Judges: GREG ABBOTT, Attorney General of Texas
Filed Date: 12/13/2004
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/6/2016
Mr. Lowry Mays, Chair Board of Regents The Texas AM University System Post Office Box C-1 College Station, Texas 77843
Re: Whether the Texas Workforce Commission Civil Rights Division is properly interpreting the equal employment opportunity training requirement of Labor Code section
Dear Mr. Mays:
The Texas AM University System ("TAMU") asks whether the Texas Workforce Commission Civil Rights Division (the "Commission") is properly interpreting the equal employment opportunity training requirement of Labor Code section
21.556 (a).1
Relevant to TAMU's inquiry, chapter 21 outlines a formal process by which a person claiming to be aggrieved by an unlawful employment practice may file a complaint with the Commission and have that complaint reviewed to determine if there is reasonable cause to believe that the employment practice was discriminatory.See generally id. §§ 21.201-.211 (Vernon 1996) (subchapter E). Before the Commission will review a complaint, the complaint must meet certain statutory requirements, which include providing the facts that establish the basis of the complaint. See id. § 21.201. If the Commission determines that there is reasonable cause to believe that discrimination has likely occurred, then the Commission will endeavor to eliminate the alleged unlawful employment practice by informal dispute resolution methods. Seeid. § 21.207. Should that fail, the Commission may file a civil suit against the respondent, see id. § 21.251, or provide the complainant with written notice of the complainant's right to file a civil action, see id. § 21.252.
TAMU asks about section
Specifically, TAMU inquires about section 21.556(a), which establishes the circumstances under which a state agency must receive the required equal employment opportunity training:
A state agency that receives three or more complaints of employment discrimination in a fiscal year, other than complaints determined to be without merit, shall provide a comprehensive equal employment opportunity training program to appropriate supervisory and managerial employees.
Id. § 21.556(a) (emphasis added). Chapter 21 does not define the term "merit," nor does it establish a process for assessing whether a complaint is "without merit." However, a Commission rule establishes a process for assessing a complaint's merit for this purpose, which provides in part:
(a) The Commission will make a determination if a complaint of employment discrimination is with or without merit by analyzing complaints filed by employees of state agencies or applicants for employment with state agencies, with either the Commission or the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), to ascertain whether the complainant has met his or her burden of providing sufficient factual evidence to establish the elements of a prima facie case of employment discrimination as delineated by the United States Supreme Court ("Supreme Court"). If a complaint is determined to have met the elements of a prima facie case, then the complaint will be administratively processed [through] the Commission's or EEOC's investigation procedures. If the Commission makes a determination that a complaint has met both a Supreme Court [prima facie] test . . . and an administrative processing test of merit, a state agency will be determined to have a complaint of merit assessed against them.
(b) If a complainant . . . fails to meet his or her burden of establishing the elements of a prima facie case as outlined by the Supreme Court, is prevented from filing a complaint for jurisdictional reasons, or provides self-defeating evidence on the face of his or her complaint that shows the complaint is defective, then the complaint will not be administratively processed nor determined to be with merit.
29 Tex. Reg. 3653 (2004) (to be codified at 40 Tex. Admin. Code § 819.18(a)-(b)) (the "Rule").3
TAMU informs us that it has been notified by the Commission that it must provide equal employment opportunity training because three or more complaints of employment discrimination were filed against TAMU during the 2004 fiscal year. See Request Letter, supra note 1, at 1; see also Tex. Lab. Code Ann. §
21.556 (a) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05).4 TAMU contends, however, that the Commission's notification is baseless because the Commission's test for determining merit contravenes chapter 21. See Request Letter, supra note 1, at 1. TAMU suggests that a discrimination complaint triggers the section 21.556(a) training requirement only if the Commission has determined in the complaint review process outlined in chapter 21 that there is "reasonable cause" to believe that discrimination has occurred. See id. at 6; see also Tex. Lab. Code Ann. §§ 21.204-.206 (Vernon 1996). By contrast, the Commission maintains that the process for determining a complaint's merit for purposes of the training requirement is distinct from a finding of reasonable cause.5 TAMU asks, essentially, which of the two interpretations is correct. SeeRequest Letter, supra note 1, at 1. TAMU also questions the Commission's interpretation of the Rule. See id. at 5-6.
In construing section 21.556 and chapter 21, we must give effect to the legislature's intent. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §§
In deciding whether the Commission, an administrative agency, has exceeded its rulemaking powers, the determinative factor is whether the rule's provisions are "in harmony" with the general objectives of the statute. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v.Meno,
A. Whether the Rule Is Invalid for Failing to Equate Merit withReasonable Cause
First we address TAMU's contention that the Commission has exceeded its rulemaking authority under section 21.556 because the Rule does not equate the statutory phrase "complaints determined to be without merit" with complaints for which the Commission has found no reasonable cause. See Request Letter,supra note 1, at 2-3; see also Tex. Lab. Code Ann. §
Section
The Commission contends that the legislature intended to create two thresholds: when met, the first establishes a complaint as meritorious for purposes of the training requirement, and the second supports a finding of reasonable cause. See Commission Brief, supra note 5, at 5. The statute's plain language validates this position. Section 21.556(a) does not use the term "reasonable cause"; rather, it uses the term "merit." See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. §
The legislative history also supports the Commission's position. Section 21.556 was adopted in 1999 following the Sunset Commission's review of the Texas Commission on Human Rights. See Act of May 17, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 872, § 15, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 3556, 3565; House Comm. on State Affairs, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 1976, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999) (enrolled version, "Background and Purpose") ("After reviewing the commission, the Sunset Advisory Commission had recommended its continuation and other statutory modifications."). According to the Sunset Advisory Commission Staff Report, the state has an interest in preventing and resolving discriminatory activity before it results in costly litigation. See Sunset Advisory Commission Staff Report, Texas Commission on Human Rights, at 7 (October 1998). To this end, the Sunset Advisory Commission advised the legislature to adopt the language of section 21.556(a), which had formerly been contained in an appropriations rider,6 to "ensure that the Commission continues to provide comprehensive training to familiarize all state agencies and public institutions of higher education with [equal employment opportunity] laws and to prevent employment discrimination from occurring." Id. at 26. Thus, section 21.556(a)'s purpose is not to remedy particular instances of discrimination or penalize state agencies after the fact. Rather, its purpose is to require training of state agency personnel in order to prevent employment discrimination. When viewed in the context of this purpose, it is reasonable to conclude that the legislature did not intend "merit" to rise to the level of "reasonable cause." The Commission's construction of "without merit" not to require a "reasonable cause" finding gives substance to and is consistent with section 21.556(a)'s broad preventative purpose.
Finally, the Commission's interpretation of "without merit" is consistent with the legislature's use of the phrase in another statute. Section
In sum, because it is consistent with the statute's plain language, comports with the statute's legislative purpose, and is consistent with the legislature's use of the phrase "without merit" in a similar statutory context, we conclude that the Commission's interpretation of section 21.556 to distinguish between an assessment of "merit" and an assessment of "reasonable cause" is reasonable.
B. Whether the Rule Misapplies the United States Supreme CourtTest
TAMU also argues that the Rule fails to incorporate legal principles for resolving discrimination complaints that are required by the United States Supreme Court. See Request Letter,supra note 1, at 4. Specifically, TAMU argues that the Commission misapplies the McDonnell Douglas test. See id.; see alsoMcDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
The McDonnell Douglas test outlines a burden-shifting scheme by which the parties' evidence is evaluated. See McDonnell Douglas,
The Rule requires the Commission, in assessing whether a claim is with or without merit, "to ascertain whether the complainant has met [the complainant's] burden of providing sufficient factual evidence to establish the elements of a prima facie case of employment discrimination as delineated by the United States Supreme Court." 29 Tex. Reg. 3653 (2004) (to be codified at 40 Tex. Admin. Code § 819.18(a)) (emphasis added). TAMU suggests that the Rule is invalid because the Commission has selectively picked the first part of the McDonnell Douglas test, which the Commission favors, while ignoring the remainder of the test. See Request Letter, supra note 1, at 4-5.
