DocketNumber: JM-231
Judges: Jim Mattox
Filed Date: 7/2/1984
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 2/18/2017
The Attormy General of Texas JIM MAlTOX Nsvember 14. 1984 Attorney General Honorable Ray Parabee opinion No. ``-231 Supreme Couti Bullding P. 0. Box 12549 Chairman *usm. TX. 78711.2549 State Affairs Comml’ttee Re: Whether an employee resident 512l4752501 Texas State Senate of a state school is a legal Telex 910/87C13S7 P. 0. Box 12068. Calpitol Station resident of the surrounding T&copier 512i4750266 Austin, Texas 78711 independent school district 714 Jackson. Suite 700 Dear Senator Farabee: Dallas. TX. 75M2.4M6 214174269U You have informed us that an employee residing on the campus of a state school seeks election to the board of trustees of the indepen- 4824 Albwla Ave.. Suite 160 dent school district in which the state school is located. The state El Paso. TX. 799052793 school Is a star:e correctional facility for delinquent children 91515333464 administered by tt,e Texas Youth Commission pursuant to chapter 61 of the Ruman Resource19 Code. The state school is not an independent .dol Terra suits 700 school district having geographical boundaries; it is a state-created “ourton. TX. 77002.3111 and state-administered facility having no elected board of trustees. 7lY22MSS9 All employee residents of the state school are employees of the state of Texas. Tbe geographical boundaries of the independent school district completely enclose the state school. The employee in 606 Broadway. Suite 312 Lubbock. TX. 79401.2479 question has resided on the campus of the state school for more than SW747.5239 six months, has voted in previous independent school district elections, s sc``ol;as district, children attending the independent school 4309 N. Tenth. Suite B McAllm. TX. 7S501.1SS5 512,SS2-4547 You ask us the following questions: 1. Uader the facts as outlined above, does the 200 Main Plaza, Suits 400 applicant for a place on the district ballot meet San Antonio, TX. 762052797 the resld’ency requirements of article 1.05 of the 51212254191 Election Code for a ‘district or political sub- division, ’ so that he may appear one the ballot as a candidate for the board of trustees of the inaependznt school district? 2. If the applicant does not satisfy the requirements of article 1.05 of the Election Code, is he still qualified to vote in the elections of the independent school district pursuant to article KC, section 2 of the Texas Constitution? 3. If the applicant is not permitted to be a candidat? or to vote in the independent school n. 1036 Honorable Ray Farebee - Page Z! (JU-231) district elections by virtue of his status as a state employee reaidtng on the campus of a state facility, does this. prohibition constitute a denial of equal Ilrotection or a deprivation of liberty under thd! Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution? We conclude, first, that the state employee applicant does meet the residency requirement of ar!:icle 1.05 of the Election Code, and that his name may appear on the b,LLlot as a candidate for a position on the board of trustees of the independent school district. A state employee cannot conclusively be presumed to be a nonresident of a political subdivision by vj,rtue of his status as a state employee residing in a state enclave. Article 1.05, V.T.C.S.. of the Election Code provides in part as follows: Subdivision 1. No person sball be eligible to be a candidate for, or to be elected or appointed to, any public trlective office in this state unless he is a citizen of the United States eligible to holsd such office under the Constitution and laws of this state . . . and unless he will hav’e resided in this state for a neriod of 12 monthe next nrecedlnn the annlicable iate specified below, and for an; public** office which is less than statewide, shall have resided for six months ntgt preceding such date in the district, county, precinct, municipality. or other political subdivision for which the office is to be filled. (EmphasK added). The residency requirement for any candidate for any public elective office in Texas is 12 months in the state preceding the last day his name may be placed on the ballot and 6 months in the state preceding such date In the distrkt or political subdivision. The Court of Civil Appeals has held that a school district was a “district or political subdivision” within the meaning of article 1.05 of the Election Code. See Brown v. Patterson, 609’S.W.2d 287 (Tex. Clv. App. - Dallas 1980, T writ). ?ou indicate that the applicant, as an employee ot the state, has c#l?sided on the campus of the state school for more than six months. What constitutes “reslinsnce” is defined in article 5.08.(a) of the Election Code: “domicj.le; i.e., one’s home and fixed place of habitation to which he intends toxurn after any temporary absence.” The Election Code does not: define “residence” for the purpose of running for public office, but the term has been construed to mean the same for the purposes of voting as for the purposes of running for political office. Cf. Prince v. Inman.280 S.W.2d 779
