Judges: GREG ABBOTT, Attorney General of Texas
Filed Date: 12/23/2002
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/6/2016
The Honorable Jane Nelson Chair, Senate Committee on Nominations Texas State Senate P.O. Box 12068 Austin, Texas 78711-2068
Re: Whether a member of the legislature who resigns his or her legislative office may, during the term for which he or she was elected, be appointed to a position or office that requires senate confirmation. (RQ-0574-JC)
Dear Senator Nelson:
You have requested our opinion as to whether, under article
Article
No Senator or Representative shall, during the term for which he was elected, be eligible to (1) any civil office of profit under this State which shall have been created, or the emoluments of which may have been increased, during such term, or (2) any office or place, the appointment to which may be made, in whole or in part, by either branch of the Legislature; provided, however, the fact that the term of office of Senators and Representatives does not end precisely on the last day of December but extends a few days into January of the succeeding year shall be considered as de minimis, and the ineligibility herein created shall terminate on the last day in December of the last full calendar year of the term for which he was elected.
Tex. Const. art.
We note as a preliminary matter that a position or office that requires senate confirmation falls within the second prong of article III, section 18, in that it constitutes "any office or place, the appointment to which may be made, in whole or in part, by either branch of the legislature." Article
We turn now to your question regarding the eligibility of a member of the legislature to be appointed by the governor to a position that requires senate confirmation "during the term for which he was elected." The answer to your inquiry depends upon the meaning of the phrase "during the term for which he was elected." We first address the situation regarding a member of the Texas Senate recently elected at the November 2000 general election.1
The phrase in question has been little construed in relation to article III, section 18. Similar language in article III, section 19 has been interpreted by the Texas Supreme Court on several occasions, most recently in 1992. Article III, section 19 provides:
No judge of any court, Secretary of State, Attorney General, clerk of any court of record, or any person holding a lucrative office under the United States, or this State, or any foreign government shall during the term for which he is elected or appointed, be eligible to the Legislature.
Tex. Const. art.
In Kirk v. Gordon,
Article III, section 19 was revisited by the supreme court in 1992, and both Kirk and Lee were overruled. See Wentworth v. Meyer,
On March 24, 1987, Relator Jeff Wentworth had been appointed by the governor to the Board of Regents of the Texas State University System for a six-year term that would expire on February 1, 1993. "On May 10, 1988, Wentworth resigned as regent, before assuming office as a state representative on May 11, 1988, after a special election. Wentworth was reelected to the House of Representatives in November 1988 and November 1990, and his current term as a representative would not expire until the legislature convene[d] on January 12, 1993." Wentworth,
Resolution of the issue requires interpretation of the words "during the term for which he is elected or appointed." The words support two interpretations. If the "term" which cannot overlap is the entire six-year Board term, then Wentworth cannot become a state senator. If Wentworth's "term" ended when he resigned, then he is free to run for legislative office.
Id.
The plurality opinion relied most significantly on the rule of construction that holds that "[a]ny constitutional or statutory provision which restricts the right to hold office must be strictly construed against ineligibility." Id. (citing Brown v. Meyer,
It is consistent with this purpose to interpret section 19 as prohibiting those officeholders from sitting in the legislature during the time they hold their offices. On the other hand, the purpose of section 19 is not advanced by denying legislative office to someone who abandons his office four years before seeking a legislative seat. That this is so is illustrated by the case before us today. Wentworth can exert no influence over the legislature by virtue of his former position as a regent, for he resigned that position four years ago. It was filled and is now occupied by someone else. Moreover, Wentworth has already served two terms in the legislature as a member of the House of Representatives. The purpose of section 19 cannot be fostered by an interpretation that denies this former regent the opportunity to run for the state senate.
