Judges: GREG ABBOTT, Attorney General of Texas
Filed Date: 9/5/2006
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/6/2016
Raymund A. Paredes, Ph.D. Commissioner of Higher Education Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board Post Office Box 12788 Austin, Texas 78711
Re: Annexation of territory by a junior college district (RQ-0446-GA)
Dear Commissioner Paredes:
On behalf of Coastal Bend College, you ask our opinion regarding the authority of a governing board of a junior college district to order an annexation election under chapter 130, Texas Education Code.1 Specifically, you inquire about the operation of sections 130.065 and 130.068. See Request Letter,supra note 1, at 1.
Section 130.065 provides the requirements for the annexation of territory by a junior college district by election. See Tex. Educ. Code Ann. §
Section 130.068 provides that a "governing board of a junior college district may order an election on the question of establishing expanded boundaries for the junior college district . . . within [all or part of]2 the district's service area established by Subchapter J" in two instances. Id. § 130.068(a)-(b). Those two instances occur:
(a) . . . if more than 35 percent of the total number of students who enrolled in the junior college district in the most recent academic year resided outside of the existing junior college district[, or]
(b) . . . if more than 15 percent of the high school graduates for each of the preceding five academic years in the territory proposed to be added to the district have enrolled in the junior college district.
Id. Section 130.068 also provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by this section, Section 130.065 applies to an action taken under this section, including the provisions of Section 130.065 requiring a petition to be submitted before an election may be called." Id. § 130.068(c). Coastal Bend College wants to know whether its governing board may call an annexation election without a petition when one of these alternative circumstances exist. See Request Letter, supra note 1, at 1-2. Your question requires us to construe sections 130.065 and 130.068.
The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the legislature's intent and to give effect to that intent. SeeUnion Bankers Ins. Co. v. Shelton,
Subsection 130.068(c) is unclear. See Tex. Educ. Code Ann. §
But subsection 130.068(c) also states that section 130.065 applies to actions taken under section 130.068, "including the provisions of section 130.065 requiring a petition to be submitted before an election may be called." Id. § 130.068(c). This language which can be interpreted to require a petition would directly conflict with the construction that subsections 130.068(a) and (b) are alternatives to the petition requirement. Were we to construe this phrase literally and under the ordinary rules of grammar, a petition would seem to be required in all instances. Such a construction would render subsections 130.068(a) and (b) meaningless and make the first part of subsection 130.068(c) surplusage. If a petition under subsection 130.065(a) is a prerequisite to an annexation election, then satisfaction of that requirement alone would authorize the governing board to call the election under section 130.065 — the student benchmark provisions in subsections 130.068(a) and (b) would be unnecessary. And there is no need for subsection 130.068(c) to create an exception to section 130.065 when it provides otherwise if section 130.068 does not provide otherwise in any respect. Based on a purely plain reading of subsection 130.068(c), we appear to be faced then with a choice between construing as meaningless either (1) the last phrase of subsection 130.068(c) or (2) the first phrase of subsection 130.068(c) as well as the entirety of subsections 130.068(a) and (b).
But there is a construction that gives full effect to all of section 130.068 and section 130.065 and that at the same time retains all of the statutory language of subsection 130.068(c). That construction requires us to interpret the language of subsection 130.068(c) that states "including the provisions of Section 130.065 requiring a petition to be submitted before an election may be called" to relate to the "[e]xcept as otherwise provided" language at the beginning of subsection 130.068(c) and not to the immediately preceding language that states that "Section 130.065 applies to an action taken under this section."Id. Under this construction, subsection 130.068(c) can be understood to provide that section 130.068 operates as an exception to section 130.065 including section 130.065's petition requirement. Such a construction harmonizes sections 130.065 and 130.068 and preserves the legislative enactment. Though this construction may not follow the ordinary rules of grammar, we are to avoid treating statutory language as surplusage unless doing so is absolutely unavoidable. See Davis v. State,
do not lightly presume the Legislature [to] have done a useless act, and [do] not read statutory language to be pointless if it is reasonably susceptible of another construction. But as both these statements suggest, we must recognize that possibility. It is at least theoretically possible that legislators — like judges or anyone else — may make a mistake.
Brown v. De la Cruz,
When subsection 130.068(c) is given this construction, subsections 130.068(a) and (b) operate as narrow exceptions to only the petition requirement of section 130.065. The remaining provisions of section 130.065 would apply to an annexation election called by a governing board under subsections 130.068(a) or (b). Accordingly, we conclude that the governing body of a junior college district may call an annexation election without a petition when authorized by subsections 130.068(a) or (b).
Very truly yours,
GREG ABBOTT Attorney General of Texas
KENT C. SULLIVAN First Assistant Attorney General
ELLEN L. WITT Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel
NANCY S. FULLER Chair, Opinion Committee
Charlotte M. Harper Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee