Gayle Penley v. Honda Motor

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
______________________________________________
GAYLE PENLEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Chester Circuit No. 4196
Vs. C.A. No. 02A01-9805-CV-00131
HONDA MOTOR COMPANY, LTD.,
HONDA RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT, AMERICAN
HONDA MOTOR COMPANY,
FILED
INC., JOE’S CYCLE SHOP, INC., August 11, 1999
d/b/a JOE’S CYCLE AND MARINE,
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Defendants-Appellees. Appellate Court Clerk
____________________________________________________________________________
FROM THE CHESTER COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
THE HONORABLE WHIT LAFON, JUDGE
Kenneth W. Hooks, Keith Belt
Pittman, Hooks, Dutton & Hollis of Birmingham, Alabama
William H. Haltom, Jr., of Memphis
For Appellant
R. Dale Bay, Susan R. High-McAuley, John R. Tarpley
Lewis, King, Krieg, Waldrop & Catron, P.C., of Nashville
For Appellees
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter
Charles S. Harrell, Assistant Attorney General
For State of Tennessee
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED
Opinion filed:
W. FRANK CRAWFORD,
PRESIDING JUDGE, W.S.
CONCUR:
ALAN E. HIGHERS, JUDGE
DAVID R. FARMER, JUDGE
This is a product liability action. Plaintiff/Appellant, Gayle Penley (Penley), appeals the
trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants/Appellees, Honda Motor
Company, Ltd., Honda R&D Co., Ltd., American Honda Motor Company, Inc., and Joe’s Cycle
Shop, Inc. d/b/a Joe’s Cycle and Marine (collectively hereinafter “Honda”).
On June 8, 1996, Penley was injured while riding an all terrain vehicle (ATV) owned by
William and Ann Morris (Morris). The ATV in question was originally purchased by Mt.
Moriah Sports and Trucks on May 23, 1987 from Joe’s Cycle Shop. On June 6, 1997, Penley
filed suit against Honda and the Morrises1 alleging strict liability, negligence, failure to warn,
and breach of express warranties and the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness. On
July 21, 1998, Honda filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that Penley failed to
bring her action within the 10 year statute of repose set by the Tennessee Products Liability Act
(TPLA), T.C.A. § 29-28-103.
On March 16, 1998, pursuant to leave of court, Penley filed an amended complaint
alleging that she was disabled and of unsound mind for twenty (20) days following the accident,
and that such disability tolled the statute of repose. Along with the amended complaint, Penley
also filed an affidavit from her treating physician which stated that she was “incapable of
working, tending to personal business, or taking care of herself” and was “mentally and
physically disabled.” After a hearing, the trial court granted Honda’s motion for summary
judgment on the basis that the action is time barred by the statute of repose set out in T.C.A. §
29-28-103 (Supp. 1998).
Penley appeals and presents the issue for review of whether the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment. Honda presents an additional issue of whether the trial court erred
in allowing the plaintiff to amend her complaint.
A motion for summary judgment should be granted when the movant demonstrates that
there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. The party moving for summary judgment bears the
burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d
618, 622 (Tenn. 1997). On a motion for summary judgment, the court must take the strongest
legitimate view of the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party, allow all reasonable inferences
in favor of that party, and discard all countervailing evidence. Id.1
Penley filed this action against the Morrises on a negligence theory, but there has been
no disposition of the case against them. The order granting summary judgment to Honda-
defendants was made final pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02.
2
Summary judgment is only appropriate when the facts and the legal conclusions drawn
from the facts reasonably permit only one conclusion. Carvell v. Bottoms, 900 S.W.2d 23, 26
(Tenn. 1995). Since only questions of law are involved, there is no presumption of correctness
regarding a trial court's grant of summary judgment. Bain, 936 S.W.2d at 622. Therefore, our
review of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment is de novo on the record before this Court.
Warren v. Estate of Kirk, 954 S.W.2d 722, 723 (Tenn. 1997).
In this case, it is undisputed that the Honda vehicle involved in Penley’s injury was first purchased for use on
May 23, 1987, that Penley’s injury occurred on June 8, 1996, and this suit was filed June 6, 1997. The action against
Honda is controlled by the Tennessee Products Liability Act of 1978 as codified in T.C.A. §§ 29-28-101 - 29-28-108
(1980 and Supp. 1998).See T.C.A. § 29-28-102(5) (6). Time limitations for filing such actions are provided for
in T.C.A. § 29-28-103(a):
(a) Any action against aLimitation of seller of a- Exception. - to person or property caused
29-28-103. manufacturer or actions product for injury
by its defective or unreasonablydangerous condition must be brought within the period fixed by §§
28-3-104, 28-3-105, 28-3-202 and 47-2-725, but notwithstanding any exceptions to these provisions
it must be brought within six (6) years of the date of injury, in any event, the action must be brought
within ten (10) years from the date on which the product was first purchased for use or consumption,
or within one (1) year after the expiration of the anticipated life of the product, whichever is the
shorter, except in the case of injury to minors whose action must be brought within a period of one
(1) year after attaining the age of majority, whichever occurs sooner.
Penley asserts that the ten-year limitations period set out in T.C.A. § 29-28-103(a) is extended by virtue of her
twenty day incapacity dating from the time of injury pursuant to T.C.A. § 28-1-106 (1980) which provide
§ 28-1-106. Persons under disability on accrual of right. - If the
person entitled to commence an action is, at the time the cause of action accrued,
either within the age of eighteen (18) years, or of unsound mind, such person, or
his representatives and privies, as the case may be, may commence the action,
after the removal of such disability, within the time of limitation for the particular
cause of action, unless it exceed three (3) years, and in that case within three (3)
years from the removal of such disability.
Although there may be a factual dispute as to whether Penley was, in fact, incapacitated under the provisions
of T.C.A. § 28-1-106, we are required to take the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and thus assume for the
purposes of summary judgment that Penley was so incapacitated. See Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tenn.
1997).
Penley argues that these two statutes read together tolled the statuteof reposeand allowed her an extra twenty
days, until June 12, 1997, to file suit. Honda counters that the TPLA means exactly what it says, that actions brought
after ten years from purchase are absolutely barred.
This appears to be an issue of first impression in this state. The ten-year period provided for in T.C.A. § 29-
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28-103(a) is a statute of repose. Wyatt v. A-Best Products Co., 924 S.W.2d 98 (Tenn. App. 1995). In Wyatt,
the Court discussed the operation and effect of a statute of repose:
Courts in Tennessee have consistently pointed out the distinction
between a statute of limitations and a statute of repose. The former has been
described as affecting only a party’s remedy for a cause of action, while the
running of a statute of repose has been said to “nullif[y] both the remedy and the
right.” Bruce v. Hamilton, 894 S.W.2d 274, 276 (Tenn. App. 1993); Via
v. General Elec. Co., 799 F. Supp. 837, 839 (W.D. Tenn. 1992). Generally
speaking, the critical distinction in classifying a statute as one of repose or one of
limitations is the event or occurrence designated as the “triggering event,” i.e., the
event that starts the “clock” running on the time allowed for the filing of suit. In
a traditional statute of limitations, the triggering event is typically the accrual of
the action, i.e., when all the elements of the action, including injury or damages,
have coalesced, resulting in a legally cognizableclaim. A statute of repose, on
the other hand, typically describes the triggering event as something other than
accrual,prompting courts to note that such statutes are “entirelyunrelated to the
accrual of any action . . .” Watts v. Putnam Co., 525 S.W.2d 488, 491
(Tenn. 1975); Cronin v. Howe, 906 S.W.2d 910, 913 (Tenn. 1995).
Becausea statute of repose sets the triggering event as something other
than accrual,it can have the effect of barring a plaintiff’s claim before it accrues,
most typically before the plaintiff becomes aware of his or her injury. See
Cronin, 906 S.W.2d at 913; Bruce, 894 S.W.2d at 276 (“A statute of repose
is a substantive provision becauseit expressly qualifies the right which the statute
creates by barring a right of action even before the injury has occurred if the
injury occurs subsequent to the prescribed time period.”). This possibility has
prompted courts to hold that statutes of repose affect the substantive right of a
party to bring suit, as well as the remedy. Id.Wyatt, 924 S.W.2d at 102.
