Ronnie Bradfield v. Steve Dotson

IN T H E C O U R T O F A P P E A L S O F T E N N E S S E E ,
A T J A C K S O N
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FL E
I D
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R O N N IE B R A D F IE L D , ) L a k e C o u n ty C ir c u it C o u r t
) N o . 9 5 -7 3 0 8
P la in tiff/A p p e lla n t. )
) A u g u s t 1 6 , 1 9 9 9
V S . ) C .A . N o . 0 2 A 0 1 - 9 9 0 2 - C V - 0 0 0 6 0
) C e c il C r o w s o n , J r .
S T E V E D O T S O N , e t a l, ) A p p e lla te C o u r t C le r k
)
D e f e n d a n t s / A p p e l le e s . )
)
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F ro m th e C irc u it C o u rt o f L a k e C o u n ty a t T ip to n v ille .
H o n o r a b le R . L e e M o o r e , J r ., J u d g e
R o n n ie B r a d fie ld , P r o S e
P a u l G . S u m m e r s , A tto r n e y G e n e r a l a n d R e p o rte r
M ic h a el E . M o o r e , S o lic ito r G e n e r a l
M ic h a e l L . H a y n i e , A s s is ta n t A tto r n e y G e n e r a l
A tto rney s for D e f e n d a n t s / A p p e l le e s .
O P IN IO N F IL E D :
A F F IR M E D A N D R E M A N D E D
F A R M E R , J .
C R A W F O R D , P .J ., W .S .: ( C o n c u rs )
L I L L A R D , J .: ( C o n c u rs )
This is the third occasion which this Court has had to address the merits of this case.
By prior opinions and judgments entered on September 6, 1996, and February 17, 1998, respectively,
the Court addressed previous issues on appeal. In the interests of judicial efficiency, the Court
adopts and incorporates herein the following recitation of facts contained in our opinion entered in
this cause on February 17, 1998:
In this case, an inmate at a state correctional institution filed
a defamation [lawsuit] in circuit court against two state employees.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants,
holding that the Tennessee Claims Commission had exclusive
jurisdiction over the matter. The trial court also denied the plaintiff's
requests for default judgment. . . .
Plaintiff/Appellant Ronnie Bradfield (a.k.a. Paul Farnsworth)
(“Bradfield”), an inmate at the Lake County Regional Correctional
Facility (“Correctional Facility”), is no stranger to this court. In
October of 1995, Bradfield filed a pro se complaint in Lake County
Circuit Court against Defendant/Appellee Ouida Stamper
(“Stamper”), a state probation officer, and Defendant/Appellee Steve
Dotson (“Dotson”), an associate warden at the Correctional Facility.
Bradfield's complaint alleges:
The defendant(s), willing with Malice and
intent, defame the Character of the Plaintiff, as well
as, falsified information to the Criminal Courts of
Shelby County, on September 20th, 1995. Of
information that the Defendant(s) knew was incorrect,
as well as, no foundation to prove there action(s)
and/or words Slanderous and damaging to the
Plaintiff legal Litigation which did affect his legal
litigation and cause his serve harm.
In January 1996, the defendants filed a motion for dismissal
based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction and lack of personal
jurisdiction pursuant to Rules 12.02(1) and 12.02(2) of the Tennessee
Rules of Civil Procedure. The motion asserted that the Tennessee
Claims Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to hear the case,
pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 9-8-307(a)(1)(R) (1997).
There were no affidavits or other documents to support the motion.
The trial court granted the defendants’ motion. Bradfield
appealed the dismissal. This Court, finding “nothing in the record to
establish lack of subject matter jurisdiction,” issued an order vacating
the trial court’s order and remanding the case.
On remand, the defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment. The motion was supported by affidavits filed by Stamper
and Dotson. The affidavits stated that Bradfield’s complaint
concerned a pre-sentence report prepared and submitted by Stamper
and Dotson for use at Bradfield's sentencing hearing. Stamper
testified in her affidavit that the pre-sentence report was the only
information she had ever provided to the Shelby County Criminal
Court concerning Bradfield. Dotson testified in his affidavit that he
never provided any information about Bradfield directly to the Shelby
County Criminal Court, but that he provided “certain information . . .
regarding [Bradfield’s] adaptation to prison life” to Stamper, with the
understanding that this would be included in Bradfield's presentence
report. Both defendants testified that the information was provided
“in the course and scope” of their employment with the State.
