Judges: JOHN L. HILL, Attorney General of Texas
Filed Date: 10/13/1977
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/6/2016
Honorable H. L. Edwards County Attorney County of Franklin Mt. Vernon, Texas
Re: Whether there is a conflict between regulations of the Franklin County Water District and the Parks and Wildlife Code.
Dear Mr. Edwards:
You have requested our opinion as to whether there is a conflict between certain regulations of the Franklin County Water District and the Parks and Wildlife Code.
Section
A motorboat operating on the water of this state must have an exhaust water manifold or a factory-type muffler installed on the engine.
Section 31.092(c) permits the governing body of a political subdivision to
make rules and regulations relating to the operation and equipment of boats which it deems necessary for the public safety. The rules and regulations shall be consistent with the provisions of this chapter.
(Emphasis added). Pursuant to this latter provision, the Franklin County Water District has promulgated the following regulation:
It shall be unlawful for any boat operating on Lake Cypress Springs to be equipped with any above-water exhaust system except an outboard motor.
a. Exception: Racing craft engaged in a sanctioned race, sanctioned by the Board of Directors of the Franklin County Water District, shall have a written permit thereto issued by the governing body or its authorized agent.
Racing craft are likewise exempted under section
In Attorney General Opinion H-613 (1975), we held that a city may not impose size and bag limits on fish which differ from those promulgated by the Parks and Wildlife Commission pursuant to the Uniform Wildlife Regulatory Act. We based that decision, however, partly upon the apparent intention of the Legislature to preempt the field with regard to size and bag limits. In the present instance, the Legislature has not only failed to preempt the field, but has specifically authorized political subdivisions to ``make rules and regulations relating to the operation and equipment of boats,' so long as such regulations are consistent with the statute. Parks and Wildlife Code §
Before it can be said that the police power delegated to local government must remain inert, it must be clear that the Legislature intended to occupy the field or declared a policy at war with the decision made by local government.
It is well established that
[t]he fact that an ordinance enlarges upon the provisions of a statute by requiring more than the statute requires creates no conflict therewith unless the statute limits the requirement for all cases to its own prescriptions.
Gannett v. Cook,
A similar situation was considered by the Supreme Court of Kansas in Leavenworth Club Owners Ass'n v. Atchison,
[W]here both an ordinance and a statute are prohibitory, and the only difference between them is that the ordinance goes further in its prohibition but not counter to the prohibition under the statute, and the municipality does not attempt to authorize by the ordinance what the legislature has forbidden or forbid what the legislature has expressly licensed, authorized, or required, there is nothing contradictory between the provisions of the statute and the ordinance because of which they cannot coexist and be effective. Unless legislative provisions are contradictory in the sense that they cannot coexist, they are not deemed inconsistent because of mere lack of uniformity in detail.
Very truly yours,
John L. Hill Attorney General of Texas
Approved:
David M. Kendall First Assistant
C. Robert Heath Chairman Opinion Committee
Leavenworth Club Owners Assn. v. Atchison , 208 Kan. 318 ( 1971 )
Kennedy v. City of Newark , 29 N.J. 178 ( 1959 )
Gannett v. Cook , 245 Iowa 750 ( 1953 )
Jones v. City of Chicago , 348 Ill. App. 310 ( 1952 )
State Ex Rel. Hewlett v. Womach , 355 Mo. 486 ( 1946 )