DocketNumber： B-4568
Citation Numbers： 515 S.W.2d 249
Judges： Pope, Reavley, Daniel, Johnson, JJ-
Filed Date： 7/25/1974
Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 10/19/2024
The legal question presented by this case concerns the meaning of the phrase “through being struck by an automobile” as used in the medical payments provisions of a standard automobile policy issued to Clifford A. Gallup. Keith Gallup, the son of Clifford A. Gallup, left school at noon on May 16, 1972, driving a Honda motorbike. He was going in a southerly direction along Highway 287 in Palestine, destined for his grandparents’ home where he was going to eat lunch. Mrs. Judy Langston was driving a car in front of Keith’s motorbike and was also headed south on the same highway. She had fully and properly stopped her car at an intersection preparatory to making a left turn. She did not stop suddenly. Her car was stationary and she was signaling for a left turn. While Mrs. Langston was waiting for the traffic to clear, Keith drove his motorbike into the rear of her car. Keith’s father instituted this action for the recovery of damages for Keith’s sizeable medical expenses resulting from the collision. The trial court ruled that Keith was struck by Mrs. Langston’s standing automobile and could recover, but the court of civil appeals, with a divided court, reversed the judgment of the trial court and rendered judgment that plaintiff take nothing. 506 S.W.2d 757.
The policy held by Clifford Gallup obligated St. Paul Insurance Company to pay
The court of civil appeals ruled that Houston Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Kahn, 359 S.W.2d 892 (Tex.1962), controls this case. We agree. In Kahn, the same medical coverage clause was in suit and the plaintiff had driven his bicycle into the rear of an unoccupied and legally parked automobile. We there rejected the plaintiff’s contention that the policy meant that one could recover upon proof that injuries were inflicted by a blow in which an automobile in whatever fashion “participates” or was involved. The differences between this case and that one are that here Mrs. Langston occupied her lawfully stationary car in the stream of traffic, whereas in Kahn, the car was unoccupied and lawfully parked at the curb.
In construing a contract, the thing of first importance is the language of the contract itself. The essential language in this contract is its coverage requirement that an insured sustain bodily injury caused by accident, “through being struck by an automobile . . . . ” The language tells us that the insured, Keith Gallup, is covered when an automobile, in this case Mrs. Langston’s, strikes him. On the basis of what the contract says, Keith must show that he was struck and “by an automobile.” Whether a verb is active or passive determines, in ordinary language and meaning, whether the insured is the actor or is acted upon. Grammatically, it cannot be doubted in this case that it is Mrs. Langston’s car which must be the actor and that Keith Gallup is the one who must receive that action. He is the one who must satisfy the language of the policy of “being struck” and “by an automobile.” This is what the sentence says.
Petitioner asks us to select a definition of the word “strike” and to use that definition in place of and instead of the words “being struck.” “Struck” is the past participle of “strike,” and when we start the selection of a different word or phrase for the one used by the Board of Insurance in the standard policy, we then enjoy the privilege of choosing from eighty-six meanings which are listed in The Random House Dictionary of the English Language at page 1407 (Unabridged Ed. 1967). The power to construe the contract in such a manner is also an invitation to change the policy. In Kahn, we rejected the suggestion that we define “being struck” as “to come in collision with.” “Collide” ignores the statuses of actor and receiver of the action, elements which are very much present in the policy phrase before us.
In Kahn, however, we amplified the meaning of the phrase “being struck by an automobile” by defining it to mean that an
The phrase under investigation uses words of ordinary meaning. They are words which have a popular and usual meaning to the general public and that is the meaning we should attribute to them. United States Ins. Co. v. Boyer, 153 Tex. 415, 269 S.W.2d 340 (1954); Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. McCown, 149 Tex. 587, 236 S.W.2d 108 (1951).
We conclude that Keith Gallup was not struck by the Langston automobile, which was standing still when Keith ran into it. The judgment of the court of civil appeals is affirmed.
. “COVERAGE C — MEDICAL PAYMENTS. To pay all reasonable expenses incurred within one year from the date of accident for necessary medical, surgical, X-ray and dental services including prosthetic devices, and necessary ambulance, hospital, professional nursing and funeral services:
Divison 1. To or for the named insured and each relative who sustains bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting therefrom, hereinafter called ‘bodily injury,’ caused by accident, (a) while occupying the owned automobile, (b) while occupying a non-owned automobile, but only if such person has, or reasonably believes he has, the permission of the owner to use the automobile and the use is within the scope of such permission, or (c) through being struck by an automobile or by a trailer of any type;”