The legislature enacted the TPLA’s statute of repose after determining that the rising number of products
liability actions had dramaticallyincreased the price of liability insurance for companies. The statute of repose was
enacted with the following purpose:
[T]o provide a reasonabletime within which action may be commenced against
manufactures, and/or sellers while limiting the time to a specific period of time
for which product liability insurance premiums can be reasonablyand accurately
calculated; and to provide other changes to expedite early evaluation and
settlement of claims. . . .
1978 Tenn. Pub. Acts 468-69.
Penley first asserts that her disability existed at the time her cause of action accrued, see Foster v.
Albright, 631 S.W.2d 147, 150 (Tenn. App. 1982) (plaintiff disabled simultaneouslywith injury is considered to lack
capacity at the time the cause of action accrued), and that the clear language of T.C.A. § 28-1-106 tolls the ten-year
statute. She argues that the disability statute “representsa long-standing policy to protect causes of action of persons
who are disabled due to minority or unsound mind.” We do not disagree with this statement, but we do note that the
legislature was surely aware of the provisions of the disability statute when it explicitlystated in T.C.A. § 29-28-103(a),
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“but notwithstanding any exceptions to these provisions [the designated statutes of limitations] [the action] must be
brought within six years of the date of injury, in any event, the action must be brought within ten years from the date
on which the product was first purchased for use . . . .”
Penley suggests that the holding of the Supreme Court in Sharp v. Richardson, 937 S.W.2d 846 (Tenn.
1996), and the holding of this Court in Bowers v. Hammond, 954 S.W.2d 752 (Tenn. App. 1997) should persuade
this Court that the disability statute tolls the TPLA ten-year statute of repose. We must decline that sugge
In Sharp, the plaintiff sued the manufacturer of an orthopedicintermedullary rod under the products liability
act and sued the physician who implanted the rod under the medical malpractice act. In dealing with the products
liability action, the issue on appeal was whether the one-year savings statute, T.C.A. § 28-1-105(a), was applicableto
save an action which was initially filed within the one-year products liability statute of limitation and the six-year
products liability statute of repose but later dismissed and refiled beyond the six-year statute of repose. In holding that
the savings statute applied to this factual situation, the Court reiterated the purpose of the products liability statute of
repose and noted that the application of the savings statute in no way frustrated this purpose. The Court s
Since the plaintiff’s suit was “commenced within the time limited by a rule or
statute of limitation,” and was concluded by an order of voluntarily dismissal
without prejudice, its refiling was within the express terms and longstanding
purpose and spirit of the savings statute -- to provide a diligent plaintiff with an
opportunityto renew a suit that is dismissed by any judgment or decree that does
not conclude the right of action. Therefore, application of the savings statute in
this case does not conflict nor frustrateeither the letter or purpose of the products
liability statute of repose.
Sharp, 937 S.W.2d at 850.
It is important to note that Sharp is distinguishable from the case at bar in two respects: In Sharp, the Court
was dealing with a statute of repose that begins to run upon the date of injury as the accrual of the cause of action, and
the action was actuallycommenced within the time limited by the statute thus giving the manufacturer notice of a claim
as the legislature envisioned.
In Bowers, the Court held that the infancy of the plaintiff tolled the medical malpractice statute of repose.
The three-year statute of repose in the medical malpractice act is linked inextricably to the injury involved and provides:
“[i]n no event shall any action be brought more than three (3) years after the date on which the negligent act or omission
occurred . . . .” The six-year statute of repose in the TPLA and discussed in Sharp is analogous to the three-year
medical malpractice statute of repose. However, the TPLA ten-year statute of reposeis much different. The language
in the TPLA ten-year statute of repose is unconcerned with the date of injury and instead prescribes a final termination
date for all actions.
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Also, the TPLA 10 year statuteof reposeis explicitin the exceptions to the statute. In determining the meaning
and scope of a statute, we must construe the statute by looking to the words of the statute itself as we find it and not as
we think it should be. Neff v. Cherokee Ins. Co., 704 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tenn. 1986). T.C.A. § 29-28-103 specifically
excludes certainactions and allows tolling in the case of minority. Penley would also have this Court hold that disability
tolls the statute of repose. We give consideration to the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Black’s
Law Dictionary explains this term as:
A maxim of statutory interpretation meaning that the expression of one thing is
the exclusion of another. . . . Mention of one thing implies exclusion of another.
