Donna Haley v. American Honda

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN SECTION AT JACKSON
______________________________________________
DONNA F. HALEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Shelby Circuit No. 81147-8
Vs. C.A. No. 02A01-9704-CV-00086
AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO.,
INC., and COVINGTON PIKE MOTORS,
INC., d/b/a COVINGTON PIKE HONDA,
FILED
INC.,
October 29, 1997
Defendants-Appellees.
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
____________________________________________________________________________
Appellate C ourt Clerk
FROM THE SHELBY COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
THE HONORABLE D’ARMY BAILEY, JUDGE
Robert L. J. Spence, Jr; The Hardison Law Firm, P.C., of Memphis
For Plaintiff-Appellant
R. Dale Bay; John R. Tarpley; Susan R. High-McAuley
Lewis, King, Krieg, Waldrop & Caltron, P.C. of Nashville
For Defendants-Appellees
AFFIRMED
Opinion filed:
W. FRANK CRAWFORD,
PRESIDING JUDGE, W.S.
CONCUR:
ALAN E. HIGHERS, JUDGE
HOLLY KIRBY LILLARD, JUDGE
This is a products liability case. Plaintiff Donna F. Haley appeals the order of the trial
court granting summary judgment to defendants American Honda Motor Co. and Covington Pike
Motors, Inc.
Plaintiff’s complaint filed August 30, 1996 alleges that plaintiff sustained personal
injuries in an automobile accident that occurred on June 1, 1995. She avers that at the time of
the accident she was driving her 1990 Honda Accord LX automobile which she had purchased
from the defendant, Covington Pike Motors, Inc., d/b/a Covington Pike Honda on November 30,
1994. She alleges that the vehicle manufactured by defendant American Honda Motor
Company, Inc., and sold by defendant Covington Pike Motors, Inc., was unreasonably dangerous
in that it was “defectively designed, manufactured, assembled and sold.” The complaint alleges
in particular that the vehicle was defectively designed because: (1) the seat belt released and
permitted plaintiff to strike the steering wheel; (2) excessive slack was permitted to develop and
(3) the seat belt was not adequate to provide safety support for a front-end type collision. The
complaint further avers that the vehicle was unreasonably dangerous and caused injuries to
plaintiff. The complaint further alleges that defendant, American Honda Motor Company, Inc.,
was negligent because of improper design, failure to warn, and inadequate testing of the seat
belts on the vehicle.
The complaint further avers that defendant, Covington Pike Motors, Inc., was negligent
by failing to warn of the defective condition and to exercise reasonable and ordinary care in the
sale of the vehicle.
The complaint also alleges that both defendants breached the warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, and that the breach of these warranties
directly caused or failed to prevent injuries suffered by plaintiff.
Both defendants filed answers in response to the complaint in which they deny the
material allegations of the complaint and join issue thereon. They also rely upon affirmative
defenses, including the statute of limitations. Subsequently, defendants filed a joint motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim and in the alternative for summary judgment.
In support of the motion for summary judgment, defendants filed the affidavit of
Covington Pike Honda’s general manager, Benny Aiken. Mr. Aiken’s affidavit states that the
Honda automobile in question was first received new from American Honda Motor Company,
Inc., and was sold as a new vehicle by Covington Pike Honda to A. Joel Henry and K. Dana
Henry on January 24, 1990. Some years later, the Honda was re-acquired from another
dealership and placed in the used car inventory and was sold to plaintiff on October 19, 1994.
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The automobile was sold to plaintiff in an “as is” condition and all warranties were explicitly
disclaimed by Covington Pike Honda. Copies of the sale documents were attached as exhibits
to the affidavit. The retail buyers order signed by the plaintiff shows on its face in a conspicuous
manner that all warranties were disclaimed, including the implied warranties of merchantability
and fitness for a particular purpose. The plaintiff acknowledged such disclaimer and
acknowledged that the vehicle was purchased and accepted “as is.”
The only proof by plaintiff in opposition to the motions for summary judgment is the
affidavit of plaintiff, which we quote:
COMES NOW the affiant, Donna F. Haley, after being duly
sworn, deposes and states as follows:
1. I am Donna F. Haley, an adult resident of Memphis, Shelby
County, Tennessee.
2. I am the plaintiff in the above-styled cause of action.
3. On or about November 30, 1994, I purchased a 1990 Honda
Accord LX from the defendant, Covington Pike Motors, Inc.
d/b/a Covington Pike Honda, Inc. At the time I purchased this
vehicle the seat belts were covered by a lifetime warranty.
4. I was involved in a motor vehicle accident while driving the
1990 Honda Accord LX, as set forth above, on or about June 1,
1995.
