Estate of Francis Logwood

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
FILED
AT KNOXVILLE
June 25, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt
Clerk
IN RE: ) SULLIVAN CHANCERY
ESTATE OF ) (No. P-95-8140)
FRANCIS M. LOGWOOD, )
DECEASED ) NO. 03A01-9902-PB-00042
)
) HON. RICHARD E. LADD
) CHANCELLOR
)
) AFFIRMED
Joel A. Conkin, Kingsport, for the Appellant.
Shelburne Ferguson, Jr., Kingsport, for the Appellee.
OPINION
INMAN, Senior Judge
I
The testator, Francis M. Logwood, died November 14, 1995. The issue in
this case is the proper interpretation of a holographic codicil to his will. The
codicil
reads:
3-10-93
I write this addition to my will on this day, of my personal belongings
Grandfather Logwood’s gold pocket watch, in my top left hand
drawer of chest of drawers in front bedroom, shall go to Jimmy
Broome of Greenville, SC or the great grandchild-
All of my model railroads are to go to my brother-in-law Douglas
Nelson, Sr.
All bank cars etc. are also to be Douglas Nelson, Sr. -My new Buick
if in good condition shall be given to Douglas Nelson, Sr.
All cameras, slides, movies and VCR tapes are to go to my daughter
Sharon - This includes albums and projectors
All furniture in the house shall be given to the Nelson family that
came from the old home place -
Sharon shall have say so of all others -
The will shall be followed thru by Sharon with the help of Douglas
Nelson, Sr.
I write this will so that my personal belongings go to those I wish to
have them. I’m in sound mind and good health as I write this.
Francis M. Logwood (Signature)
March 10, 1993
Will of Personal Belongings
March 10, 1993
II
The executrix and widow, Wayne Rule Logwood, proposed to distribute the
net estate to herself pursuant to the provisions of the will. The daughter of the
testator from his first marriage, Sharon L. Jones, objected to such proposed
distribution for the reason that the language “Sharon shall have say so of all other
personal belongings” gave her a general power of appointment over all of the
testator’s personal property not otherwise specifically devised by the codicil.
The Chancellor, sitting in Probate, held that the codicil was not ambiguous,
and that it was the intent of the testator that Sharon L. Jones would have decision-
making power only as to tangible, personal property such as that mentioned in the
codicil, which excluded cash, corporate stock, and bonds. The experienced
Chancellor explained:
THE COURT:
These cases are always difficult where there is a death of one spouse
and the remarriage of the surviving spouse, and especially difficult
when the property can be traced to the deceased’s spouse’s side of the
family and goes to the new spouse. The children feel like they have
some inherent right to get the property their parents had. Under the
law, there’s no inherent right for that. I think it’s all too easy for
children with that thought to overlook that -- the comfort a new
spouse may give to their parent. In any event, I feel there’s no
ambiguity here; but, as Ms. Jones said, Mr. Logwood changed his
mind a lot. I don’t have any doubt that he told her and his son-in-law
that this stock that had belonged to Betty Logwood would come to
her, but he didn’t do that, and I don’t think there’s any ambiguity
here. The codicil clearly is just to take care of tangible, personal
property. Looking at the entire -- both instruments and all of the
surrounding circumstances, I don’t feel like there’s any doubt in that.
I’m not saying it’s fair for the present Ms. Logwood to get stock and
money that came through Betty Logwood. That’s not the purpose
here today. The purpose is to interpret the intent of Mr. Frances
Logwood, and I think his intent was clear -- that the things that meant
the most to him -- tangible, personal property -- that had some
intrinsic value to the family would go back to the family; whereas,
those that really had no intrinsic value -- money -- he felt like should
go to his spouse, to see that she was taken care of the rest of her life.
So I find that the codicil only applies to the tangible, personal
property -- the furniture, clothes, automobile, trains. It did not apply
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to any bank accounts, stocks, bonds or other intangible, personal
property.
III
Ms. Jones appeals, and presents for review the issue of whether the “power
of appointment” was limited to tangible personal property, and the additional issue
of whether she was entitled to recover her attorney’s fees from the estate.