When certain persons or things are specified in a law, contract, or will, an
intention to exclude all others from its operation may be inferred. Under this
maxim, if statute specifies one exception to a general rule or
assumes to specify the effects of a certain provision, other
exceptions or effects are excluded.
Black’s Law Dictionary 581 (6th ed. 1990); see also Pryor Oldsmobile v. Motor Vehicle Comm’n.,
803 S.W.2d 227 (Tenn. App. 1990).
Disability is not included in the three exceptions. This is persuasive that the legislature did not intend for the
ten-year statute of repose to be tolled for disability or any other exception not found within the statute itself. Further,
the stated purposeof T.C.A. § 29-28-103 is to give manufacturers a definitive period of time in which they must insure
against product liability suits. By expanding the exceptions to the TPLA statute of repose, this Court would be
subverting the purpose and intention of the legislature.
Penley next asserts that the products liability statute of reposefound in T.C.A. § 29-28-103(a) allows a plaintiff
injured in the tenth year after the product’s sale one year from the date of injury in which to file suit. We deem this
reading of the TPLA’s statute of repose inapposite to the plain reading and purpose of the statute. There is nothing in
the statute to indicate that the legislature intended to extend the stated “cap” of ten years for injuries that occur in the
last year. However, such a provision is not unknown to the legislature, as indicated by the provisions of T.C.A. § 28-3-
203(a) dealing with actions involving defectsin improvementsto real property. While the legislature provided for extra
time in such actions, it did not choose to do so in products liability actions, obviously for the reason that such an
extension would subvert the purpose of the legislation.
In the final analysis, we are required to construe T.C.A. § 29-28-103 in a manner that ascertains and gives
effect to the intention and purpose of the legislature as expressed in the statute. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
King, 678 S.W.2d 19 (Tenn. 1984), appeal dismissed, 470 U.S. 1075, 105 S. Ct. 1830, 85 L. Ed.2d 131 (1985).
Legislative intent must be ascertained from the natural and ordinary meaning of the statutory language read in the
context of the entire statute without any forced or subtle construction which would extend or limit its meaning. State
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v. Butler, 980 S.W.2d 359 (Tenn. 1998). Moser v. Dep’t. of Transp. of State of Tenn., 982 S.W.2d 864(Tenn. App. 1998). The court must reconcileinconsistent or repugnant provisions of a statute and construe a statute
so that no part is inoperative, superfluous,void, or insignificant. It must give effect to every word, phrase, clause, and
sentence of the act in order to achieve the legislature’s intent, and it must construe a statute so that no section will
destroy another. Tidwell v. Collins, 522 S.W.2d 674, 676-77 (Tenn. 1975). A statute of repose exists solely to
create a settled time when exposure to liability ceases. We find the statute to be unambiguous and for the reasons
heretofore set out hold that the ten year statute of repose in T.C.A. § 29-28-103 is an absolute cap for the filing of a
products liability action, subject to the exceptions set out in the statute.
Penley asserts that the TPLA’s statute of repose is unconstitutional. Although Penley did not raise
constitutional issues at the trial level, we will briefly discuss them on appeal. There is a strong presumption favoring the
constitutionality of a legislative enactment. Bozeman v. Barker, 571 S.W.2d 279, 282 (Tenn. 1978). Whenever
a statute’s constitutionalityis called into question, it is a court’s duty to resolve all doubts in favor of the statute’s
validity. Marion County Bd. v. Marion County Election Comm’n, 594 S.W.2d 681, 684 (Tenn. 1980).
The TPLA statute of repose has withstood many constitutional attacks. See Kochins v. Linden-Alimak, Inc.,
799 F.2d 1128 (6th Cir. 1986); Wayne v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 730 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1984); Mathis v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 719 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1983); Spence v. Miles Lab., Inc., 810 F. Supp. 952 (E.D. Tenn.
