Judges: MARK WHITE, Attorney General of Texas
Filed Date: 10/29/1980
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/6/2016
Honorable Ben Z. Grant Chairman Judiciary Committee House of Representatives Austin, Texas 78769
Honorable Neal Pfeiffer Criminal District Attorney Bastrop County P. O. Box 753 Bastrop, Texas 78602
Re: Failure to timely apply for residence homestead exemptions and related matters
Gentlemen:
Each of you has questioned the effect of a taxpayer's failure to timely apply for a residence homestead exemption from local ad valorem taxes. Representative Grant's inquiry is limited to the exemptions addressed in subsection (c) of article
Mr. Pfeiffer's question embraces exemptions afforded pursuant to subsection (b) of that section, as well as subsection (c) exemptions. He asks if a school district may allow homestead exemptions — and be reimbursed under section 20.81(a) of the Education Code for the loss of revenue occasioned thereby — where taxpayers' applications for exemptions were made out of time because the district failed to provide taxpayers timely notice of the need to file them, or to provide them proper forms for the purpose.
Recent Texas cases have emphasized that one who seeks a favored position with reference to the imposition of taxes labors under the burden of showing clearly that he comes within the terms of the constitutional provision he invokes. See Smith v. Padgett,
In Moore, supra, the court determined that an application for special tax treatment under the "agricultural use" provision of the constitution, article
In our opinion, the same rationale would apply to applications for residence homestead exemptions under subsections (b) and (c), section 1-b, article VIII of the constitution. The subsection (c) provision, affording a $5,000 homestead exemption, like the agricultural use provision of section 1-d, is self-executing. And like the 1-d provision, the 1-b provisions operate to exempt part of the market value of property from taxation, not the entire property. None of the exemptions are automatically allowed. Each person who wishes to secure the benefits thereof must show himself entitled to them.
But this is not to say that the legislature or other taxing authorities may arbitrarily establish cutoff dates for the recognition of claims to constitutional exemptions and by that device subject constitutionally exempt property to taxation. See Prop. Tax Code §
Where the constitution does not exempt a particular kind of property but merely permits its exemption without prescription, the legislature may ordinarily limit the exemption as it pleases. Dickison v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc.,
Whether a late-filing taxpayer is estopped from claiming a homestead exemption in a particular case will depend on the facts of the matter, but a legislatively designated cutoff date will not necessarily control the question. A person estopped to claim an exemption because he delayed asserting his rights beyond the time administratively feasible for redressing the wrong has not been subjected to an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power; he has brought the difficulty upon himself. See generally 22 Tex. Jur.2d Estoppel § 1, at 660.
Applying the foregoing conclusions to Mr. Pfeiffer's question, we believe the school district may recognize otherwise-allowable homestead claims made out of time. In fact, it would be difficult for the district to show taxpayers estopped from claiming them where the district itself was responsible for the late filing. See Grandview Ind. School District v. Storey,
But, we do not believe the district will be necessarily entitled to reimbursement from the state under article 20.81(a) of the Education Code. That provision was passed to comply with a constitutional dictate found in article VIII, section 1-b, subsection (c). It makes payable to a school district the "amount of taxable value actually lost" by applications of the statute implementing article VIII, section 1-b of the constitution, but to receive the payment, a school district is statutorily required to apply for it on or before a legislatively established cutoff date, November 1st of the tax year. Educ. Code § 20.84. Although estoppel is not ordinarily available as a defense against claims of a political subdivision of the state, we think the rationale of the Gregg and Moore cases previously discussed might be applied to estop the school district from claiming the reimbursement where its own delay made reimbursement not administratively feasible. See City of Hutchins v. Prasifka,
Very truly yours,
Mark White Attorney General of Texas
John W. Fainter, Jr. First Assistant Attorney General
Richard E. Gray III Executive Assistant Attorney General
Prepared by Bruce Youngblood Assistant Attorney General
City of Hutchins v. Prasifka , 450 S.W.2d 829 ( 1970 )
Gragg v. Cayuga Independent School District , 539 S.W.2d 861 ( 1976 )
Jay v. Devers , 563 S.W.2d 880 ( 1978 )
Dickison v. Woodmen of the World Life Insurance Society , 280 S.W.2d 315 ( 1955 )
Parks v. West , 102 Tex. 11 ( 1908 )