Id. at 767-68. In summing up the plurality's position, Justice Cook stated that "[t]o allow Wentworth to take his seat as a senator does not violate either the express language or the purpose of article
Although article III, section 19 contains certain language that is virtually identical to that of article III, section 18, i.e., "during the term for which he was elected," we are not persuaded that the rationale of Wentworth should be applied to an interpretation of article III, section 18 that involves sitting members of the senate. No member of the senate elected at the November 2000 general election has resigned as of this date. Consequently, the rationale of Wentworth, that the relator in that case "can exert no influence over the legislature by virtue of his former position," id. at 768, can have no bearing on the question you present. If, as the plurality in Wentworth declares, the purpose of article III, section 19 is "to maintain separation of the powers of our government," id. at 769, and is not served by excluding from the legislature certain named officials, the purpose of article III, section 18 may more fairly be said to be served by excluding a sitting, or newly resigned, member of the senate from consideration for a coveted office that requires legislative confirmation. Even if such individual were to resign days, weeks, or months before an appointment by the governor, it would not necessarily follow that the former legislator could "exert no influence over the legislature by virtue of his former position." Id. at 768. Such resignation so relatively close to the date of an appointment would, in our view, undermine rather than serve the purpose of maintaining the constitutional separation of powers.
In addition, a concurring opinion demonstrates that sections 18 and 19 are, in fact, not identical. Article III, section 19 applies only to those persons "holding a lucrative office," whereas article III, section 18 imposes no such requirement. The concurring opinion quite rightly notes that although Relator Wentworth concedes he once held a lucrative office, at the time he was determined to be disqualified by the Chairman of the Republican Party of Texas, Fred Meyer, he was not holding a lucrative office — he had resigned that office. Thus, regardless of the true meaning of "during the term to which he is elected or appointed," the constitutional prohibition on its face applies only to "any person holding a lucrative office," which Wentworth plainly is not.
Id. at 778 (Cornyn, J., concurring). Because article III, section 18, does not contain similar language, we do not believe that the Texas Supreme Court would necessarily follow the view of Wentworth with regard to a member of the senate who resigns days, weeks, or months before any prospective gubernatorial appointment. Given these differences between sections 18 and 19, we are reluctant to accord Wentworth determinative precedential value regarding a constitutional provision it did not consider. See Tex. Att'y Gen. LO-95-069, at 4-5 ("Cases that arise in the future under article III, section 19 will involve different facts and may raise different policy issues . . . . Whether a court might distinguish, depart from, broaden, or restrict Wentworth in the future is, of course, a question that cannot be resolved in the opinion process.").
We conclude therefore that, for purposes of article III, section 18, the phrase "during the term for which he was elected" must be read literally, despite the injunction that a constitutional provision that restricts the right to hold office must be construed strictly against ineligibility. As a result, a member of the Texas Senate who was elected at the November 2000 general election is not eligible to be appointed to any office or position that requires confirmation by the senate, even if the individual resigns shortly before the prospective appointment. This ineligibility, under the terms of article III, section 18, "shall terminate on the last day of December of the last full calendar year of the term for which he was elected," i.e., December 31, 2004.
As to all members of the house and those members of the senate elected for a new term in the November 2002 general election, a somewhat different situation obtains. Prior to the 1966 amendment of sections
Consequently, since the 1966 amendment to sections 3 and 4 of article III, the term of office of members of the legislature begins on the day the legislature convenes in January of odd-numbered years. The clear implication is that a member of the Seventy-seventh Legislature who was elected to the Seventy-eighth Legislature at the general election of November 2002 has a small "window of opportunity" during which he or she may be appointed by the governor to an office or position that requires senate confirmation. Such individual may be appointed at any time beginning January 1, 2003, until the convening of the Seventy-eighth Legislature on January 14, 2003.
Very truly yours,
GREG ABBOTT Attorney General of Texas
BARRY MCBEE First Assistant Attorney General
NANCY FULLER Deputy Attorney General — General Counsel
SUSAN DENMON GUSKY Chair, Opinion Committee
Rick Gilpin Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee