DocketNumber: O-3315
Judges: Gerald Mann
Filed Date: 7/2/1941
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 2/18/2017
HonorableKing Fiks c0uat.v Attorney EU-tluycoumty DAlhart,Teras Dear Sir: OpinionNo.O-3315 Ret Constructionof Arts. 7328 aJd 7290,V.A.C.S. We are in receiptof your letterof MProh 19, 1941 in whiah you requestthe opininnof this dsparhnaatasto the proper ooa&uotioa of Articles729% aad 7329 of Veraon'sAanotatedCivil Statutes. Suoh a oonst- ruatioais aeoessaryin order to~dstemiae whether or not the oolleotioaof delinqusatschool distriottaxer is Wrrad after tea years. It also requir- es 8 consideration of whether or noisArtiole 729% is a limittition statuteor is rather oae which forbidsthe.kiaging of any suit for the oolleotionof dsliaqueatsohooldistriattaxes later thaa tea years after the same had be- ooma delinquent. Artiale 72981~8 ,origiaally enactedin 1896 aad rood as followsr "No delinqueattaxpayershall havs the right to plead in any court or in any manner rely upoa say Statuteof Limitationby way of defeaseagainst the paymentof any taxes due from him or her eitherto the State or amy oounty,city or tom." Arkiole 7329 was mated in 1923 and reads as followsa "There shall be ao defenseto a suit for oolleotioaof deliaquemttaxes,a8 providedfor iathis chapter aroept: "1. That the defendnatwas not the omer of the land at the time the suit-s filed. '2. That the taxes sued for have beeapaid, or ;3. That the taxes sued for are in exoess of the limit allowed by law, kt.this defenseshall apply only to such exooss. 4&s 2nd C.S. 1923, p. 36." The above quotedArtialasqere ooasideredia referenceto delin- qusat schooldistricttaxes by the Conmissionof Appealsof Te1p8 intie case of HerefordIndependentSohoolDistrictV. Jones, 23 5.X (2d) 690. In that case the defendantowed the independentschooldistrictdelinquent, taxes for the years 1918, 1921 end 1924. The contentionwas made that the Statute HonorableKing Fike, pa@ 2 (C-3316) of Umitatioa oould not be urged boause of Artiols 7296, aupra. The Court answeredthis as follows, "It is urged that the provialonsof rrOiols 7298, R.S. 1925, operatedto pre- vent the plea of limitationfrom being availablein a suit for the reoovery ofthetaxes by 8 a&o01 dirhiot. This artioleread6 a8 follows: 'No delin- quest tax payer shall have the right to plead in any oourt,or in any manner rely upoa pargstatuteof limitationti way of defenseagaiartthe paymentof any taxes due from him or her eitherto the State, or any aounty,city or tom.1 "The applicationof the above statuteis sxpre8slylimitedto suits to oolleot taxes due the state, county,city, or tovm, and is not in our opinion,applica- ble to taxes due to sohooldistriats. This being the oaly statutewhich we think can be urged as havingthe effsot of preventiagthe operationof the statuteof limitationas to the taxes due for the years 1918 and 1921,-peare oomplled to hold that the reoovsryof suohtaxes bythe sohooldistriotwas kerrsd$henoe the trial oourtproperly suuetained an exceptionto the petition seekluga recoverytherefor." Therefore,the co&t held that Article 7298 did not apply to schooldistricttaxes. The oourt held, however,that the taxes for the year 1924 had not been barred baaauseof &tiole 7329, supra,which artiolesat out the only defensethat could be plead in a tax suit and which Artiolethe court held -aasapplicableto schooldistriottax suits. Also, the SuprelpeCoUrt of Texas in theuxseof Statev. Glenn, 13 6.W. (2d) 337, held that the two year Statuteof Limitationappliedto delin- quent tax suits broughtby oertaindypes of dietriotsto which Artiole 7239 did not apply. Therefore,in 1929 the Legislatureby Senate Bill 169 amended Artiole 7298 and the same regd as follous: "Section1. That Artiole 7298, RevisedCivil Statutesof 1925 be, and the sam is, hereby-amended toread as follows: "That no delinquenttax payer hhall hava the right to plead in any aourt or in any manner rely upon any statuteof limitationby way of defenseagainst the paymentof taxes due from him or her to the State, or any county, city, torn, navigatfon~district, drainagedistrict,road distriot,levee district, reclamationdistriot,irrigationd&&riot, improvementdistrict,school dis- triot, aad all other districts. Providedthat ao suit shall b, broughtfor the oollectioaof delinquenttaxes of a school distriotor road distriot unless institutedwithin six years from the time the same shallbeooma delin- quent* "Sm. 2. Whereas,there is now no law in this Stats to preventdelinquent tax payersfrom settingup this statuteof limitationas