriate court discretionary rather than mandatory. We must respectfully
disagree. T.C.A. § 16-2-107 provides for transfers from chancery to circuit or circuit to
chancery, but retains the language used in § 16-11-102 that such case “may be transferred.”
Therefore, we do not find that the provisions of this statute would change the Supreme Court’s
decision based upon T.C.A. § 16-11-102, which remains in full force and effect. Therefore,
under Flowers, we are bound to conclude that the transfer of the case before us was mandatory
under T.C.A. § 16-11-102 and that the chancery court erred in failing to transfer the case to the
appropriate circuit court.
Accordingly, the order of the trial court dismissing the case is reversed. The case is
remanded to the trial court with directions to transfer this case to the circuit court for further
proceedings. Costs of the appeal are assessed against the appellees.
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_________________________________
W. FRANK CRAWFORD,
PRESIDING JUDGE, W.S.
CONCUR:
____________________________________
HOLLY KIRBY LILLARD, JUDGE
____________________________________
HEWITT P. TOMLIN, JR.
SENIOR JUDGE
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