Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion

~IIPTI-IN 11. TExAB
January 0, 1965
Honorable John Connally Opinion No. C-373
Governor of Texas
Capitol Building Re: Eligibility of Legislator for
Austin, Texas appointment to another state
office under tlie facts stated.
Dear Governor Connally:
You have requested an opinion based on the following question:
“Where a vacancy occurs in a state office by virtue of the
resignation of an incumbent, can a member of the 58th Legis-
lature be appointed to that vacancy, after his reelection but
prior to the time he takes the oath of office as a member of
the 59th Legislature? I’
The answer to the above question turns on the construction of Article
III, Section 18 of the Texas Constitution, which reads:
“No Senator or Representative shall, during the term for
which he may be elected,~ be eligible to any civil office of
profit under this State, which shall have been created, or
the emoluments of which may have been increared during
such term; no member of either Houre shall, during the
term for which he is elected, be eligible to any office or
place, the appointment to which may be made, in whole or
in part, by either branch of the Legislature; and no member
of either House shall vote for any other member for any of-
fice whatever, which may be filled by a vote of the Legisla-
ture, except in such cases as are in this Constitution provided.
Nor shall any member of the Legislature be interested,
either directly or indirectly, in any contract with the State,
or any county thereof, authoriaed by any law passed during
the term for which he shall have been elected. ‘I
The critical language is that which is underlined.
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Honorahle John Connally, page 2 (C-373)
This office has consistently held that any appointment which requires
Senate confirmation is an appointment “made in whole or in part, by either
branch of the Legislature. ” This is such an office. Attorney Cener..l’s
Opinion No. O-1092 (1939).
According to the Legislative history a8 set out in Volume 1, page
582, Vernon’s Texas Constitution, the above quoted section of the Consti-
tution was clearly designed to prevent the appointment of Legislators dur-
ing a period of time when they could vote on the filling of an office, or,
by virtue of their official position, would be able to unduly influence an
appointment.
Basically, that portion of Section 18 with which we are concerned
makes two reouirements in order for the inhibition to become effective--
namely, (1) member of either House and (2) during the term of the office
to which he is elected. If a person faile to meet either requirement, then
there would be no inhibition under Section 18 which would prevent his
appointment.
On the meaning of the term “member” it is well settled that if a
candidate who is elected to an office fails or refuses to qualify he does
not become an office holder. Flatan v. State, 56 Tex. 93. For, as Judge
Pop4 so aptly put it, “until one qualifies or enters upon the duties of an
office, he does not ‘hold’ office. ‘I Purcell v. Carrillo, 349 S.W.2d 263,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
Although there are no Texas decisions exactly parallel to the ques-
tion presented in the instant caoe, the Texas Supreme Court during the past
year wrote several decisions interpreting Section 19 of Article III of the
Texas Constitution dealing with the eligibility of other office holders, and
it is to there casee that we may look to guidance for the solution of this
problem. The decision most directly in point is that of the Texas Supreme
Court in Lea v. Danielr, 377 S.W.2d 618 (1964). In this case the Court
held that once the person is (1) elected (2) takes his oath and (3) begins
holding office, the constitutional inhibition attaches, and he is therefore
rendered ineligible for the additional specified office during the term for
which he is elected. In discussing whether or not the respondent Jorrie
could resign from one office to seek another, the Court said:
a lucrative offic
stitution in question applies and that person is made ineligible
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Honorable John Connally. page 3 (C-373)
to the Legislature during the entire term of the office he then
holds. Whez&rTewas elected County Commissioner of
Bexar County and qualified to and began holding such office.
Article III. Section 19, Constitution of Texas, became appli-
cable to him and said to him, ‘you are not eligible to the
Legislature during the term of office of County Commissioner
to which you have been elected. ’ Nothing Jorrie did after that
time can affect his eligib bility. He was already ineligible to
the Legislature and the subsequent act of resignation at any
point of time cannot thereby make him eligible once more.
We construe the constitutional provision as allowing no excep-
tions as to ineligibility once it has been established. ”
(Underlining ours)
Certainly, when the term for which a Legislator has been elected
has expired, there is no longer any constitutional inhibition against his
appointment as the disability continues only during the term for which he
was elected. See Attorney General’s Opinion No. V-703 (1948). In thin
connection we wish to point out that a difference exists in a situation
where the term has expired and the office holder, although elected for a
new term hae not yet qualified, and in a situation where the office holder
has qualified for a new term and then seeks to resign. The cases of
Lee v. Daniela, supra, and Kirk v. Gordon, 376 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. Sup.
1964) both deal with the latter type situation in which an office holder,
during the term of his office, sought to resign to seeks another office.
