Gloria Spivey v. James Robinson

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN SECTION AT JACKSON
______________________________________________
GLORIA SPIVEY, as Administratrix of
the Estate of Michelle Christi Spivey,
and GLORIA SPIVEY and LARRY
FILED
SPIVEY, as guardians and next friend
of JESSICA MICHELLE SPIVEY- September 09, 1997
ROBINSON,
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Obion Circuit No. 6-16
Vs. C.A. No. 02A01-9704-CV-00075
JASON D. ANDERSON,
Defendant-Third-Party
Plaintiff-Appellee,
JAMES C. ROBINSON, JR., and
SHELBY COUNTY HEALTH CARE
CORPORATION d/b/a REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER AT MEMPHIS,
Defendants-Third-Party
Defendants-Appellants.
____________________________________________________________________________
FROM THE OBION COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
THE HONORABLE WILLIAM B. ACREE, JR., JUDGE
Damon E. Campbell; Conley Campbell Moss
Smith of Union City
Guardian ad litem for Jessica Michelle Robinson
Gary C. McCullough; McCullough and McCullough of Memphis
For Appellants
REVERSED AND REMANDED
Opinion filed:
W. FRANK CRAWFORD,
PRESIDING JUDGE, W.S.
CONCUR:
ALAN E. HIGHERS, JUDGE
DAVID R. FARMER, JUDGE
This case involves a hospital’s lien on the proceeds from a wrongful death suit. Third-
party defendant, Shelby County Health Care Corporation d/b/a The Regional Medical Center at
Memphis (the Med), appeals the order of the trial court holding that the proceeds of the wrongful
death settlement were not subject to the Med’s hospital lien.
On December 23, 1995, Michelle Christi Spivey was killed while riding as a passenger
in a car driven by James C. Robinson, Jr., which was involved in an accident in Obion County,
Tennessee. The Robinson vehicle collided with an automobile driven by Jason D. Alexander.
Michelle Christi Spivey was treated for injuries at the Med following the accident, but she later
died from her injuries. On January 26, 1996, the Med filed “Affidavit for Hospital Lien” in the
Obion County Circuit Court Clerk’s office pursuant to T.C.A. § 29-22-101 (1980) for medical
expenses totaling $19,082.54.
On April 12, 1996, Gloria Spivey, as administratrix of the estate of Michelle Christi
Spivey, and Gloria and Larry Spivey, as guardians and next friend of Jessica Michelle Spivey-
Robinson, a minor, (the Spiveys), filed a complaint, in the Obion County Circuit Court for
wrongful death against Jason D. Anderson. The deceased, Michelle Christi Spivey, was the
mother of Jessica Michelle Spivey-Robinson, and James Robinson is the putative father of the
minor child. On August 5, 1996, Jason D. Anderson and Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance
Company, the uninsured motorist carrier, filed a “Petition for Approval of Compromised
Settlement of Minor’s Claim for Wrongful Death,” in the amount of $50,000, $25,000.00 to be
paid on behalf of Jason Anderson and $25,000.00 to be paid on behalf of Tennessee Farmers.
On August 12, 1996, the Spiveys filed an amendment to the petition challenging James
Robinson’s standing before the court and asserting that the settlement was free from the Med’s
lien by virtue of T.C.A. § 20-5-106 (1994). The Spiveys’ amendment requested that James
Robinson and the Med be added as defendants.
The trial court tentatively approved the settlement and entered a disbursement order on
August 13, 1996. The order provides, inter alia, that the settlement funds are not subject to the
Med’s lien.
On September 18, 1996, Jason Anderson filed a “Motion to Allow Third Party Complaint
for Declaratory Judgment.” The trial court granted his motion to include James Robinson and
the Med as defendants, and on September 26, 1996, Jason Anderson filed a third party complaint
for declaratory judgment against James Robinson and the Med. The complaint requests the trial
court to declare the relative rights of James Robinson and the Med to the funds that were
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approved as a full and final settlement in the wrongful death suit.1
The trial court entered an order approving the compromise settlement on October 15,
1996, relieving Jason Anderson and Tennessee Farmers from any liability to Jessica Michelle
Spivey-Robinson and to the Med. On October 17, 1996, the Med filed an answer to the third
party complaint asserting that it was entitled to a portion of the proceeds of the wrongful death
suit pursuant to the hospitals’ liens statute, T.C.A. § 29-22-101 (1980).
On February 21, 1997, the trial court entered a judgment holding that the settlement
proceeds were not subject to the Med’s lien by virtue of T.C.A. § 20-5-106(b) (1994), which
provides that the cause of action passes to the beneficiary free from claims of creditors of the
estate.
The Med appeals the order of the trial court and presents one issue for review: whether
the trial court erred in holding that the proceeds of the wrongful death settlement are not subject
to its hospital lien. The Spiveys filed a brief on behalf of Jessica Michelle Spivey-Robinson and
add two additional issues: 1) whether the Med properly perfected its hospital lien, and 2)
whether the Med can recover more than one-third of the settlement proceeds.
