In Re: Meader

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN SECTION AT KNOXVILLE FILED
October 30, 1997
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
) BLEDSOE CHANCERY Clerk
Appellate C ourt
)
IN RE: ESTATE OF ) NO. 03A01-9707-CH-00252
)
JAMES C. MEADER, DECEASED ) HON. G. RICHARD JOHNSON
) CHANCELLOR
)
)
) AFFIRMED
OPINION
INMAN, Senior Judge
I
The decedent, James C. Meader, died testate in Bledsoe County,
Tennessee on May 23, 1995. His will was duly propounded for probate and
letters testamentary were issued to his widow, Virginia Meader.
In 1966, the decedent and his first wife were divorced in Milwaukee
County, Wisconsin. Custody of five (5) children was awarded to their mother;
the decedent was ordered to pay $45.00 per week child support.
He paid nothing. In Wisconsin the age of majority is 19, and the children
attained majority in 1970, 1971, 1972, 1974 and 1977, respectively. The
decedent having defaulted in his natural and legal obligation to support his
children, the State of Wisconsin and the County of Milwaukee stepped in and
provided partial support for the children until each attained majority. The State
of Wisconsin filed a claim against the estate of the decedent to recover
$47,728.86 paid to the mother in the form of aid to dependent children; the
mother, Joyce Bunnell, one of the appellants, filed a claim for $32,590.04 for
support arrearages, and the County of Milwaukee filed a modest claim for
$320.00 to recover certain fees.
To each of these claims the executrix filed exceptions, pleading the
statute of limitations of ten (10) years [T.C.A. § 28-3-110(2)]. The trial court
sustained the exceptions, holding that the claims were barred by the affirmative
defense of the statute of limitations of ten years.
II
So far as we know, all civil actions in this jurisdiction are subject to a
statute of limitations. T.C.A. § 28-3-110 provides that ‘actions or judgments
and decrees of courts of record of this or any other state or government’ shall be
commenced within ten (10) years after the cause of action has accrued.
In the light most favorable to the appellants, their actions accrued in 1977
when the legal duty of the father to provide support for his children ended. If
the statute of limitations of ten (10) years is applicable, it is conceded that the
claims are barred, since they were filed in 1996.
T.C.A. § 36-5-613(c) provides:
(c) The Court shall apply the statute of limitations for
maintaining an action on arrearages of support payments
of either the local law of this State or of the State which
issued the support order . . . whichever is longer.
The Wisconsin statute of limitations is not revealed in the record,
requiring the presumption that it is identical to the Tennessee statute,1 which, as
stated, provides that actions on judgments and decrees of courts of record of
this or any other State or government shall be commenced within ten (10) years
after the cause of action accrued.
This Court has ruled in a number of cases that the statute of limitations
1
Bagwell v. McTighe, 85 Tenn. 616, 4 S.W. 46 (Tenn. 1887); Kempe v.
Bader, 86 Tenn. 189, 6 S.W. 126 (Tenn. 1887); Hubble v. Morristown Land &
Imp. Co., 95 Tenn. 585, 32 S.W. 965 (Tenn. 1895).
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does not apply in actions to enforce judgments wherein the defaulting parent
sought to avoid payment of only that portion of the judgment which accrued
more than ten years before the action was brought, e.g., Sandidge v. Brown, No.
03A01-9104-CV-00142 (Tenn. App. 1991), and cases therein cited. The
rationale of these cases is that the obligation of support for minor children is a
continuing one and that the right of the child to be supported cannot be defeated
by the dereliction of the custodial parent in enforcing a decree of support.
But the obligation of support in Wisconsin terminates when the child
reaches 19, the age of majority, subject to exceptions not here relevant, or, in
the language of the cases, the obligation then ceases to be a continuing one, and
the delimiting period of ten (10) years begins to run.
The arrearages were not reduced to ‘judgment.’ For this reason,
according to the appellants, the statute of limitations is not applicable, since no
judgment was entered to trigger its commencement.
In 1987 the Tennessee Legislature amended T.C.A. § 36-5-101 to provide
that “any order for child support shall be a judgment to be enforced as any other
judgment . . . .” This amendment guaranteed the enforceability of child support
payments. See, generally, 42 U.S.C. § 666; Rutledge v. Barrett, 802 S.W.2d
604 (Tenn. 1991). It also eliminated any equitable defense of laches, waiver or
estoppel. Rutledge did not address the issue of the statute of limitations.
We think that, absent a clear legislative mandate, child support judgments
are subject to the defense of the statute of limitations as is “any other
judgment.” We are not in the least reluctant to express the view that, in the
field of civil law, child support payments and judgments rendered therefor
should never be barred by a delimiting statute. This parental obligation is both
natural and legal and should remain enforceable against the estate of the
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obligor. But given the current status of the applicable statutory and decisional
law, [”Judgments (for child support) are subject to the defenses applicable to
judgments generally, Bloom v. Bloom 769 S.W.2d 491 (Tenn. App. 1988)”], we
hold that in the case at Bar the plaintiffs’ ‘causes of action’ arose more than ten
years before their causes were filed. We are thus in agreement with the trial
court, and the judgment is affirmed at the costs of the appellant.
_________________________________
William H. Inman, Senior Judge
CONCUR:
________________________________
Houston M. Goddard, Presiding Judge
________________________________
Herschel P. Franks, Judge
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