Booze v. Fairfield Communities

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
FILED
AT KNOXVILLE January 28, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt
Clerk
ALLEN A. BO OZE and wife, ) C/A NO. 03A01-9803-CV-00095
DIANE BOOZE, )
) CUM BERL AND CIRCU IT
Plaintiffs-Appellants, )
) HON. JOHN A. TURNBULL,
v. ) JUDGE
)
FAIR FIEL D CO MM UNIT IES, IN C., )
d/b/a FAIRFIELD GLADE RESORT, ) AFFIRMED
) AND
Defendant-Appellee. ) REMANDED
JOHN PH ILIP PARSO NS, EDW ARDS & PARSON S, Cookeville, for Plaintiffs-
Appellants.
JOE M. LOON EY, LOONEY & LOON EY, Crossville, for Defendant-Appellee.
O P I N IO N
Franks, J.
Plaintiffs’ ac tion against F airfield Co mmun ities, Inc., d/b/a Fa irfield
Glade Resort (Fairfield), was dismissed by summary judgment, and plaintiffs have
appealed. It was alleged that Fairfield, acting as an innkeeper, rented room 5621
Country Club Villas, to the plaintiffs for a period from April 6, 1994 through April 9,
1994, which is a part of a town house unit owned by William E. Rueff and Margaret
L. Rueff. The complaint further alleges that Allen Booze started down the steps
leading from his room to the sidewalk and slipped on ice which had formed on the
steps, and the fall was due to the negligence of the defendants in failing to remove the
ice or w arn plain tiffs ab out the c onditio n.
At the time of summary judgment, plaintiffs had dismissed the Rueffs
from the action with prejudice, and the remaining defendant’s summary judgment
motion was based upon the theory that defendant was under no duty to maintain the
premises where plaintiff fell, since it was owned by another entity. It states that the
Country C lub Villas, Ph ase II, is a tow nhouse d evelopm ent created b y Fairfield
Communities, Inc., and that a Tennessee non-profit corporation was created under the
name of “Country Club Villas II Property Owners Association, Inc.,” which serves as
administrato r, manage r, and prop erty owner’s a ssociation fo r the own ers of prop erty
in Country Club Villas, Phase II. The area where plaintiff fell is classified as “limited
common property”, and the property owners association is responsible for the
maintena nce of this a rea. Thus, th e defend ant argues th at it had no d uty to maintain
the premise s where p laintiff fell, on th e basis of a n affidav it and docu ments filed with
the motion.
In response, plaintiffs argue that they made their reservation for the
Fairfield Glade Resort Inn or Motel in Cumberland County, Tennessee, and that when
they arrived they were told by the Fairfield reservation agent that the Inn was over
booked, and they were placed in the condominium unit. They further argue that they
were in p rivity of contract w ith Fairfield, an d that Fairfie ld had the u ltimate
responsibility to made sure the premises were safe and habitable.
While the plaintiffs made these allegations in response to the motion for
summary judgment, they did not offer any affidavit in response to the motion. The
Trial Judge , in granting su mmary judg ment, obse rved that at the time of filing this
action plaintiffs were on notice that the townhouse units where they were staying was
not owned by the defendant Fairfield Communities, Inc.
When faced with a motion for summary judgment, a party “may neither
ignore it nor treat it lightly.” Byrd v. H all, 847 S .W.2d 208 at 2 10 (Te nn. 199 3).
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Once a party makes a properly supported motion for summary judgment, “the burden
then shifts to the non-moving party to set forth specific facts, not legal conclusions, by
using affidavits or the discovery materials listed in Rule 56.03 [now rule 56.04]
establishing that there are indeed disputed, material facts creating a genuine issue that
needs t o be res olved b y the trier of fact”. Id. at 215.
In a negligence action, the p laintiff has the burden of p roving: “(1) a
duty of care owed b y the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) a brea ch of that duty; and (3) a
causal relation between the injury to the plaintiff and defendant’s breach of his duty of
care.” Shouse v . Otis, 224 Tenn. 1, 448 S.W.2d 673 (1969). Whether the defendant
owes the plain tiff a du ty of care is a que stion of law. Bradshaw v. Daniel, 854 S.W.2d
865, 869 (Tenn . 1993). If no duty is owed to th e plaintiff, then a grant of sum mary
judgment is appropriate, because there are not disputed material facts to submit to a
jury. See Marr v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 922 S .W.2d 526, 52 9 (Ten n. App . 1995) .
Defendant’s motion was supported by affidavit which established that
the Property Owner’s Association for the Country Club Villas Phase II, was
responsible for the maintenance of the premises where plaintiff fell, and not the
defendant. Upon evidence that defendant had no duty to maintain the premises, the
burden sh ifted to the pla intiffs to off er evidenc e establishing facts wh ich wou ld
establish a duty, not legal conclusions. Plaintiffs’ respo nse to the motion for su mmary
judgment argued that defendant owed plaintiffs the duty to maintain, because the
defendant w as an innkeeper an d plaintiffs were guests o f the innkeeper. Innke epers
owe a duty to their guests to keep the premises reasonably safe, and the duty is non-
delegable, 40 Am.Ju r.2, Hotels, Motels, Etc. §81. We find no authority to extend such
duty to premises owned and maintained by another party, absent the innkeeper’s right
to control su ch premis es. Plaintiffs f iled no sup porting aff idavits or dep ositions to
establish material facts. Instead, they relied solely on the assertions in the complaint
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and other assertions of fact in their response. The opponent of the motion for
summary judgment may not rely on the allegations in their pleadings, but must
respond with affidavits or discovery material showing specific facts and material
issues f or trial. See Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56.0 6; Byrd, 847 S.W.2d 215;
Dellinger v. Pierce, 848 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tenn. App. 1992). Plaintiffs offered no
material evid ence dispu ting defen dant’s evid ence that it did not have a duty to
maintain the premises where the injury occurred.
Accordingly, we affirm the summary judgment granted by the Trial
Court and remand with the cost of the appeal assessed to the appellants.
__________________________
Herschel P. Franks, J.
CONCUR:
___________________________
Don T. McM urray, J.
___________________________
Charles D. Susano, Jr., J.
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