Our review of the findings of fact made by the trial Court is de novo upon
the record of the trial Court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of
the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. TENN. R. APP.
P., RULE 13(d); Campbell v. Florida Steel Corp., 919 S.W.2d 26 (Tenn. 1996).
IV
Before his marriage to Wayne Rule Logwood, the testator was married to
Bettye Nelson Logwood for over forty years, with whom he had his only child,
Sharon Logwood Jones. Ms. Bettye Nelson Logwood, who died on January 26,
1991, owned, among other items, shares of AT&T, BellSouth, and Potomac
Electric Company stock, which she had inherited from her mother, Mary Inman
Nelson. This stock was bequeathed to Francis Logwood by his wife, Bettye
Nelson Logwood.
The testator married Wayne Lockard Rule on December 18, 1992, and on
that day they executed an Antenuptial Agreement which provided that “each party
recognizes that the other has obligations toward his and/or her family that should
be protected by means of this Agreement . . .” Specifically, the Agreement
protected the individual assets owned by each party prior to the marriage from any
claims of elective share, homestead, curtesy, and year’s support by the surviving
spouse. It also provided that the testator was to provide a trust funded by his
probate estate for the benefit of Wayne Rule Logwood for her life with the
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remaining principal and accumulated income to pass to Sharon Logwood Jones
outright and free of trust.
The testator did not set up such a trust in his Will; rather, his typewritten
Last Will and Testament left all of his property both real and personal, tangible and
intangible, to Wayne Rule Logwood outright, subject to the codicil which he wrote
about a month later.
The codicil refers to specific items of personal property: “Grandfather
Logwood’s gold pocket watch, all bank cars, my new Buick, all camera, slides,
movies and VCR tapes, albums and projectors, all furniture in the home that came
from the old home place.” We agree with the Chancellor, under familiar rules of
construction to ascertain the intent of the testator, that the codicil only applied to
tangible personal property as described in the codicil, and that the testator did not
intend to include intangible property.
The meaning of the words “Sharon shall have say so of all others” should be
ascertained from the context of the codicil which will ensure that the disposition
of the testator’s assets will be according to his volition. Moore v. Neely, 370
S.W.2d 537 (Tenn. 1963).
In Lee v. Hale, 562 S.W.2d 190 (Tenn. 1978), the Supreme Court held
that the phrase “any other of my personal possessions which may be left” had
reference to items of tangible personal property, and not to cash in banks,
following the generally accepted rule that where the testator used words in a
certain sense, the Court should do likewise. 80 Am.Jur. Wills, 1156.
The appellant argues that, in context, the words “Sharon shall have say so
of all others” should be read as “Sharon shall have say so of all other personal
belongings,” because “others” refers to the phrase “personal belongings,” which
encompasses intangible property such as cash, citing Travis v. Randolph, 172
Tenn. 396 (Tenn. 1938). We agree with the appellee that both the will and the
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codicil should be studied to ascertain intent, which impels the conclusion that
the testator intended to bequeath certain family items to other family members.
V
The Chancellor disallowed attorney fees to the appellant, who argues that
‘a prospective beneficiary should be awarded her attorney fees when a suit for
construction inures to the benefit of an estate, citing Leaver v. McBride, 506
S.W.2d 141 (Tenn. 1974). This case is not apposite, because the will (in
Leaver) “had to be construed” and “the testatrix’s true intent was established.”
Moreover, the beneficiaries who claimed their attorney fees were impleaded by
the Executor, unlike the appellant in the case at Bar, who instituted this
litigation.
We are unable to fathom any benefit accruing to the Logwood estate as a
result of the filing of the objections to the final distribution of assets by a
beneficiary claiming more than the will and codicil bequeathed her. The
Chancellor held that the codicil was not ambiguous. We agree. He also held,
by implication, that the grounds stated in the objection would have defeated the
testator’s intention, and that the litigation did not benefit the estate. See, In re
Eppinger’s Estate, 336 S.W.2d 28 (Tenn. 1960). We agree.
The judgment is affirmed at the costs of the appellant.
_______________________________
William H. Inman, Senior Judge
CONCUR:
_______________________________
Herschel P. Franks, Judge
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_______________________________
Charles D. Susano, Jr., Judge
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