a defenseagainst the paymentof taxes due fran him or her whether to the State,or any county, city, town or district,and the furtherfact that the SupremeCourt, in&e case of State for Dallas County Bois D*Aro IslandLevee Districtvs. Glenn, 13 S-W., Second Edition,page 337, has-heldthat the two year st8tutaof HonorableRiag Fike, page 3 (C-3315) limitationappliesto deliaqueattaxes duo i-0distriots,thus prsventing hundredsof districtsia this State frcm the oolleotioaof delinquent taxes, and to avoid the filing of R multiplioityof suits by the authorities againstdelinquenttax payers in order to preveattha km of limitatioabe- ing set up againstthem, andthe furtherfact that hundredsof distriots throughtTexas are affeotedtherebyand will loss large amountsof delinquent taxes,thereforean smergeaayexists and aa imperativepublicneoessityre- quiring . . . " eta. In 1931 the legislatureamendedthe above quoted artioleand sub stitutedthe words "ten years" in place of the words "six years" ia the Act quoted. By way of summary,therefore,it is apparentthat Article7296 as the sam now reads and the provisocontainedtherein~9th refereaoeto school districttaxes is the more reoent enactmentPS well a8 the oae ooveriagthe speoifiasubjectunder disoussion,snd if the scum is ia anymy in confliot with Artiole 7329,Article 7298 in our opinionis oontrolling,and we believe that if suit islroughtfor the colleotionof delinquentschooldistiiottaxes, a taxpayermay plead 88 a defensethe limitationsRS set out in Article7298, supra
. The questionis also raised as to whether or not the proviso con- tained in Article 7298 "that ao suit shallbe broughtfor the colleotioaof de- linquenttaxes of a sohooldistriotor road distriotunless institutedwithin ten years fromthe time the smse shall becamedelinquent,"is a statutswhich prohibitsthe institution06 a suit for the oolleotioaof.deliaquentsohool districttaxes more thantsn years old, whiah would in fact operateRS a releaseor remissionof all such taxes, or whether the same is in fact P statuteof limitatian which must be pleadedin order to bs a bar or a defsnsa to a racoveryof the 681~4. It is our opinionthat the above quoted proviso is merely a statuteof limitation. In the first plaoe,the provisi is an exceptionto tbelsstoftie statuteshioh providesthat no delinquenttaxpayer &hall have the right to plead or rely oa any statute of limitation. Ws also call your attentiontotbhe captionof the Act snaotedin 1929 pmioh reads in part as follows: "prescribinga limitationof time when suitsmay be brought for taxes of schooldistriotsand road districtF It is significantthat nearly all the Texas statutesof limitation of personalactionsare worded 80 as to providethat suit may be broughtwith- in a certainperiod of time and not thereafter. See Articles 5524 through Article 5546 of the Revised Civil Statutes. Suoh statutes,however,have always been aonstroedto operatemerely a8 statutesof limitationwhich must be specificallyplead in order to operateas a bar or a defenseto a suit broughtlaterthan withinthe period presol’ibda Ia'tie Stat&e. "r'ne%UI‘Iv "limitstioa" nas defined bythe Conmri~sion of Appealsof Texas iathe case of AmsrioanNationalInsuraaoeComprryv. Hicks, 35 S.". (2d) 128. The Court stated as follows: Hon. King Fike, page 4 (O-3315) ". . . The term *limitation* has been definedto mean the time at the end of which no action at law or suit in equity oan be maintained. 37 C. J. 684, par. 1. Statutesof'limitationdo not oonferany right of a&ion, but are enaotedto restrictthe periodwithin vhichthe right, otherwiseunm, might be asserted.' Riddlesberger v. HartfordF. Ins. Co.7 Wall. 386
, 19 L. Rd. 257." (Underscoring ours). The ReamaontCourt of CivilAppeals passed on a questionsimilarto the one under oonsideration herein in the case of Chapnanv. Tyler County,259 S. 911. 301, writ of error refusadby the SupremeCourt in a memorandumopinion reportedin278 S.W. 1115
. The Court statedas follows~ "Artiale464, RevisedCivil Statutes,provides: "The actionupon the claim so rejectedmust be broughtwithin six months after such service.' "This is a statuteof limitationand must be pleadedaffirmativelyin order to constitutea defense. 17 R.C. La 9841 Green v, MoCord,204 Ala. 364
,85 So. 762
~ Stanleyv. Green,205 Ala. 226
,87 So. 356