The trial court granted the defendants’ motion and dismissed
the case.
Bradfield v. Dotson, No. 02A01-9707-CV-00152, 1998 WL 63521, at *1 (Tenn. App. Feb. 17,
1998) (footnote omitted).
On appeal from that order, Bradfield claimed that the trial court erred by failing to
award him a default judgment and by dismissing his complaint on summary judgment. This Court
determined that it was inappropriate for the trial court to have granted the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment without considering the plaintiff’s request that the trial court compel the
defendants to respond to his discovery requests. Therefore, by opinion and judgment entered
February 17, 1998, this Court reversed the trial court’s order of summary judgment and remanded
the cause to the trial court to consider Bradfield’s motion to compel discovery. Bradfield v. Dotson,
1998 WL 63521, at *4.
On remand, the trial court ordered the defendants to respond to Bradfield’s discovery
requests by April 17, 1998. On November 9, 1998, the trial court entered an order stating that the
defendants had responded to all written discovery, closing discovery, and giving the parties thirty
days in which to file any additional pleadings. On December 9, 1998, the defendants filed a motion
for summary judgment, and the plaintiff filed a response on January 7, 1999. By order entered
February 3, 1999, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and
dismissed the lawsuit. The trial court ruled that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the
suit and also determined that the defendants had acted within the course of their employment with
the State of Tennessee. Bradfield timely filed a notice of appeal on February 22, 1999, and the cause
is properly before this Court.
On appeal, the Court first addresses the issue of whether the trial court lacked
jurisdiction over a defamation action brought against two employees of the State of Tennessee who
were acting within the scope of their employment. T.C.A. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(R) (Supp. 1995) provides
in relevant part:
(a)(1) The commission or each commissioner sitting
individually has exclusive jurisdiction to determine all
monetary claims against the state falling within one
(1) or more of the following categories:
....
(R) Claims for libel and/or slander where a
state employee is determined to be acting within the
scope of employment.
In an affidavit dated April 23, 1997, defendant Ouida Stamper stated in relevant part:
2. In Mr. Bradfield’s complaint, he alleges that I defamed
him by knowingly providing false information about him to the
Shelby County Criminal Court. The only information that I have ever
provided to the Shelby County Criminal Court about Mr. Bradfield
was in the form of a presentence report I prepared in September, 1995
at the court’s request for use at his sentencing hearing following
criminal convictions for attempted first degree murder, possession of
a firearm by a convicted felon and carrying a firearm during a judicial
proceeding.
3. The preparation and submission of this presentence report
by me was carried out in the course and scope of my employment
with the State as a Probation Manager for the TDOC.
4. In fact, the only involvement or contact that I have ever
had with Mr. Bradfield has been involvement or contact while in the
course of my employment with the State.
In a second affidavit sworn on December 3, 1998, defendant Stamper stated in
pertinent part:
2. I am currently employed by the Tennessee Department of
Correction as a Probation Manager and was so employed at all times
pertinent to the allegations in the complaint.
3. As a probation manager for the TDOC, I supervise
approximately 20 probation officers. My particular division, Division
of Field Services, Delta Region, is responsible for production and
delivery of Presentence Reports to the ten Divisions of Criminal
Court in Shelby County Tennessee.
4. In mid-September 1995 I received an Order for Pre-
sentence Report from the Sixth Division of the Shelby County
Criminal Court. . . . That Order directed an investigation into the
background of Ronnie Bradfield and a subsequent report . . . .
5. Pursuant to the Court’s Order, I conducted a presentence
investigation of Ronnie Bradfield for the purpose of preparing a
presentence report to be submitted to the Court as directed.
6. As part of my investigation, I contacted Associate Warden
Dotson in order to obtain information concerning Ronnie
Bradfield. . . .
7. . . . I specifically contacted Associate Warden Dotson, as
he was the appropriate individual in the chain of command within the
TDOC and was the best source of information concerning
Bradfield. . . .
....
9. Upon completion of the investigation, I filed a presentence
report with the Sixth Division of the Shelby County Criminal Court
as directed by that Court’s Order.
