DocketNumber: JM-580
Judges: Jim Mattox
Filed Date: 7/2/1986
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 2/18/2017
THE ATTOIRXEY GENERAL OF' TEXAS December 2, 1986 1 Mr. 0. L. McCotte? opinion No. m-580 Director Texas Department of COrrSCtiOnS Re: Authority of the Texas Depart- P. 0. Box 99 ment of Corrections to assume Huntsville, Texas 77340 medical costs with regard to the hospitalization of a .premature infant born to an inmate Dear Mr. McCotter: You ask whether the Txas Department of Corrections (hereinafter the department) is responsjble for the medical expenses of a premature infant born to a prison inuate. You provide the following background: As a part of the medical services provided inmates incarce.rated at the Gatesville and Mountain View Units, TDC contracts with several free world hospitals to provide delivery services to pregnant inmates. Generally, pregnant inmates are transported to a contract hospital for de- livery, and following such delivery, the newborn is placed with rs:tativesof the inmate or, if no relatives are i.vailable, placed in a foster environment. Arrangements for placement of the newborn are made with the coordinated efforts of TDC and the Departnent of Human Services. . . . Recently, an infant was born to an inmate some three months premature. Because of the premature birth, extensive h,Dspitalizationhas been required and it is expected that another 2-3 months inten- sive care hospitalization will also be required. You assert that the department lacks legal authority to pay for the medical costs which exceed the expenses of the inmate mother in "normal deliveries." You suggest that the mother is responsible for all such medical costs. Our response to your raquest assumes that you do not question the department's constitutional ;andstatutory duty to provide inmates with necessary medical care. Ste U.S. Const. Amends. 8, 14 (due process clause); V.T.C.S. art. 61gGf. The medical expenses of a mother who p. 2593 Mr. 0. L. McCotter - Page 2 (m-580) delivers prematurely are no less "necessary" than the medical expenses of a normal, full-term deliv'ery. Accordingly, this response addresses only the liability of the drpartment for the medical expenses attri- butable solely to the infant. No person or agency hclds the authority to make a contract which is binding on the state, exc:eptwhen authorized to do so by the Texas Constitution or statutes. Tex . Const . art. III. §§44. 49: State v. Ragland Clinic-Hospital, 159 S.W.2d~l05, 106 (Tex. 1942); cf. State v. City National Bank of Aust::n,578 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. Civ. App. - Tyler 1979), aff'd. 603 S.W.2d 76r(Tex. 1980). Article 6166~ provides that the Texas Department of Corrections, together with its d&actor, shall be responsible "for the proper care, treatment, feeding, clothing and management of the prisoners confined therein." This statute applies, by its terms, only to "prisoners." Article 61661 grar,tsthe department the power to prescribe reamnable rules and regulations governing the humane treatment of prisoners and the classification and separation of prisoners according to sex. Article 61663 also prohibits discrimina- tion against prisoners on the basis of sex. Like article 6166g, however, article 61663 applies only to "prisoners." No other statutes authorize the department to provide for the medical expenses of an infant born to one of tht! department's prisoners. Other than the oblique reference in artic'to 6166j to the separation and classifica- tion of prisoners according to sex, the Texas Legisiature has made no attempt to address the spem::ialproblems faced by pregnant inmates -- much less by their childre:l. Consequently, the department lacks the authority to enter into a contract to pay the medical expanses of a premature infant born to a prisoner. You suggest that the prisoner-mother is legally responsible for the medical expenses of her premature infant. Section 12.04 of the Texas Family Code provides, in part, that [elxcept as otherwise provided by judicial order or by an affidavit of relinquishment of parental rights . . . the esrent of a child has. . . . . . . . (3) the duty to support the child, including providing the child with clothing, food, shelter, medical care, i1c.d dducation. . . . (Emphasis added). Thus, "parental" duties clearly include necessary medical care for a premature infant. Addition.slly, section 4.02 of the code provides that parents are liable to prrsons who provide necessaries to those to whom support is owed. Section 11.01 of the Family Code states, in part: p. 2594 Mr. 0. L. McCotter - Page 3 (JM-580) (3) 'Parent' mans the mother, a man as to whom the child is legitimate, or an adoptive mother or father, but does not include a parent as to whom the parent-child relationship has been terminated. You do not mention the chi:td'sfather. Both parents have a statutory duty under section 12.04 to support their minor children. Rarrington v. State,547 S.W.2d 616
