DocketNumber: JM-533
Judges: Jim Mattox
Filed Date: 7/2/1986
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 2/18/2017
The Attorney General of Texas JIM MATTOX August 18, 1986 Attorney General Supreme Court Building Honorable Rem Guerra Opinion No. JM-533 P. 0. Box 12546 Austin, TX. 76711. 2546 Criminal District Mtorney 512l476-2501 Hidalgo County Courthouse Re: Whether a county clerk may Telex 9101674-1367 Edinburg, Texas "8539 deliver the services of his Telecopier 512/475.0260 office on credit 714 Jackson, Suite 700 Dear Mr. Guerra: Dallas. TX. 752024% 21417428944 You have subm::tted the following question: Does it violate article III. sections 50 and 4624 Alberta Ave.. Suite 160 El Paso, TX. 79905.2793 52, of the Texas Constitution for the county clerk 9151533.3464 of Hidalgo County, Texas to maintain a policy of allowing the general public, including attorneys, title ccmpanies. individuals, partnerships, and -M Texas, Suite 700 corporat:.ons, to maintain credit accounts for Aston, TX. 77002.3111 paying f,ses due the county clerk? Stated in the 713/223-5666 convsrsez, must the county clerk adopt a cash only policy on all fees except the filing of lawsuits? 606 Broadway, Suite 312 Lubbock, TX. 79401.3479 The provisions of the Texas Constitution you cite, sections 50 WN747.5236 and 52 of article 'III, as well as article XI, section 3, prohibit the "lending of credit" by the state or its subdivisions. section 50 4309 N. Tenth. Suite 6 prohibits lending the credit of the state, and section 52 prevents the McAllen, TX. 76501-1665 legislature from authorizing political subdivisions to lend their 5121682.4547 credit -- thereby :.nhibiting counties indirectly. Article XI, section 3, is a direct prohibition against the lending of its credit by a 200 Main Plaza. Suite 4W county. San Antonio. TX. 76205.2797 512/2254191 With exceptions not pertinent here, article III, section 52, reads: An Equal Opportunity/ Affirmative Action Employer [T]he Le@lature shall have no power to authorize any county, city, town or other political corpora- tion or :subdivision of the State to lend its credit or to grant public money or thing of value in aid of. or to any individual, association or corporatj.on whatsoever, or to become a stockholder in such corporation, association or company. (Emphasis, added). p. 2455 Honorable Rene Guerra - Pagr 2 (ai-533) ‘7 Article XI, section 3, reads:: No county, city, or other municipal corporation shall hereafter bt!come a subscriber to the capital of any private corporation or association, or make any appropriation ,or donation to the same, or in anywise loan its --,credit; but this shall not be construed to in any way affect any obligation heretofore undertaken pursuant to law. (Emphasis added). The other provision, section 50 of article III, declaresi The Legislatum shall have no power to give or to lend, or to auxhorize the giving or lending. of the credit of the State in aid of, or to any person, associat:ion or corporation, whether municipal or othe::,, or to pledge the credit of the State in any mannm: whatsoever, for the payment of the liabilities, present or prospective, of any individual, association of individuals, municipal or other corpcration whatsoever. (Emphasis added). In each of these provtrions, the phrases “lend its credit,” “loan its credit,” and “lending #of the credit” appear to have the same meaning. The meaning of 1:h.e section 50 language was considered in Braden, The Constitution ~jf the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis (1977);volume 1 at page 225, where it was said: Section 50 states that the legislature may not ‘give’ the credit of the state to anybody, ‘lend’ the credit of the state to anybody, or ‘pledge’ the credit of thlt state for anybody. . . . This is an involved and somewhat imprecise way of saying that the state may not aid anybody by lending him mone:r; by provtding him land, goods, or services on cl,edit; or by guaranteeing payment to a third party-z aids anybody by lending him money or providing him land, goods, or services on credit. (Emphasis added). See Attorney General 0pin:ton MW-461 (1982). The Supreme Court of Texas similarly concluded in City of Cleburne v. Brown,11 S.W. 404
(Tex. 1889) that the article XI, section 3, language specifying that a municipality could not in anywise “loan its credit” prevented a city from accepting, in lieu a:E cash, corporate bonds in payment for transferring its waterworks to a corporation. In construing the meai:Lng of particular words in a part of the Constitution of Texas, such as article III, section 52, resort may be p. 2456 , Bonorable Rene Guerra - Pag, 3 (JM-533) had to other sections of the instrument for the sense in which the words are used. State v. Gillette's Estate,10 S.W.2d 984
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1928). In the-tight of the 9 ' of Cleburnq holding, we believe the proscriptions of article III, section 52, andI article XI, section 3, mean that county officers are not authorized -- and cannot be authorized -- to deliver county services to individuals, associa- tions or corporations on t,redit unless some other provision of the constitution authorizes it IO do so. . You have noted the provisions of Rule 142 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, authorizing the clerk to require security for costs from the plaintiff before iissuing any process, but specifying that the clerk "shall file the'petitlon and enter the same on the docket." The emphasized provision, we tz;lieve, is necessary to comply with the command of article I, sectim 13. of the Constitution of Texas that [a]11 courts shall be open, and every person for and injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law. See Dillingham v. Putnam,14 S.W. 303
(Tex. 1890). See also Union Century Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning,26 S.W. 982
(Tex. 1894). cf. r Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2(r918 (Tex. 1984). Thus, the county clerk :nust file and docket a petition presented for filing without requir~ll: immediate payment therefor, because to refuse would deny the petttioner his constitutional right to open courts. Cf. LeCroy v. Hanlor!, _ S.W.2d (Tex. 1986) (No. C-4745, opinion delivered July 2, -986). But the= is no warrant to extend credit for county fees, fines and other charges not similarly impinging on constitutional rights and privileges. See Robinson v. State,29 S.W. 788
(Tex Crim. App. 1895); Attorney General Opinions MW-461 (1982). S-42 (1953). Cf. Tex. R. Civ. Proc. 145 (affidavit of inability to give security). - SUMMARY County officers are not authorized -- and cannot be authorixed -- to deliver county services to individuals, ,xasociations or corporations on credit unless sore provision of the Constitution of Texas authoriza!a it to do so. s /Y-JJ Very JIM ruly /c;, Attorney yours MATTOX General of Texas p. 2457 Honorable Rene Guerra - Pag#z 4 (JM-533) JACK HIGHTOWER First Assistant Attorney General MARY KELLER Executive Assistant Attornq General RICK GILPIN Chairman, Opinion Ccmnittee . Prepared by Bruce Youngblood Assistant Attorney General p. 2458