Citation Numbers: 7 Tenn. App. 466
Judges: Crownoyer, Dewitt, Faw
Filed Date: 4/19/1928
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/17/2022
This cause is before us on petition of Mrs. Bragg to supersede an interlocutory order of the Chancellor appointing a receiver to take charge of a farm, claimed by her, that had been mortgaged by her son Sam E. Bragg to the defendants.
The petition for supersedeas must be denied, because we think the appointment of a receiver was within the discretionary power of the Chancellor, and is not subject to. review by this court.
If the chancery court had lawful power and jurisdiction to appoint a receiver upon any legitimate view of the facts of the record and the law applicable thereto, it is not proper for this court to supersede the order. Gibson’s Suits in Chancery, revised edition, secs. 1278 and 1295; Shannon’s Annotated Constitution of Tenn., 412 to 416; 23 R. C. L., 29-30; Pope v. Hazen, 4 Hig., 224; Cone v. Paute, 12 Heisk., 506.
The petitioner claims, the right of possession of the property by virtue of the will of her husband and by seven years adverse posses
After a careful review of the record and authorities, we are of the opinion that her contentions are not well made and that the appointment of the receiver was a matter within the discretion of the Chancellor.
Adverse possession under Shannon’s Code, sec. 4456, has no application to an action which merely seeks to subject the land to the burden of a debt or charge imposed either by contract or by statute in the absence of a disclaimer and of actual knowledge of hostile occupancy. 41 Corpus Juris 489-490, sec. 412; Curry v. Williams, 38 S. W. 278; 8 Michie’s Tenn. Ency. Dig., 601, 651-652; Gudger v. Barnes, 4 Heisk., 570; Lincoln v. Purcell, 2 Head., 143; 2 Corpus Juris, 156, sec. 279; also page 161, sec. 291.
As the case is before us on the interlocutory order we base our opinion on the record as it is, and express no opinion as to the facts of the case. It results that the petition must be denied.