DocketNumber: C-282
Judges: Waggoner Carr
Filed Date: 7/2/1964
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 2/18/2017
THE OlSgiVEP EWEBLAL TEXAS Honorable C. J. Eden Opinion No. C-282 County Attorney Stephens County Re: Whether the County Clerk, Breckenridge, Texas under the provisions of Article 3930, Vernon’s Civil Statutes, has the authority to charge the fee for filing and regis- tering a chattel mortgage and charge the fee for fil- ing, registering and releas- ing of a chattel mortgage or other lien on personal property at the time the original chattel mortgage is deposited with the Clerk’s office for proper filing, Dear Mr. Eden: ragi stering and indexing. You have requested the official opinion of this office on the captioned matter. The pertinent provisions of Article 3930, Vernonts Civ- il Statutes, as amended by Acts of the 55th Legislature, 1957, Chapter 228, page 477, are as follows: . “Clerks of the County Court may receive not to exceed the following fees: .. “Filing and registering each chattel mort- gage or other written lien on personal property with or withouttransfer thereof in same instru- ment .75 ,I . . . “Filing, registering and entering the satis- faction and release of the following: I, . . . Hon. C. J. Eden, page 2 (C-282) 11 * . . chattel mortgage or instrument intended as a chattel mortgage or lien on personal property *?5” Prior to 1945, Article 3930 provided, as it does now, sepa- rate fees for filing and releasing a chattel mortgage. Between 1945 and 1957, Article 3 30, as amended by Chapter 368, Acts of the 49th Legislature, 1935, placed all of the.services of "filing, registering and entering satisfaction and release of each chattel, mortgage" in a single category and provided for a single fee to be paid for such services. Under the 1945 amendment, the County Clerk was authorized to charge the full fee for all services, including release, at the ,dateof original filing. Attorney General's Opinion O-6765 A (1945) * It is a well settled rule in this State that statutes pre- scribing fees for nublic officials are to be strictly construed against-the officer collecting them. Binford v. Robinson,112 Tex. 84
,244 S.W. 807
(1922). McCalla V. City Of R ockdale,112 Tex. 209
, 246 S.,W.654 (19221. By virtue of this rule, a power of the County Clerk to join together duties which the Legislature has declared separate may not rest on implication. A different result would allow him to receive a fee in addition to the maximum fee provided by stat- ute, a fee for services he might not be called on to perform. If the Legislature had intended this, they could easily have enact- ed the statute as it was prior to 1957. Instead they divided,the services and provided separate fees for each. Accordingly, we must answer your question negatively. Under the provisions of Article 3930, Vernon's Civil Statutes, the County Clerk does not