(Tex. Civ. App. --- c Ronorable Ray Farsbee - PaSe 3 (JM-231) - Beaumont 1955, no vrit). For the purpose of voting, article 5.08.(i) states that [t]he residence of one who is an officer or employee of the g;overnment of this state or of the United States shall be construed to be vhere his home was before . . . unless he has become a bona fide resident of the place where he is in government servic:fr. . . . Determining the question of residency is a question of intent and factual circumstances. It ,Ls not within the authority of this office nor within the discretion of the official receiving the application to determine those factual qnastions. See Parker v. Brown.425 S.W.2d 379
, 381 (Tex. Civ. App. - Tyler 1968, writ) (question of residence is to be judicially determined); see also Mills v. Bartlett,377 S.W.2d 636
, 637 (Tex. 1'364) (residence Is determined by factual circumstances). In any event, article 5.08 when read with article 1.05 cannot operate to disenfranchise: a state employee who lives within the geographical boundaries of the independent school district merely because his place of resid'ence is located on a public enclave. The right to vote and to run for a political office are basic fundamental rights guaranteed by tha First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Dunn V. Blumstein,405 U.S. 330
(1972); Evans v. Cornman.398 U.S. 419
(1975); ,ington v. Rash,380 U.S. 89
(1965). Any statutory provisions which restrict the right to hold public office should be construei. strictly against ineligibility. See Chapa v. Whittle,536 S.W.2d 681
, 683 (Tex. Civ. App. - Corpus Christi 1976 no writ). The factual situation as presented is governed by the principles of Carrington v. Rash, supta, and Evans v.Co-n, supra
. In Carrington, the United Swtes Supreme Court held that article VI. section 2 of the Texas Constitution was violative of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the provision established a conclusive presumption against servicemen from acquiring residency for voting purposes. However, the Court did conclude that "Texas ha[d] a right to require that all military personnel enrolled to vote be bona fide resitients of thecommunity." 380 U.S. at 93-94
. At that time the state of Texas provided no means by which a soldier could establish a bona fide residency in the county where he was stationed. Similarly, in Evans '5 Cornman.398 U.S. 419
(1970). the United States Supreme Court considered the issue of whether persons living on a federal enclave could acquire residency for voting purposes. In m. &. the Permanent Board of Registry of Montgomery County. Maryland, ruled that perwns living on the grounds of the National Institutes of Health [hereinafter NIH]. a federal enclave located Honorable Ray Parabee - Page s!, (Jn-231) withla the geographical boundaries of the state, did not meet the residency requirement of the! Maryland Constitution. Accordingly, NIA residents were denied the right to vote In Maryland elections. The Court in striking down the provision of the Maryland Constitution as violative of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, held that the state could assert no overriding interest to restrict the right to NIH enclave residents; and, that NIB residents wer I! residents of Maryland and were “just as interested in and connected with electorial decisions . . . as [are] their neighbors who lived off the enclave.” -Id. at 426. We conclude that Carrington and Evans prohibit election officials from applying article 1.05 x circumscribe the right of a state employee to acquire residency to run for public office by virtue of the fact that he resides OIL a state enclave, particularly, as here, when the state enclave is l.c~cated within the geographical boundaries ,of the political subdivision in which he seeks office. The purpose of article 1.05 is to provide better representation by assuring that the voter will be better acquainted with the qualifications and views of the candidate and the candidate will be acquainted vith and responsive to the needs and desires of the voter. See Brown v.Patterson, supra
. By construing article 1.05 jn favor of theresidency of the applicant, the statutory purpose ~111 rot be frustrated. Since your second and third questions are ~predicated on a negative answer to your firt,t question, it ia not necessary to address them. SUMMARY Article 1.05 o:i the Election Code does not bar a state employe,? from establishing residency within an indepentlent school district by virtue of the fact that he resides on a state facility located within the: geographic boundaries of the independent school district. The applicant, having met the res,idency requirement may obtain a place on the ballot: for the position of trustee of the independent school district. I Very truly y J JIM L MATTOX Attorney General of Texas TOMGREEN First Assistant Attorney General p. 1039 Eonorable Ray Parabee - Pagr 5 (JM-231) DAVID R. RICBABDS Executive Assistant Attorney General RICK GILPIN Chairman, Opinion Committee Prepared by Tony Guillory Assistant Attorney General APPROVED: OPINIONCOMMITTEE Rick Gilpin, Chairman Colin Carl Susan Garrison Tony Guillory Jim Moellinger Jennifer Riggs Nancy Sutton Bruce Youngblood
Parker v. Brown , 1968 Tex. App. LEXIS 2126 ( 1968 )
Prince v. Inman , 1955 Tex. App. LEXIS 1929 ( 1955 )
Chapa v. Whittle , 1976 Tex. App. LEXIS 2802 ( 1976 )
Mills v. Bartlett , 377 S.W.2d 636 ( 1964 )
Evans v. Cornman , 90 S. Ct. 1752 ( 1970 )