The facts of this case are not in dispute, and we must resolve a conflict between the
wrongful death statute and the hospitals’ liens statute.
The wrongful death statute states,
(a) The right of action which a person, who dies from
injuries received from another, or whose death is caused by the
wrongful act, omission, or killing by another, would have had
against the wrongdoer, in case death had not ensued, shall not
abate or be extinguished by the person’s death but shall pass to
the person’s surviving spouse and, in case there is no surviving
spouse, to the person’s children or next of kin; or to the person’s
personal representative, for the benefit of the person’s surviving
spouse or next of kin; or to the person’s natural parents or parent
or next of kin if at the time of death decedent was in the custody
of the natural parents or parent and had not been legally
surrendered by them, otherwise to the person’s legally adoptive
parents or parent, or to the administrator for the use and benefit
of the adoptive parents or parent; the funds recovered in either
case to be free from the claims of creditors.
(b) In any case involving a beneficiary who is a minor or
who is legally incompetent, if the court finds it is in the best
interest of such beneficiary, the court in its discretion may
1
James Robinson did not answer the third party complaint, and on March 13, 1997,
the trial court entered a default judgment dismissing any claim that he may have had against
Jason Alexander and Tennessee Farmers. James Robinson is not a party to this appeal.
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authorize all or any portion of the funds recovered for such
beneficiary to be added to any trust or trusts established for the
benefit of such beneficiary, wherever situated, whether such trust
was created by the person whose death was caused by the
wrongful action or omission or by any other person. The funds
recovered shall be for the benefit of such beneficiary and shall be
free from the claims of creditors.
T.C.A. § 20-5-106 (a), (b) (1994) (emphasis added).
The hospitals’ liens statute states,
(a) Every person, firm, association, corporation,
institution, or any governmental unit, including the state of
Tennessee, any county or municipalities operating and
maintaining a hospital in this state, shall have a lien for all
reasonable and necessary charges for hospital care, treatment and
maintenance of ill or injured persons upon any and all causes of
action, suits, claims, counterclaims or demands accruing to the
person to whom such care, treatment or maintenance was
furnished, or accruing to the legal representatives of such person
in the case of his or her death, on account of illness or injuries
giving rise to such causes of action or claims and which
necessitated such hospital care, treatment and maintenance.
(b) The hospital lien, however, shall not apply to any
amount in excess of one-third (1/3) of the damages obtained or
recovered by such person by judgment, settlement or compromise
rendered or entered into by such person or his or her legal
representative by virtue of the cause of action accruing thereto.
(c) The lien herein created shall be subject and
subordinate to any attorney’s lien whether by contract, suit or
judgment upon such claim or cause of action and shall not be
applicable to accidents or injuries within the purview of the
Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Law, compiled in chapters
9-12 of title 50. Any such lien arising out of a motor vehicle
accident shall not take priority over a mechanic’s lien or prior
recorded lien upon a motor vehicle involved in said accident.
T.C.A. § 29-22-101 (1980) (emphasis added).
In a wrongful death suit, the recovery passes to the statutory beneficiary free from any
claims of creditors of the estate because the statutory beneficiary is the real party in interest.
Memphis Street Ry. Co. v. Cooper, 313 S.W.2d 444, 448 (Tenn. 1958). The wrongful death
statute is in the nature of the statutes of descent and distribution. See Dilworth v. Tisdale
Transfer & Storage Co., 354 S.W.2d 261, 262 (Tenn. 1962). However, neither of these cases,
which were relied upon by the trial court, deals with a hospital’s lien, and both were decided
before the General Assembly passed the hospitals’ liens statute.
T.C.A. § 1-3-103 (1994) provides: “If provisions of different titles or chapters of the
code appear to contravene each other, the provisions of each title or chapter shall prevail as to
all matters and questions growing out of the subject matter of that title or chapter.” T.C.A. § 1-3-
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103 (1994).
A specific statute or a special provision of a particular statute controls a general provision
in another statute or a general provision in the same statute. Valley Fidelity Bank & Trust Co.
v. Ayers, 861 S.W.2d 366, 369 (Tenn. App. 1993). The wrongful death statute is a general
statute dealing with recovery for an injury resulting in death, and the subsequently enacted
hospitals’ liens statute specifically establishes a lien for recovery of medical expenses. In
Holston Valley Hospital and Medical Center v. Moffitt, et al, No. 03A01-9608-CV-00271,
Court of Appeals, March 31, 1997, the Eastern Section of this Court, in considering the precise
issue before us, said:
The Hospital defends the Trial Court’s action with regard to
T.C.A. 20-5-106(a) upon the ground that provisions of the
Hospital Lien Statute, having been enacted subsequent to the one
providing the funds, would “be free from the claims of creditors”
repealed by implication that provision insofar as hospitals are
concerned. Chief Justice Green, one of the premiere jurists of this
State, recognized the Rule almost three-quarters of a century ago,
in Southern Construction Co. v. Halliburton, 149 Tenn. 319,
329, 258 S.W. 409, 412 (1924), wherein he stated the following:
Although a later act may not cover the entire
subject-matter of an earlier act, nor purport to
provide a new system, if the later act is repugnant
and irreconcilable on a particular point, it will
operate as a repeal by implication to the extent of
the repugnance and conflict. Baily v. Drane, 96
Tenn. 16, 33 S.W. 573. Balden v. State, 122
Tenn. 704, 127 S.W. 134.