5. In this accident my vehicle was struck on the driver’s side
door and thereafter struck a pole. As a result of the injuries
sustained, I was transported via ambulance to the Med where I
was admitted and diagnosed as suffering from bilateral
pneumothoraces. I was hospitalized at the Regional Medical
Center from June 1, 1995 through June 8, 1995, and thereafter
transferred for further treatment at the Baptist Hospital Central
from June 8, 1995 through June 25, 1995.
6. The mechanics of how I was injured in the vehicle were not
known to me at the time of the accident or at any time thereafter
until August 15, 1996, when the national Highway Traffic
Administration made known to the public that the seat belts my
[sic] 1990 Honda Accord LX were faulty and defective.
7. When I purchased my vehicle I was not aware that the
seatbelts were defective and unreasonable [sic] dangerous.
Although the trial court’s order does not specify the basis for granting summary
judgment, it is apparent that the summary judgment on the implied warranty claim was granted
because there is no genuine issue of material fact. Summary judgment was granted on the
products liability causes of action because they are barred by the statute of limitations. The only
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issue for review is whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendants.
Although plaintiff filed her suit more than one year after her accident and resulting
injuries, she asserted in the trial court and asserts in this Court that the applicable statutes of
limitation were tolled because the defendants fraudulently concealed the cause of action.
Plaintiff’s attorneys argued in the trial court that plaintiff saw an article in the newspaper, USA
Today, on or about August 15, 1996, that stated that the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration may seek civil penalties against American Honda for “withholding information
about potentially faulty seatbelts in 1986 - 91 cars.” We mention this only by way of explanation
because there is nothing in the record to support plaintiff’s position other than her affidavit
previously quoted.
Defendants assert that plaintiff has not properly pleaded claims for either fraud or
fraudulent concealment, and in any case has offered no evidence in the record to support her
theory of fraudulent concealment. Defendants argue that the seat belt either performed properly
or malfunctioned at the time of the accident and that plaintiff should have known of any possible
cause of action against defendants immediately. Even if she did not discover her cause of action
at the time of injury, Ms. Haley had ample opportunity after the accident to inspect the seat belt
and determine whether it failed or not. Defendants argue that Ms. Haley has offered no evidence
that her seat belt was in any way defective, nor has she demonstrated how the defendants could
have possibly concealed any defect from her.
A trial court should grant a motion for summary judgment only if the movant
demonstrates that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.03; Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208,
210 (Tenn. 1993); Dunn v. Hackett, 833 S.W.2d 78, 80 (Tenn. App. 1992). The party moving
for summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact
exists. Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 210. When a motion for summary judgment is made, the court must
consider the motion in the same manner as a motion for directed verdict made at the close of the
plaintiff's proof; that is, "the court must take the strongest legitimate view of the evidence in
favor of the nonmoving party, allow all reasonable inferences in favor of that party, and discard
all countervailing evidence." Id. at 210-11. In Byrd, the Tennessee Supreme Court stated:
Once it is shown by the moving party that there is no genuine
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issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must then
demonstrate, by affidavits or discovery materials, that there is a
genuine, material fact dispute to warrant a trial. In this regard,
Rule 56.05 provides that the nonmoving party cannot simply rely
upon his pleadings but must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial.
Id. at 211. (citations omitted)(emphasis in original). The summary judgment process should
only be used as a means of concluding a case when there are no genuine issues of material fact,
and the case can be resolved on the legal issues alone. Id. at 210 (citing Bellamy v. Federal
Express Corp., 749 S.W.2d 31, 33 (Tenn. 1988)).
NEGLIGENCE & STRICT LIABILITY CLAIMS
Tennessee Code Annotated § 28-3-104(a)(1) provides that actions for injuries to the
person must be commenced within one (1) year after the cause of action accrues. Additionally,
T.C.A. § 29-28-103(a) provides that products liability actions involving personal injury must be
brought within the period of time specified in T.C.A. § 28-3-104. In products liability cases the
cause of action for injury to the person generally accrues on the date of the personal injury.
T.C.A. § 28-3-104(b)(1) (Supp. 1996). However, Tennessee follows the “discovery rule” in
personal injury actions which provides that:
the cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run when the
injury occurs or is discovered, or when in the exercise of reasonable care and
diligence, it should have been discovered. . . . The discovery rule applies only in
cases where the plaintiff does not discover and reasonably could not be expected
to discover that he had a right of action.
