Eddie Cook v. Archie Glen Edwards, and wife Martha Sue Edwards

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
FILED
EDDIE COOK, in his capacity as )
HICKMAN COUNTY HIGHWAY ) November 5, 1998
SUPERINTENDENT, and THE )
HICKMAN COUNTY HIGHWAY ) Cecil W. Crowson
COMMISSION, ) Appellate Court Clerk
)
Plaintiffs/Appellees, )
) Appeal No.
) 01-A-01-9712-CH-00705
VS. )
) Hickman Chancery
) No. 9612187
ARCHIE GLEN EDWARDS and )
wife, MARTHA SUE EDWARDS, )
)
Defendants/Appellants. )
APPEALED FROM THE CHANCERY COURT OF HICKMAN COUNTY
AT CENTERVILLE, TENNESSEE
THE HONORABLE DONALD P. HARRIS, JUDGE
DANA DYE
P. O. Box 11
105 West End Avenue
Centerville, Tennessee 37033
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellees
JERRY SCOTT
JOHN KEA
110 City Center Building
100 East Vine Street
Murfreesboro, Tennessee 37133-1216
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART;
AND REMANDED
BEN H. CANTRELL, JUDGE
CONCUR:
KOCH, J.
CAIN, J.
OPINION
The Hickman County Road Superintendent filed a declaratory judgment
action to ascertain if an old cemetery road across the defendants’ property was a
public road. The Chancery Court of Hickman County ruled that the road was not a
public road but that the defendants’ property was subject to an easement created in
a deed in their chain of title. Since the court granted relief that no one had sought, to
individuals not parties to the action, we reverse.
I.
The complaint in this case, filed by the Highway Superintendent and the
members of the Highway Commission, named Archie Glen Edwards and his wife,
Martha Sue Edwards, as defendants, and sought a declaration that a road across the
Edwards’ property to the Bates Cemetery was a county road. After a hearing, the
chancellor held (1) that the road was not a public road, but (2) that the Edwards’
property is the servient estate of an express easement contained in a 1946 deed to
the Edwards’ predecessors in title. The deeds are in the record, but there was no
other evidence preserved at the hearing. The Edwards filed this appeal attacking the
holding that there was an easement across their property. The County Highway
Commission filed an appellee’s brief but did not raise any issues with respect to the
chancellor’s holding that the road was not a public road.
II.
Mr. and Mrs. Edwards assert that the portion of the lower court’s
judgment finding that their property is subject to an easement is void, because it was
not alleged in the pleadings. In an earlier dispensation we would have agreed and
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summarily reversed the lower court’s judgment. Our cases made it clear that the
court’s jurisdiction over a question “which it assumes to decide” was only invoked by
that question being raised in the pleadings. Isham v. Sienknecht, 59 S.W. 779 at 782
(Tenn. Ct. Chan. App. 1900). A judgment had to be justified by the facts alleged.
State v. Collier, 53 S.W.2d 982 (Tenn. 1932). Otherwise the judgment was
considered coram non judice. Loftis v. Dearing, 201 S.W.2d 655 (Tenn. 1947). See
also Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Jackson, 181 S.W.2d 625 (Tenn. 1944).
The question, now, however, is governed by Rule 54.03, Tenn. R. Civ.
Proc., which reflects a more liberal approach to pleading. Rule 54.03 provides that
“[e]very final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is
rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in the party’s
pleadings.” Under that provision we would hesitate to hold a judgment void where all
the necessary parties were before the court and the issue was fairly tried, even though
the issue was not raised in the pleadings. Rule 15.02, Tenn. R. Civ. Proc. also allows
the parties to try issues by express or implied consent. Thus, a judgment deciding an
issue not raised in the pleadings is no longer per se invalid.
The last part of Rule 54.03, however, imposes a due process
requirement on the trial court. It provides: “[T]he court shall not give the successful
party relief, though such party may be entitled to it, where the propriety of such relief
was not litigated and the opposing party had no opportunity to assert defenses to such
relief.” In this case the “successful party,” any person claiming the right to use the
easement, was not even before the court (the only plaintiffs being the Road
Superintendent and the Highway Commission.) The record does not reflect that the
easement issue was litigated or that the Edwards had an opportunity to defend that
issue. It is true that the burden is usually on the appellant to preserve the record for
review, State v. Banes, 874 S.W.2d 73 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993), but the appellant
may proceed with less than a full record, and the burden then shifts to the appellee
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to designate the parts of the record it deems essential. Rule 24(a), Tenn. R. App.
Proc. Since there was no party before the court having an interest in the easement,
it is understandable that the remaining part of the record was not designated. Thus,
on the state of the record before us, we hold that the trial court’s declaration of an
easement across the Edwards’ land must be reversed.
The judgment declaring an easement across the appellants’ land and
enjoining the appellants from closing the gates across the old road is reversed. In all
other respects the lower court’s judgment is affirmed and the cause is remanded to
the Chancery Court of Hickman County for any other proceedings that may become
necessary. Tax the costs on appeal to the appellees.
______________________________________
BEN H. CANTRELL, PRESIDING JUDGE, M.S.
CONCUR:
_____________________________
WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE
_____________________________
WILLIAM B. CAIN, JUDGE
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