John L. Miller v. Scott D. Williams

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
FILED
JOHN L. MILLER, ) C/A NO. 03A01-9707-CV-00270
) February 5, 1998
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
) Cecil Crowson, Jr.
) Appellate C ourt Clerk
)
) APPEAL AS OF RIGHT FROM THE
v. ) ANDERSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
)
)
)
)
SCOTT D. WILLIAMS, )
) HONORABLE WILLIAM E. LANTRIP,
Defendant-Appellee. ) CHANCELLOR, By Interchange
For Appellant For Appellee
JESS D. CAMPBELL ALBERT J. HARB
Campbell & Dawson Hodges, Doughty & Carson
Knoxville, Tennessee Knoxville, Tennessee
JOHN W. BUTLER
Butler, Vines & Babb
Knoxville, Tennessee
O P I N IO N
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED Susano, J.
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This appeal questions the adequacy of a jury’s verdict.
The plaintiff, John L. Miller (“Miller”)1, alleged in his
complaint that he sustained physical and emotional injuries and
medical expenses when his automobile was struck from behind by a
vehicle driven by the defendant, Scott D. Williams (“Williams”).2
After Williams admitted liability at trial, the jury awarded
Miller damages of $45,000. Miller then filed a motion for an
additur or a new trial. The trial court denied his motion, and
this appeal followed. The sole issue3 on this appeal is whether
the trial court erred in failing to suggest an additur or grant a
new trial due to the alleged inadequacy of the jury’s award.
I
In this case, we must decide if the record contains
“material evidence to support the [jury’s] verdict.” Rule 13(d),
T.R.A.P.; Coffey v. Fayette Tubular Products, 929 S.W.2d 326, 331
n.2 (Tenn. 1996); Poole v. Kroger Co., 604 S.W.2d 52, 54 (Tenn.
1980); Pettus v. Hurst, 882 S.W.2d 783, 788 (Tenn.App. 1993);
Benson v. Tennessee Valley Elec. Coop., 868 S.W.2d 630, 640
(Tenn.App. 1993). Because Miller asserts that the jury’s award
is insufficient, our focus is on the “lower limit” of the “range
of reasonableness.” Foster v. Amcon Int’l, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 142,
146 (Tenn. 1981). In the Foster case, the Supreme Court stated
1
Miller’s wife, Margie Miller, was also a plaintiff in this case. The
jury awarded her a judgment for $5,000. That judgment has not been appealed.
2
Also named as a defendant in the complaint was Chad Busby, a passenger
in the vehicle driven by Williams. The complaint against Busby was
voluntarily dismissed.
3
The Court of Appeals “does not have the authority to grant an additur”
under T.C.A. § 20-10-101. Wilkerson v. Altizer, 845 S.W.2d 744, 749
(Tenn.App. 1992); Poole v. Kroger Co., 604 S.W.2d 52, 54 (Tenn. 1980).
2
that
[a] reasoned examination of the credible
proof of damages leads to a determination of
the figure beyond which excessiveness or
inadequacy lies and beyond which there is no
evidence, upon any reasonable view of the
case, to support the verdict.
Id. In reviewing the adequacy of the jury’s award, we note that
[the determination of] the amount of
compensation in a personal injury case is
primarily for the jury, and that next to the
jury, the most competent person to pass on
the matter is the trial judge who presided at
the trial and heard the evidence.
Id. at 143-44; Coffey, 929 S.W.2d at 331 n.2.
The effect of a trial court’s approval of the amount of
a jury award is clear:
... the trial judge’s approval of the amount
of the jury’s verdict invokes the material
evidence rule, just as it does with respect
to all other factual issues upon which
appellate review is sought....
* * *
“[a]ll of the evidence in the record that
tends to support the amount of the verdict
should be given full faith and credit upon
appellate review.”
Poole, 604 S.W.2d at 54 (citing Ellis v. White Freightliner
Corp., 603 S.W.2d 125 (Tenn. 1980)). Thus, our analysis is
limited to a determination of whether the record reflects
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material evidence demonstrating that the jury’s award is “at or
above the lower limit of the range of reasonableness, giving full
faith and credit to all of the evidence that tends to support
that amount.” Poole, 604 S.W.2d at 54. We are required to take
the strongest legitimate view of all the evidence, including all
reasonable inferences therefrom, to sustain the verdict; to
assume the truth of all the evidence that supports it; and to
discard all evidence to the contrary. Id. In this analysis, we
do not weigh the evidence, nor do we determine the credibility of
the witnesses. Id.
II
The facts relative to the accident itself are not in
dispute. On April 4, 1995, as Miller was stopped at a traffic
light, his vehicle was struck from behind by Williams’ vehicle,
causing Miller’s vehicle to collide with a van in front of him.