We have already established that the Commission has reasonably construed the term "merit" in section 21.556(a) to be distinct from the term "reasonable cause." The McDonnell Douglas test establishes the burden of proof in the context of a trial on the merits to determine whether discrimination has occurred. SeeMcDonnell Douglas,
If a complaint is determined to have met the elements of a prima facie case, then the complaint will be administratively processed [through] the Commission's or EEOC's investigation procedures. If the Commission makes a determination that a complaint has met both a Supreme Court [prima facie] test . . . and an administrative processing test of merit, a state agency will be determined to have a complaint of merit assessed against them.
29 Tex. Reg. 3653 (2004) (to be codified at 40 Tex. Admin. Code § 819.18(a)) (emphasis added). In a letter to TAMU, Commission staff clarified this part of the Rule by stating that it addresses the Commission's jurisdiction over a complaint. See
Request Letter, supra note 1, at 5; Exhibit 2, supra note 1. That is, if the complaint falls within the Commission's jurisdiction, then the complaint passes the administrative processing test of merit. See Request Letter, supra note 1, at 5-6; Exhibit 2, supra
note 1. TAMU counters that this explanation is inconsistent with the Rule. See Request Letter, supra note 1, at 6. Instead, TAMU asserts that this language in the Rule should tie the "administrative processing" test of merit to formal investigation procedures outlined in chapter 21 of the Labor Code. See id; seealso Tex. Lab. Code Ann. §
We construe administrative rules in the same way as statutes, and an agency's interpretation of its own rule is entitled to deference. See Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Gulf States Utils. Co.,
Here, we question the Commission's assertion that the administrative processing test of merit is nothing more than a finding that the Commission has jurisdiction over a complaint.See Request Letter, supra note 1, at 5-6; Exhibit 2, supra note 1.7 The Rule's subsection (b) reads:
If a complainant . . . fails to meet his or her burden of establishing the elements of a prima facie case as outlined by the Supreme Court, is prevented from filing a complaint for jurisdictional reasons, or provides self-defeating evidence on the face of his or her complaint that shows the complaint is defective, then the complaint will not be administratively processed nor determined to be with merit.
29 Tex. Reg. 3653 (2004) (to be codified at 40 Tex. Admin. Code § 819.18(b) (emphasis added)). By its plain language, subsection (b) suggests that when the Commission lacks jurisdiction over a complaint, the complaint will not be administratively processed. Because subsection (b) suggests that establishing jurisdiction is a prerequisite to a complaint being administratively processed, the Rule's language does not appear to support the Commission's construction that administrative processing is merely a determination of jurisdiction. Nevertheless, we disagree that this part of the Rule necessarily requires a finding of reasonable cause before an employment discrimination complaint can be counted as meritorious. Nothing in the Rule supports the construction that meeting the "administrative processing test of merit" is equivalent to a reasonable cause finding.
In sum, the Commission does not appear to have given a meaning to the "administrative processing test of merit" that is consistent with the Rule as a whole. However, we cannot agree with TAMU that this part of the Rule limits the Commission to counting only those complaints for which it has found reasonable cause in determining that an agency must provide equal employment opportunity training under section 21.556(a).
Very truly yours,
GREG ABBOTT Attorney General of Texas
BARRY R. McBEE First Assistant Attorney General
DON R. WILLETT Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel
NANCY S. FULLER Chair, Opinion Committee
Daniel C. Bradford Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 93 S. Ct. 1817 ( 1973 )
Helena Chemical Co. v. Wilkins , 47 S.W.3d 486 ( 2001 )
Edgewood Independent School District v. Meno , 917 S.W.2d 717 ( 1995 )
In Re Canales , 52 S.W.3d 698 ( 2001 )
Jessen Associates, Inc. v. Bullock , 531 S.W.2d 593 ( 1975 )
Gerst v. Oak Cliff Savings and Loan Association , 432 S.W.2d 702 ( 1968 )
L & M-Surco Mfg., Inc. v. Winn Tile Co. , 580 S.W.2d 920 ( 1979 )
Public Utility Commission v. Gulf States Utilities Co. , 809 S.W.2d 201 ( 1991 )
Tarrant Appraisal District v. Moore , 845 S.W.2d 820 ( 1993 )
Albertson's, Inc. v. Sinclair , 984 S.W.2d 958 ( 1999 )