Likewise, in Associate Warden Steve Dotson’s affidavit sworn on April 23, 1997,
Dotson stated in pertinent part:
2. In Mr. Bradfield’s complaint, he alleges that I defamed
him by knowingly providing false information about him to the
Shelby County Criminal Court. I have never directly provided any
information about Mr. Bradfield to the Shelby County Criminal
Court. However, in response to an inquiry from TDOC Probation
Manager Ouida Stamper’s office, I did provide certain information to
her regarding plaintiff’s adaptation to prison life. It is my
understanding that this information was included in a presentence
report prepared and submitted by her to the Shelby County Criminal
Court at the court’s request.
3. The submission of information about Mr. Bradfield to Ms.
Stamper was an act on my part which was taken in the course and
scope of my employment with the State as Associate Warden at
LCRCF.
In the second affidavit sworn to on December 2, 1998, Dotson stated in relevant part:
2. At all times pertinent to this action I was employed by the
Tennessee Department of Correction as the Associate Warden of
Operations at Lake County Correctional Facility (LCRCF).
....
4. One of my responsibilities as associate warden was to
provide necessary information to TDOC probation managers in the
Division of Field Services who were conducting presentence
investigations of inmates currently incarcerated at LCRCF.
The unrefuted affidavits from defendants Dotson and Stamper clearly establish that
they were each acting within the course and scope of their employment with the State of Tennessee.
T.C.A. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(R) (1992) expressly provides that the Claims Commission has exclusive
jurisdiction over claims for libel and slander against state employees acting within the scope of their
employment. This conclusion is not contrary to the holding of this Court in our earlier opinion
entered in regard to this cause on September 6, 1996. See Bradfield v. Dotson, No. 02A01-9604-
CV-00075, 1996 WL 502499 (Tenn. App. Sept. 6, 1996) (memorandum opinion). The earlier
opinion merely stated that there was nothing in the record before the Court at that time to establish
a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Since entry of that opinion, each defendant has introduced into
the record two unrefuted affidavits which establish that the defendants were acting within the course
and scope of their employment at all times relevant hereto. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude
that the trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff’s claims on the ground of lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
Assuming arguendo that the trial court did, in fact, have jurisdiction over this cause,
the Court concludes that Bradfield’s claims of defamation necessarily fail for two reasons. First, the
statements made by defendant Stamper were absolutely privileged, since her statements were made
in the course of a judicial proceeding. The Tennessee Supreme Court has held that “statements made
in the course of a judicial proceeding that are relevant and pertinent to the issues involved are
absolutely privileged and cannot be the predicate for liability in an action for libel.” Lambdin
Funeral Serv., Inc. v. Griffith, 559 S.W.2d 791, 792 (Tenn. 1978); Jones v. Trice, 360 S.W.2d 48,
50 (Tenn. 1962). On prior occasions, this Court has indicated that this concept is to be liberally
construed in order to insure unfettered access to the judicial process. Tabor v. Eakin, No. 03A01-
9902-CV-00043, 1999 WL 330318, at *3 (Tenn. App. May 26, 1999); Myers v. Pickering Firm,
Inc., 959 S.W.2d 152, 161 (Tenn. App. 1997).
Stamper’s presentence report to the Shelby County Criminal Court was absolutely
privileged because her submission of the report was pertinent to and in the course of a judicial
proceeding. Sentencing hearings are judicial proceedings in Tennessee. T.C.A. § 40-35-209(a)
(1997). Moreover, it appears that the presentence report at issue in this case complies with T.C.A.
§ 40-35-207(a), which sets forth the contents of such reports.
As a second basis, the Court concludes that defendant Dotson’s communications with
defendant Stamper do not constitute defamation as that term as been defined by our courts. This
Court has recognized that publication is a necessary element of any defamation claim. Woods v.
Helmi, 758 S.W.2d 219 (Tenn. App. 1988). In Woods, this Court held that “communication among
agents of the same corporation made within the scope and course of their employment relative to
duties performed for that corporation are not to be considered as statements communicated or
publicized to third persons.” Id. at 223. See also Freeman v. Dayton Scale Co., 19 S.W.2d 255(Tenn. 1929). The unrefuted affidavits supplied by the defendants establish that all communication
between them concerning Bradfield was made in the course and scope of the defendants’
employment with the State of Tennessee. Therefore, we conclude that defendant Dotson did not
publish defamatory information as that term has been defined.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the trial court dismissing Bradfield’s cause of
action is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are taxed to Mr. Bradfield, for which execution may issue
if necessary.
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FARMER, J.
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CRAWFORD, P.J., W.S. (Concurs)
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LILLARD, J. (Concurs)