Harlan White v. State of Tennessee, Department of Correction

HARLAN WHITE, )
)
Petitioner/Appellant, ) Appeal No.
) 01-A-01-9602-CH-00071
v. )
) Davidson Chancery
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) No. 95-1598-III
TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF )
CORRECTION, )
Respondents/Appellees.
)
) FILED
May 8, 1996
COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE Cecil W. Crowson
Appellate Court Clerk
MIDDLE SECTION AT NASHVILLE
APPEAL FROM THE CHANCERY COURT FOR DAVIDSON COUNTY
AT NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE
THE HONORABLE ROBERT S. BRANDT, CHANCELLOR
HARLAN WHITE, Pro Se
L.C.R.C.F.
Route 1, Box 330
Tiptonville, Tennessee 38079
CHARLES W. BURSON
Attorney General and Reporter
PATRICIA C. KUSSMANN
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights and Claims Division
404 James Robertson Parkway
Suite 2000
Nashville, Tennessee 37243
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENTS/APPELLEES
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED
SAMUEL L. LEWIS, JUDGE
O P I N I O N
This is an appeal by petitioner, Harlan White, from the
trial court’s order dismissing his petition for declaratory
judgment on the ground that petitioner failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies.
Petitioner filed a petition for declaratory judgment with
the Tennessee Department of Correction ("Department") in March
1995. He claimed the Department failed to calculate his sentence
expiration date for one conviction, his sentence reduction credits,
and the date upon which he would be eligible for parole
consideration. Based on a claim that the Department failed to
provide him a timely hearing, petitioner filed a petition for
declaratory judgment in the Chancery Court for Davidson County
against respondents on 22 May 1995.
On 30 May 1995, Wilma Lutche, legal assistant for the
Department of Correction, responded to petitioner’s request for
declaratory order by letter. In his response, Mr. Lutche advised
petitioner that the Department was postponing its decision on his
request until petitioner presented his questions to his counselor
who would then contact the institution’s record office and sentence
management services if necessary. Mr. Lutche further advised
petitioner that, if he had already attempted to resolve his
question through those channels, he should send the Department
documentation which verified his attempts. Petitioner filed a
motion for "judicial estopple [sic]" in regard to the letter and
attached a supplement to his petition and a request for oral
argument titled "writ of habeas corpus testificandum."
Petitioner subsequently moved to amend his petition to add
additional defendants who are employees of the Department and who
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are associated with petitioner’s records. The court denied his
motion in August 1995. Next, petitioner filed a written argument
asserting that the Department’s failure to calculate his sentence
in the manner he proposed in his petition was unconstitutional and
illegal.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss petitioner’s petition
in July 1995 on the ground that petitioner had failed to comply
with the jurisdictional prerequisites for filing a petition for
declaratory judgment. Respondents accompanied their motion with
the affidavit of Candace Whisman, a Department of Correction’s
sentence information service technician. The affidavit explained
the Department’s inability to calculate petitioner’s sentence
expiration date until it received information from the sentencing
court regarding petitioner’s sentence.
Before responding to the motion to dismiss, petitioner filed
a second supplement to his petition for declaratory order
explaining his calculation of his sentence. In response to the
respondents’ motion, petitioner insisted they had no legal grounds.
In a third supplement filed in August 1995, petitioner took issue
with the Department’s refusal to calculate his sentence before
receiving information from the sentencing court and complained he
had attempted to resolve the question at an institutional level.
The chancery court granted respondents’ motion on 30 August
1995 and dismissed petitioner’s petition on the ground that he had
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Petitioner is currently in the custody of the Department of
Correction at the Lake County Regional Correction Facility in
Tiptonville, Tennessee. After being convicted of armed robbery in
Shelby County in 1987, a court sentenced petitioner to ten years.
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Petitioner was paroled in March 1989, but then violated his parole
by possessing a handgun and committing forgery. He was returned to
the Department’s custody in April 1993.
Subsequently, a court convicted petitioner of forgery and
possession of a handgun in Shelby County, but it did not sentence
him until February 1994 at which time he received two concurrent
two-year sentences. One of the sentences stated that petitioner
was to serve the sentence consecutively to a conviction in case no.
8700833. The Department had no information about case no. 8700833
and was unable to calculate petitioner’s release eligibility date
until it received the information.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court properly
dismissed petitioner’s petition for declaratory judgment.
Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-224(b)(1991) provides:
"A declaratory judgment shall not be rendered concerning the
validity or applicability of a statute, rule or order unless a
complainant has petitioned the agency for a declaratory order and
the agency has refused to issue a declaratory order." In the
instant case, the Department has not refused to issue a declaratory
order. Instead, it is unable to do so because of petitioner’s
failure to resolve his complaint or to document his attempts to
resolve his complaint. Although petitioner provided the necessary
information to the trial court, we find nothing in the record to
show that he provided the Department with the information it needed
to respond to his request for a declaratory order. Therefore, a
declaratory judgment on this issue is premature.
The purpose of requiring that administrative remedies be
exhausted prior to judicial review are:
1) avoidance of premature interruption of the
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administrative process,
2) provision for the agency to apply its expertise
and to develop a record, and
3) maintenance of judicial efficiency by
elimination of as many complaints as may be through
the administrative process prior to judicial
review.
Seepe v. Department of the Navy, 518 F.2d 760, 764 (6th Cir. 1975).
In the instant case, the Department has not had the
opportunity to address petitioner’s complaint. If he has followed
the procedure outlined in the correspondence to him, he has failed
to provide the Department with any documentation of these attempts.
Simply initiating the administrative process, as petitioner has
done, is not the same as exhausting his administrative remedies.
He must pursue his remedies through the Department to their
conclusion. Bracey v. Woods, 571 S.W.2d 828, 829 (Tenn. 1978).
In the instant case, the Department was unable to issue a
declaratory order because petitioner had not met the prerequisites
for requesting a declaratory order nor had he documented his
attempts to resolve his questions through his counselor, the
institution’s record office personnel, or the sentencing
information services. It is possible that the process of
administrative review would resolve petitioner’s complaint and
would render a suit unnecessary. Until petitioner exhausts his
administrative remedies, this controversy is not ripe for
adjudication. The trial court properly dismissed the petition for
declaratory judgment.
Judgment of the trial court is affirmed, and the costs are
assessed to petitioner/appellant, Harlan White. The cause is
remanded to the trial court for further necessary proceedings.
__________________________________
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SAMUEL L. LEWIS, JUDGE
CONCUR:
_________________________________
HENRY F. TODD, P.J., M.S.
_________________________________
BEN H. CANTRELL, JUDGE
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