Potts v. Celotex Corp., 796 S.W.2d 678 (Tenn. 1990) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff asserts that she could not reasonably have been expected to discover that she had
a cause of action against the defendants because they “knowingly and willfully” withheld
information from the public regarding potentially defective seat belts. On the other hand,
defendants assert that plaintiff must have known at the time of the accident whether the seat belt
malfunctioned or not. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that “the seat belt released and permitted
plaintiff to strike the steering wheel of her vehicle,” and that “said seat belt was further defective
in that it permitted excessive slack to develop.” If those allegations are true, it is difficult to
understand how American Honda or Covington Pike Motors could possibly have concealed this
from her. Ms. Haley stated in her affidavit that:
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The mechanics of how I was injured in the vehicle were not
known to me at the time of the accident or at any time thereafter
until August 15, 1996, when the National Highway Traffic
Administration made known to the public that the seat belts my
[sic] 1990 Honda Accord LX were faulty and defective.
We question how learning of possible defects in Honda seat belts through a newspaper article
suddenly put Ms. Haley on notice of the mechanics of how she was injured in her particular
accident.
Even if we assume that the defendants’ alleged failure to warn of known defects in
certain seat belts amounted to fraud, crucial elements of fraudulent concealment are lacking. The
Tennessee Supreme Court has held that:
[A] plaintiff who seeks to toll a statute of limitations on the ground of fraudulent
concealment must prove that the cause of action was known to and fraudulently
concealed by the defendant. Knowledge on the part of the [defendant] of the
facts giving rise to a cause of action is an essential element of fraudulent
concealment. Concealment is also an essential element and it may consist of
withholding information or making use of some device to mislead, thus involving
act and intention.
Generally, a plaintiff seeking to establish fraudulent concealment must
prove that the defendant took affirmative action to conceal the cause of action
and that the plaintiff could not have discovered the cause of action despite
exercising reasonable diligence.
Benton v. Snyder, 825 S.W.2d 409, 414 (Tenn. 1992) (emphasis added)(citations omitted). See
also Soldano v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 696 S.W.2d 887 (Tenn. 1985) (stating that
the statute of limitations begins to run at the time of the discovery of the fraud by the plaintiff
if the plaintiff could not have discovered his cause of action despite exercising reasonable
diligence).
In the case at bar, plaintiff’s use of the seat belt would alert her to any defect that would
allow the restraint to fail, and she was, at the very least, put on inquiry as to how she sustained
her injuries. In the record before us, summary judgment on the negligence and strict liability
claims was proper.
BREACH OF WARRANTY CLAIMS
Ms. Haley’s complaint alleged that both American Honda and Covington Pike Motors
breached the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. Ms. Haley also
asserts that the seat belts in her Honda were covered by a lifetime warranty, however, her
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complaint contains no such allegation.1 The only evidence in the record to this effect is a
statement by Ms. Haley in her affidavit that: “At the time I purchased this vehicle the seat belts
were covered by a lifetime warranty.” From examining the transcript of the hearing on the
defendants’ motions, it seems that some statement in the USA Today article alludes to a lifetime
warranty on Honda seat belts. This article is not part of the record. However, the record does
contain documents from Covington Pike Motors wherein Ms. Haley acknowledged by her
signature that the vehicle she purchased was “as is,” and that all warranties express and implied,
including the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, were
expressly disclaimed. Under Tennessee law, both express and implied warranties may be
disclaimed. T.C.A. § 47-2-316 (1996). “[U]nless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all
implied warranties are excluded by expressions like ‘as is,’ . . . or other language which in
common understanding calls the buyer’s attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain
that there is no implied warranty.” T.C.A. § 47-2-316(3)(a) (1996). See Malone v. Moore
Oldsmobile, Pontiac, GMC, Inc., 1988 WL 36455 (Tenn. App. 1988). The evidence shows that
Ms. Haley’s signature appeared a total of eight times beneath the various disclaimer clauses in
the sales contract. When faced with a motion for summary judgment, the party opposing the
motion cannot simply rely on her pleadings, but must set forth specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.06. When considering the
evidence presented by defendants of the warranty disclaimers, Ms. Haley’s uncorroborated
statement in her affidavit that the seat belts came with a lifetime warranty is not a sufficient
“specific fact” to create a genuine issue for trial as to the existence of any warranty. This
statement simply does not rise to the dignity of evidence that will support plaintiff’s claim. See
Perryman v. Peterbilt of Knoxville, Inc., 708 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Tenn. App. 1985).
The order of the trial court granting summary judgment is affirmed. Costs of appeal are
assessed against the appellant.
1
The defendants point out that Ms. Haley raised the issue of a lifetime warranty on
the seat belts on the day of the hearing on this matter. We agree that her complaint does not
properly allege a breach of a lifetime seat belt warranty, but hold that the argument is moot
because even if properly alleged, Ms. Haley has offered no competent proof of such a
warranty.
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___________________________
W. FRANK CRAWFORD
PRESIDING JUDGE, W.S.
CONCUR:
________________________________
ALAN E. HIGHERS, JUDGE
________________________________
HOLLY KIRBY LILLARD, JUDGE
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