Judges: JIM MATTOX, Attorney General of Texas
Filed Date: 8/31/1984
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/6/2016
Honorable Charles Evans Chairman Committee on House Administration Texas House of Representatives P.O. Box 2910 Austin, Texas 78769
Re: Statutory regulation of a water district's construction contracts
Dear Representative Evans:
You have asked the following questions:
1. Is there any reason under case law or the statutes or constitution why section 51.146 of the Texas Water Code does not require the Tarrant County Water Control and Improvement District Number One to retain ten percent of the estimated amount of any construction contract covered by section 51.146 until at least fifty percent of the work has been completed satisfactorily?
2. Does article 6252-5b in any manner relieve the district of its obligations under section 51.146 of the Texas Water Code?
We know of no reason why the district in question is not required by section 51.146 of the Water Code to retain ten percent of the estimated amount of a construction contract until at least 50 percent of the work has been completed satisfactorily. We believe that article 6252-5b does not relieve the district of its obligations under section 51.146.
The Tarrant County Water Control and Improvement District Number One is created under the provisions now codified as chapter 51 of the Texas Water Code and pursuant to article
§ 51.146. Payments Under Construction Contract
(a) The district shall pay the contract price of such contracts as hereinafter provided.
. . . .
(c) In making such progress payments, there shall be retained 10 percent of the estimated amount until final completion and acceptance of the contract work. However, if the directors, at any time after 50 percent of the work has been completed, find that satisfactory progress is being made, they may authorize any of the remaining progress payments to be made in full.
In 1981, the legislature enacted article 6252-5b, V.T.C.S., which requires that retainage in contracts between a governmental entity and a prime contractor be deposited in an interest bearing account for the benefit of the contractor. The Tarrant County Water Control and Improvement District Number One is a governmental entity within the meaning of the act. Sec. 1(A). Retainage under the act is the part of a contract payment withheld by a governmental entity to secure performance of the contract. Sec. 1(D).
Section 2 of the act provides that
[in] any contract providing for retainage of greater than five percent of periodic contract payments, the governmental entity shall deposit the retainage in an interest-bearing account, and interest earned on such retainage funds shall be paid to the prime contractor upon completion of the contract.
It is a well settled rule of statutory construction that statutes dealing with the same general subject are considered in pari materia though they contain no reference to each other and were enacted at different sessions of the legislature. C.A. Dunham Co. v. McKee,
Section 3 of article 6252-5b excepts from its provisions a contract executed before August 31, 1981, a contract with a price estimated to be less than $400,000, a contract by the State Department of Highways and Public Transportation, and, until June 1, 1983, a contract by a political subdivision funded by certain bonds pursuant to sections
A brief submitted with your questions also discusses whether the district should deposit the funds withheld in accordance with section 51.146 in an interest bearing account that segregates those funds from other funds of the district. As introduced, House Bill No. 1815 of the Sixty-seventh Legislature, which enacted article 6252-5b, would have required that the retainage in question be deposited in a state or national bank, savings and loan association, or credit union pursuant to a trust agreement which designated the financial institution to serve as escrow agent and to invest the retainage in the manner prescribed by the original bill. As finally passed, House Bill No. 1815 requires only that the governmental entity "deposit the retainage in an interest-bearing account." We believe that if the legislature intended that the retained funds be deposited in a separate interest bearing account that segregates the retainage from other funds of the district, the legislature would have said so. The courts frequently have quoted the statement that "if parliament does not mean what it says, it must say so." Railroad Commission of Texas v. Miller,
Very truly yours,
Jim Mattox Attorney General of Texas
Tom Green First Assistant Attorney General
David R. Richards Executive Assistant Attorney General
Prepared by Nancy Sutton Assistant Attorney General