, 619 (Tex. Grim. App. 1977). If the child is not legitimate as to ::ts father, the Family Code provides for paternity suits and support proceedings. See §13.01 et ,seq. Bio- logical fathers have a dum to support their"illenitimate' children. Se; 513.01 et seq.; In Inierest df Miller, 605 S.<2d 332 (Tex. Civ. GF. - Fort Worth 1980), --- afT'd, In Interest of J.A.M.,631 S.W.2d 730
(Tex. 1982). See also Mil1.s; -- vi Habluetzel,456 U.S. 91
(1982); Gomez v. Perez,409 U.S. 535
(1973). "Parent" under the code, however, "does not include a parent as to whom the parent-child relationship has been terminated." You indicate that the children of inmates are usually placed with relatives of the inmate or with foster homes through the Texas Department of Human Services. You do not indicate whether proceedings have been instituted to imminate, either voluntarily- or involun- tarily, the inmate's parental rights. See generally Family Code §§15.041, 15.02 (Iuvoluntary Termination of Parental Rights); B.W.J. v. State Department of Public Welfare,543 S.W.2d 9
(Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1976, no writ);-In Interest of Guillory, 618 S.W.Zd 948 (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston ['lstDist.] 1981, no writ); cf. Elliott v. Maddox,510 S.W.2d 105
(Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1974, no writ) (although imprisonment of a parent may be evidence of legal grounds for termination of parental .cights,imprisonment alone is insufficient to warrant termination of parental rights under section 15.02, particularly when the eve'.~tsleading to the imprisonment occurred prior to the child's bi::t:h). If proceedings are instituted to terminate the mother's parental rights in the child, a simultaneous demand by the state that t'hemother fulfill her financial parental duties could trigger questions under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 'UnitedStates Constitution. The duty of an inmate-mother to pay for the medical costs of her premature infant may depend Dn her ability to pay. A parent's duty to support his or her childrer.under section 12.04(3) of the Family Code generally depends on his or her ability to contribute to the support of the child. Valaque v. Valaque, 574 S.W.Zd 608, 609 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1978, no writ). Circumstances may exist which relieve a parent of the general duty to support his or herchildren. 574 S.W.2d at 610
; see also In Interest ofGuillory. 618 S.W.2d at 951
. As indicated, section 4.02 of The Family Code creates a direct cause of action for parties who provide necessaries to the children to whom parents owe support. Necessaries clearly include necessary medical treatment. Although the legal liability of parents under section 4.02 p. 2595 Mr. 0. L. M&otter - Page 4 (JM-580) to parties who provide necessary medical treatment to children is not predicated upon the parents' ability to pay, it will, as a practical matter, determine whether filing suit under section 4.02 is worth- while. The party to institute suit under section 4.02 is the party that actually provided mcessaries, not the Texas Department of Corrections. If the parents of the child of an inmate are unable to support their child, the #child could be deemed an indigent for purposes of medical care. Lee generally V.T.C.S. art. 4438f (Indigent Eealth Care and Treatment A;::). SUMMARY The Texas Department of Corrections lacks the authority to ente'r into a contract to pay the medical costs of an infant born prematurely to an inmate when .such costs exceed the costs attri- butable to the inmate-mother. Both the prir.oner-mother and the father of the child, whethe,clegitimate or illegitimate, are legally liable under section 4.02 of the Texas Family Code to parties who actually provide necessary medical treatment to children to whom the mother and f;ltherowe support. Depending on -their financial ability, they may also be liabie under section 12.'14(3)of the Family Code. dIgJ&tt% Attorney General of Texas JACK RIGHTOWER First Assistant Attorney General MARY KELLER Executive Assistant Attorney General RICK GILPIN Chairman, Opinion Committee Prepared by Jennifer Riggs Assistant Attorney General p. 2596
H. W. J. v. State Department of Public Welfare , 1976 Tex. App. LEXIS 3235 ( 1976 )
Harrington v. State , 1977 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1001 ( 1977 )
In the Interest of J. A. M. , 25 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 290 ( 1982 )
Elliott v. Maddox , 1974 Tex. App. LEXIS 2200 ( 1974 )