The rule has been affirmed in a number of cases, including the
relatively recent case of State v. Palmer, 902 S.W.2d 391 (Tenn.
1995), and an earlier case, Kennon v. Commercial Standard Ins.
Co., 52 Tenn. App. 521, 376 S.W.2d 703 (1963).
Although the Trial Judge did not specifically so state, implicit
in his determination is a finding that the provisions of the
Hospital Lien Statute repealed by implication the provision of 20-
5-106 that funds recovered would be free of claims of creditors.
We concur with the implicit finding of the Trial Court that the
Code Sections touching on the question are irreconcilable and that
the former was repealed by the latter.
Id. at 3-4.
We agree with Holston to the extent it holds that the provisions of the hospitals’ lien
statute are irreconcilable with the provisions of T.C.A. § 20-5-106 that funds recovered are free
from claims of creditors. Therefore, we hold that such provisions of T.C.A. § 20-5-106 do not
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apply in the face of an applicable and properly perfected hospital lien authorized by T.C.A. § 29-
22-101, et seq. (1980 and Supp. 1996).
In their brief, the Spiveys argue that this case should be remanded to the trial court to
determine the issue of whether the Med’s lien was properly perfected. The trial court did not
reach this issue because it decided that the wrongful death statute prevailed over the hospitals’
liens statute. A hospital’s lien must be perfected in accordance with T.C.A. § 29-22-102:
(a) In order to perfect such lien, the agent or operator of
the hospital, before or within one hundred twenty (120) days after
any such person shall have been discharged therefrom, shall file
in the office of the clerk of the circuit court of the county in
which the hospital is located, and in the county wherein the
patient resides, if a resident of this state, a verified statement in
writing setting forth the name and address of the patient as it
appears on the records of the hospital, and the name and address
of the operator thereof, the dates of admission and discharge of
the patient therefrom, the amount claimed to be due for such
hospital care, and to the best of the claimant’s knowledge, the
names and addresses of persons, firms or corporations claimed by
such ill or injured person or by his or her legal representative, to
be liable for damages arising from such illness or injuries.
(b) A copy of the claim shall, within ten (10) days from
the filing thereof be sent by registered mail, postage prepaid, to
each person, firm or corporation so claimed to be liable on
account of such illness or injuries, at the address given in the
statement, and to the attorney, or attorneys, representing the
person to whom services were rendered by the hospital if such
attorney, or attorneys, are known to the claimant or could, with
reasonable diligence, be known to the claimant.
T.C.A. § 29-22-102 (a), (b) (Supp. 1996).
The record contains the “Affidavit for Hospital Lien” filed by the Med in this case. The
lien appears to comply with the statute and directly tracks its language. Moreover, T.C.A. § 29-
22-102 (d) provides:
29-22-102. Perfecting lien - Filing and notice - contesting -
Effect of settlement or payment. -
* * *
(d) Any person desiring to contest such a lien or the
reasonableness of the charges thereof may do so by filing a
motion to quash or reduce the same in the circuit court of the
county in which the lien was perfected, making all other parties
in interest respondents thereto. Any such motion may be heard
in term time or vacation and at such time and place as maybe
fixed by order of the court.
Appellees’ only contention in the trial court was that the hospitals’ lien statute is not applicable
to wrongful death actions. Appellees have otherwise failed to contest the lien or the
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reasonableness of the charges in the trial court, and the issue may not be raised for the first time
on appeal. Simpson v. Frontier Community Credit Union, 810 S.W.2d 147, 153 (Tenn. 1991).
The Spiveys also argue that the Med is entitled to only one-third of the settlement
proceeds. The hospitals’ liens statute specifically addresses this issue: “The hospital lien,
however, shall not apply to any amount in excess of one-third (1/3) of the damages obtained or
recovered by such person by judgment, settlement or compromise rendered or entered into by
such person or his or her legal representative by virtue of the cause of action accruing thereto.”
T.C.A. § 29-22-101(b) (1980). The Med does not dispute that it is entitled to only one-third of
the $50,000.00 settlement in this case. We find that pursuant to the hospitals’ liens statute the
Med is entitled to judgment of $16,666.66.
Accordingly, the order of the trial court is reversed, and judgment is entered for the Med
in the amount of $16,666.66. This case is remanded to the trial court for such further
proceedings as may be necessary. Costs of appeal are assessed against appellees.
_________________________________
W. FRANK CRAWFORD,
PRESIDING JUDGE, W.S.
CONCUR:
____________________________________
ALAN E. HIGHERS, JUDGE
____________________________________
DAVID R. FARMER, JUDGE
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