1992); Stutts v. Ford Motor Co., 574 F. Supp. 100 (M.D. Tenn. 1983); Hawkins v. D & J Press Co., Inc.,
527 F. Supp. 386 (E.D. Tenn. 1981); Buckner v. GAF Corp., 495 F. Supp. 351 (E.D. Tenn. 1979), aff’d 659 F.2d
1080 (6th Cir. 1981); Jones v. Five Star Eng’g Inc., 717 S.W.2d 882 (Tenn. 1986); Wyatt v. A-Best
Products Co., 924 S.W.2d 98 (Tenn. App. 1995); King-Bradwell Partnership v. Johnson Controls,
Inc., 865 S.W.2d 18 (Tenn. App. 1993). In each of these challenges,the validity of T.C.A. § 29-28-103 has been
upheld as a legitimate exercise of legislative authority.
Penley first attacks T.C.A. § 29-28-103 under the “Open Courts” provision of the Tennessee Constitution.
Article I, Section 17 states :
That all courts shall be open; and every man, for an injury done him in his lands,
goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right
and justice administered without sale, denial, or delay. Suits may be brought
againstthe state in such manner and in such courts as the Legislature may by law
direct.
She argues that T.C.A. § 29-28-103 violates the “Open Courts” provision becausepersons injured during the tenth year
of the statute of repose have a shorter time to file suit.
The Tennessee SupremeCourt dealt with the issue of whether T.C.A. § 29-28-103 violates the “Open Courts”
7
provision in Jones v. Five Star Eng’g, Inc., 717 S.W.2d 882 (Tenn. 1986). Upholding the TPLA statute of
repose, the Supreme Court adopted the reasoning it used in Harrison v. Schrader, 569 S.W.2d 822 (Tenn. 1978)
to uphold the statute of repose in the medical malpractice act. The Harrison Court noted that Article I, Section 17
has been judicially interpreted as “a mandate to the judiciary and not as a limitation upon the legislature.” Harrison,
569 S.W.2d at 827.
The legislature has chosen to enact a statute of repose for products liability actions which imposes a specific
cut off date for bringing actions regardless of when the injury occurs. Wyatt v. A-Best Prod. Co., 924 S.W.2d
98, 107-08 (Tenn. App. 1995). “The hardship upon the person injured the day before the ten-year period expires is the
necessary result of establishing a ceiling, ‘Line-drawing’ as such is ‘peculiarlya legislative task and an unavoidable
one.’” Stutts v. Ford Motor Co., 574 F. Supp. 100, 104 (M.D. Tenn. 1983) (citations omitted). The authority
clearlyestablishes that T.C.A. § 29-28-103 does not violatethe “Open Courts”provision of the Tennessee Constitution.
Penley next contends that T.C.A. § 29-18-103 violates Article I, Section 8 or the “due process clause” of the
Tennessee Constitution. Article I, Section 8 states:
That no man shall be taken or imprisoned, or deseized of his freehold, liberties or
privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed or deprived of his
life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land.
Article I, Section 8 has been held synonymous with the due process clauses of the Fifth and FourteenthAmendments
to the U.S. Constitution. Daugherty v. State, 216 Tenn. 666, 393 S.W.2d 739 (1965).
In Mathis v. Eli Lilly & Co., 719 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1983), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals examined
the TPLA’s ten-year statute of repose and a due process challenge to its limitations. Plaintiff, Mathis, sought damages
for personal injuries due to exposure to DES which she took while pregnant in May of 1955. She had no knowledge
that the drug could cause cancer, and she discovered she had cancer in July 1980, some twenty-five years after the
product was purchased and used. The trial court granted summary judgment on the basis of the ten-year statute of
repose; T.C.A. § 29-28-103. She contended the application of the statute violated her due process rights becauseshe
was denied the opportunityto pursue a remedy for her injury. The Court noted that there is a permissiblelegislative
object for the action of the legislature as expressed in the statute and that there is no due process violation involved. The
Court found a rational relationshipbetween this statute and the aims and goals expressed in the legislative preambleto
the act. The Court held that the statute does not violate the due process requirementsof the FourteenthAmendment of
the United States Constitution. In determining that the statute did not violate the Tennessee Constitution, the Court
examined various Tennessee cases, including Harrison v. Schrader, supra, and stated: “[t]he specific
constitutional challenges made in Harrison v. Schrader, supra, were not the same challenges made by appellants
8
in this case, but the general and broad language used by the court [to uphold the statute] seems, nevertheless,to address
the due process challenges here.” Id. at 143. There simply is not a due process violation in this case.