Williams admitted that the accident was his fault and stipulated
to liability at trial.
Although Miller was awake and alert at the scene of the
accident, he was transported to the hospital by ambulance. Among
other things, he was treated for dizziness and pain in his back,
neck, and right knee. Miller was released from the hospital
after two and a half days.
Prior to the accident, Miller had suffered from various
neck, back and knee problems. The record indicates that between
August, 1988, and the time of the accident, he was treated by
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several physicians for these problems. Miller had also been
involved in a previous automobile accident in April of 1994,
causing him to seek treatment for neck and shoulder pain.
Furthermore, Miller had complained to a physician in January,
1995, of pain in his right knee, approximately three months
before the accident.
The parties present competing theories regarding the
relationship of Miller’s pre-existing conditions to the injuries
he sustained in the April, 1995, accident. Miller contends that
the accident caused new injuries and substantial aggravation of
his pre-existing conditions. He insists that the jury’s verdict
is grossly inadequate to compensate him for his pain, suffering
and medical expenses. Williams, on the other hand, argues that
Miller’s pre-existing neck, back and knee problems were
extensive. He maintains that the jury correctly determined that
the aggravation caused by the accident was less severe than
Miller claimed.
Following his release from the hospital, Miller
received treatment from a chiropractor, Dr. Ronald Mabry. He
later was treated by a medical doctor, Dr. Gilbert Hyde, who
performed surgery on Miller’s knee. In May, 1995, Miller began
seeing another physician, Dr. John Purvis, for back, neck and arm
pain. He also began complaining of pain in his hands. Dr.
Marvin Cohn, who also treated Miller, testified that the pain in
Miller’s hands was not directly related to the accident, but
instead was a result of arthritis that Miller had experienced for
several years. Following further treatment, Dr. Mabry and Dr.
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Hyde subsequently informed Miller that he could return to work.
However, Miller was involved in another automobile accident in
December, 1995. Subsequent to the December, 1995, accident, Dr.
Purvis performed neck surgery on Miller.
At trial, each side submitted material evidence in
support of its position. Miller introduced medical bills in the
aggregate amount of $44,585.42. He also offered the testimony of
his physicians in support of his contention that the accident had
severely aggravated his pre-existing medical conditions.
Williams, on the other hand, presented evidence indicating that
much of Miller’s pain and suffering resulted from conditions that
pre-dated the accident and that the extent of the injuries that
actually resulted from the accident was not very severe. For
example, the record indicates that on the day after his release
from the hospital, Miller was able to go to his place of
employment, Dean Stallings Ford, talk with other employees, and
drive home in one of the dealership’s cars. Furthermore, despite
claiming that he was unable to work, Miller was able to continue
preaching at his church. There is also evidence that Miller was
less than candid with his post-accident physicians regarding his
prior medical history.
It is clear from the briefs and record that the parties
presented the jury with greatly contrasting characterizations of
the testimony regarding Miller’s injuries. In limiting Miller’s
recovery to $45,000, the jury obviously gave credence to
testimony indicating that some of Miller’s pain and suffering was
not caused by the April, 1995, accident. We note again that
6
determinations regarding the credibility of the witnesses fall
within the purview of the jury. Reynolds v. Ozark Motor Lines,
Inc., 887 S.W.2d 822, 823 (Tenn. 1994). As we have previously
stated, we are not in a position to assess credibility. Poole v.
Kroger Co., 604 S.W.2d 52, 54 (Tenn. 1980).
III
As stated earlier, in evaluating the jury’s award, we
consider only the evidence supporting that award and disregard
all evidence to the contrary. Poole, 604 S.W.2d at 54. Upon
review of the record in this case, we find that there was
material evidence to support the jury’s award. Rule 13(d),
T.R.A.P. Given the evidence in the record regarding the nature
and extent of Miller’s pre-existing conditions, and the testimony
of his post-accident physicians, the jury could have reasonably
concluded that the aggravation of Miller’s injuries as a result
of the accident was not as severe as Miller claimed. We thus
cannot say that the jury’s award falls below the lower limit of
the range of reasonableness. Foster v. Amcon Int’l, Inc., 621
S.W.2d 142, 146 (Tenn. 1981); Poole, 604 S.W.2d at 54.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is
affirmed. Costs on appeal are taxed to the appellant and his
surety. This case is remanded to the trial court for enforcement
of the judgment and collection of costs assessed there, all
pursuant to applicable law.
__________________________
7
Charles D. Susano, Jr., J.
8
CONCUR:
_________________________
Houston M. Goddard, P.J.
_________________________
Don T. McMurray, J.
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