In the Kirk care, the Court said:
1’. . . It is the fact that the term of office of dirtrict attorney
to which he was elected conflicts with the term of office of
members of the House of Representatives which controls. ”
In rejecting the argument that the terms did not overlap since it would not
be necessary that he be sworn in as a member of the House of Representa-
tives until after the first of the year, the Court said:
“When the qualified electors have cast their ballote and
their votes have been canvassed, the election process is at
an end and the term of office for the one receiving the highest
number of votes begins, regardless of when he qualifies or
whether he ever qualifies. The Constitution plainly rays
that the term of office of members , . . ohs11 be two years from
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Honorable John Connally, page 4 (C-,373)
the date of their election. We are not at liberty to say that
that means two years from the date the Legislature, to
which the member is elected, convenes. ‘I 376 S. W. 2d, at
page 562.
Consequently, a Legislator who was reelected to office but who
has not qualified for the new term of office does not in our opinion become
a qualified member of the new Legislature by virtue of such election, as
Article XVI, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution requires him to take the
prescribed oath before he qualifies for the naw term of office for which he
was elected. Only when he takes this oath does he become a qualified
member of the Legislature during the term for which he was elected and
the inhibition of Section 18 then applies. We do not feel that this construc-
tion is in conflict with Kirk v. Gordon, supra. The Court in that instance
was considering only when the term of a Legislator began, and was not
concerned with the time at which the constitutional inhibition would attach
as a result of election to this term. The Daniel6 case. aupra, resolved
any apparent conflict by stating it was necessary for the individual to qual-
ify for an office for the inhibition to apply. (In both of these cases, the job
seeker was holding office in an existing term and was already under the
inhibition of the Constitution. ) For as etated in Attorney General’s Opinion
No. O-5106 (1943) until the time that he takes the oath, he is merely entitled
to the office and only upon taking the constitutional oath does he in fact be-
come a member of the Legislature.
When the term of the individual ends and his service as a Legislator
ceases, it would follow that he is eligible to assume the duties of the new
office to which he may be appointed, wnlesr some other inhibition exlats.
In this connection, the provisions of Article XVI, Section 17, Texas Consti-
tution, requiring an officer to “hold-over” until his successor hao qualified,
in order to prevent vacancies, does not apply to one who elects to accept
‘and qualify for a second office, for as a matter of law he has vacated the
firet office. Section 40 of Article XVI prohibits the holding of two public
offices at the same time by the same individual. 47 Tex. Jur. 2d ppn. 63-64,
Sec. 42; State ex rel Peden v. Valentine, 198 S.W. 1006 (Tex. Civ. App.,
error ref. 1917); Pruitt v. Glen Rose I.S.D. Il. 126 Tex. 45, 84 S.W.Zd
1004 (1935); See also State V. Brinkerhoff, 66 Tex. 45, 17 S.W. 109 (1886);
Brencourt v. Parker, 27 Tex. 558.
For the sake of argument, let us assume that the subject of the
inquiry is two persons instead of just one. Suppose that A was elected to
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Honorable John Connally, page 5 (C- 373)
the 58th Legislature in November, 1962, served his term and did not seek
reelection; B ran to succeed A, was elected in November, 1964, but has
not yet qualified by taking his oath of office nor has he begun holding this
office. In this situation, would either A or B be ineligible for appointment?
A would not be ineligible because the term for which he was elected has
expired under Article I I I, Section 4 of the Constitution, and the holding of
the Kirk case, supra. That term began in November, 1962 and ended in
Novsr, 1964. B is not ineligible, because under the holding of the
Daniels case, supra, he has not yet qualified and has not begun holding the
omand therefore, Article III, Section 18 has not yet been invoked as to
him. Until he qualifies, takes his oath, and begins holding office, he is not
a member of either house. Sound logic will not allow us to reach the conclu-
sion that because A and B are the same person, that this alone would render
him ineligible for the appointment. The Supreme Court of Texas has held
that any constitutional provision which restricts the right to hold public office
should be strictly construed against ineligibility. Willis’“. Potts, et al, 377
S.W.2d 622 (Tex. Sup. 1964). We must therefore conclude tha.t under the
authorities which we have cited and the reasoning above given, that the
answer to your question must be in the affirmative.
SUMMARY
A member of the 58th Legislature who is reelected but does not qualify
for his new term of office as a member of the 59th Legislature is not ineligible
to be appointed to another state office because of Article III, Section 18 of the
Texas Constitution.
&I&
Attorney General
OPINION COMMITTEE:
Hawthorne Phillips
Stanton Stcne
W. V. Geppert
Paul Phy
Roger Tyler
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