~ Sharrewv. InlandLines, 214 N. Ye 101, 108 B. E. 217, L&U. 1916E, 1192, and note, Ann. Gas. 1916D, 1236; Chapmanv. Doonsy, 257 8.W. 1106, an opinion'@ this aourt." The same rule of law was announcedby the Gemmissionof Appeals in the case of State BankingBoardv. Pilcher,270 8.8, 1004. The Court statedas fOllowS,~ ". . . The issues beforethis oourt,are, first,as to the oorreotnessof the action of the trial oourt in reiusingto sustaindefendant'sgeneraldemurrer beoausethe petitionfailedto affirmativelyshow that the,olaimof plaintiff was presentedwiVJ.n 90 days,as providedin artiole463 of the RevisedCivil Statutes,and.thatthe aotioa upon the olah was broughtwithin 6 months after serviceof notice,as providedin article464 of the RevisedCivil Statutesl . . . "The SuprameCourt, in refusinga writ of error in Chapmanv* Tyler County (Tex. Civ. App.) 259 8.W. 301, heldthat statuteslike said artiole463 are statutes of limitation,and must be affinaativelypleadby the defeadantin order to oonstitutea defense,and therefore,of oourse,the petitionof plaintiffwas good as againsta generaldemurrer." The generalprinoipleapplicablewas laid dorm by the EastlandCourt of Civil Appeals in the oaee of EdwardsDfg. Co. v. SouthernSurety Co., 283 5.. W. 624. The Court statedas follows: Vhe first oontention,that a statutecreatinga right and presoribinga time withinwhich the right maybe assertedis not a Statute of limitation,does not obtain in this state. De Ham v. RailwayCo.,23 S.W. 281
,86 Tex. 68
; Chap- man v. Mooney (Tex. Civ. App.)237 S.W. 1109
) Chapnanv. T lsr County (Tex. Civ. App.)259 S.W. 3033
State Boardv. Pilcher (Tex. Corn.App. 270 S-W. 1005. %norable King Nke, page 5 (O-3315) "It is not the rule in msny other jurisdiotions.Sharrowv. InlandLines,108 N.E. 217
,214 N.Y. 101
, t. R-A. 1914E, 1192, note Ilnn.Gas. 1918D, p. 1236. "Ia the cases cited above,the statutescreatinga cause of action for injuri- es resultingin death, and limitingthe time withinwhich to sue, was held to be a statuteof limitation,althoughthe oauseofaotionwas oreatedby the Legislatureand did not exist at commonlaw. In the other oasesreferredto the SupremeCourt held that the statutepresoribiagthe timewlthi~whiohto oreaent alajmssgainst the guarantyfund was a statuteof limitatlon,andmust be pleaded,although,of course,such a rightwas unheardof at e-on law. asubjectto the limitationset forth in Erp v . Tillmm,131 S.W. 1057
, 103 Tar. 575, all statutesprescribinga time in which suit may be lmuughthave, so far as our investigationdiscloses,been treatedin this state as statutesof lM- tation.' (lkdersooringours) It is our opinionthat the statuteunder oonsiderationlhich provides that no suit shall be bought after ten years is in the smae categoryas the statutesdiscussedin the above quotedoases whereia it is providedthat suits nay be bought within a certainperiod of tim and not thereafter. Such statutes have alwaysbeen construedin this State to be statutesof limitationwhioh must be specificallypleadedas a defense. In line with the abow reasoaing,this departi&. ruled in OpinionNo. G-103 as follows: "It is our opinion that this provisionin Article 7298 is a ten year statute of limitationon oollectionof delinquewttaxes due a schooldistrictor a road distrlet. In order totakeadvantageof the limitationperiodthe tax payer would have to speciallyplead and se% up his rights under this tea year statute. In the absenceof such spoial pleadings,by the tax payer, the attorneylwinging the tax suit could take judgmentfor the sohoolaad road tax, delinquentten years prior to the date the suit was filed,even thoughthe other taxes had been paid." We subsequentlyruled in OpinionNo. G-1458 that a tax oolleotorwho collectedmneytir sehool distriottax08 whioh were more thanim years delin- quent oould not returnthe money so colleotedto the taxpayerbeoauseArtiole 7298 did not operateto extinguishthe debt, but rather such artiolowas a stat- ute of liwitatioawhich had to be speciallypleaded. In line with the ativw-quoteddecisionsand opinionsof this deparb- meut,we concludethat suitsmay be broughtfor the colleotioaof sohool dis- triot taxes whioh are delinquentfor sure thanten years but that the tawpayer mpy affinaativKl.yplead Article 7298 as a bar or defenseto the recoveryin suoh suits. EGrLMzegw Yours re*+nlly AFPROVRDAFR 10, 1941 /s/GROVER SELLRRS ATTORNEYGENE& OF TEXAS hi2S.T ASSISTANT ATI’OBHFY GENERAL by /s/ SillyGoldberg Assistamt
Erp v. Tillman , 103 Tex. 574 ( 1910 )
De Harn v. the Mexican National Ry. Co. , 86 Tex. 68 ( 1893 )
Sovereign Camp, W. O. W. v. Burrell , 204 Ala. 210 ( 1920 )
Green v. McCord , 204 Ala. 364 ( 1920 )
Stanley v. Green , 205 Ala. 225 ( 1920 )
Golson v. W. F. Covington Mfg. Co. , 205 Ala. 226 ( 1920 )
Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Insurance , 19 L. Ed. 257 ( 1869 )