Finally, Penley argues that the statuteviolates ArticleXI, Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Article XI, Section 8 states:
The Legislature shall have no power to suspend any general law for the benefit
of any particular individual, nor to pass any law for the benefit of individuals
inconsistent with the general laws of the land; nor to pass any law granting to any
individual or individuals,rights, privileges,immunities,or exemptions other than
such as maybe, by the same law extended to any member of the community, who
may be able to bring himself within the provisions of such law. . . .
In King-Bradwell Partnership v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 865 S.W.2d 18, 21-22 (Tenn. App.
1995), this Court dismissed an action on the basis that the injury occurred after the ten-year statute of repose ended, yet
addressed the constitutionalityof T.C.A. §29-28-103 on equal protections grounds. Although dicta, the Court correctly
stated the law. The Court said:
Assuming, however, that the Plaintiffs could have brought an action
challenging the constitutionalityof T.C.A. § 29-28-103, we neverthelessconclude
such an attack must fail.
* * *
Under the [Equal Protection Clause of the] FourteenthAmendment of
the United States Constitution, a legislative action not affecting a suspect class or
infringing upon a fundamental right is upheld if it is rationallyrelated toward the
advancement of any legitimate legislative interests of society. See, e.g.,
Kochins, supra. Fundamental rights include voting, privacy, interstate travel,
and the freedoms of speech and association. See generally Ronald D.
Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law:
Substance & Procedure, 2nd., Section 15.7 (1992). Suspect classifications
are race, alienage, national origin, and sex. See City of Cleburne, Tex. v.
Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 87 L. Ed. 2d 313(1985). Clearly this matter involves neither a fundamental right nor a suspect
class. Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Tennessee “has adopted a virtually
identical equal protection standard or analysis under Article XI, Section 8 of the
Tennessee Constitution.” Spence, supra (citing Kochins, supra, and
Harrison, supra).Thus, we need only determine that T.C.A. § 29-28-103 meets the
minimal scrutiny requirementsof the rational relations test. In so doing, we
quote from Spence, supra, (at page 963):
[T]he statute represents public policy which affords plaintiffs
what the legislature deems to be a reasonabletime to present
their claims; and it protects defendants and the courts from
having to deal with stale cases where the search for the truth
and justice may be seriously impeded by the death or
disappearance of witnesses,fading memories,disappearance
of documents or other loss of material evidence. United
States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117, 100 S. Ct. 352, 357,
62 L. Ed. 2d 259 (1979). In the preambleto § 29-28-103, the
Tennessee General Assembly stated that the purpose of the
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statute of repose is to protect the public interest by making
product liability insurance more readily available at a
reasonablecost to manufacturers and sellers so that the cost of
productsmay be lessened to consumers. The statuteprovides
a reasonabletime within which an action to recover damages
may be commenced against a manufacturer or seller while
limiting liability to a specific period of time so that product
liability insurance premiumscan be reasonablyand accurately
calculated. Ch. 703, Tenn. Pub. Acts 468-69; Kochins, 799
F.2d at 1139; Mathis, 719 F.2d at 139. The Tennessee
statute of repose, then, was enacted for stated purposes. It is
the role of the legislature, not this Court, to pass on the
wisdom of that purpose. Hargraves v. Brackett
Stripping Machine Co., 317 F. Supp. 676, 683 (E.D.
Tenn.1970).
Penley’s other constitutional argument that the statute’s purpose in solving the products liability crisis is
unreasonable is without merit. The Tennessee Supreme Court has previously ruled that this statute is “a legitimate
exercise of legislative authority” thus ending debate on this issue. Jones v. Five Star Eng’g Inc., 717 S.W.2d
882, 883 (Tenn. 1986).
The order granting summary judgment to the appellees is affirmed, and the case is remanded for such further
proceedings as are necessary. Costs of appeal are assessed to the appellant.
_________________________________
W. FRANK CRAWFORD,
PRESIDING JUDGE, W.S.
CONCUR:
____________________________________
ALAN E. HIGHERS, JUDGE
____________________________________
DAVID R. FARMER, JUDGE
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