Judges: MARK WHITE, Attorney General of Texas
Filed Date: 4/18/1979
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/6/2016
Honorable Tim Von Dohlen Chairman House Committee on Constitutional Amendments State Capitol Austin, Texas 78711
Re: Authority of legislature to permit taxing districts to exempt automobiles from property tax on a local option basis.
Dear Representative Von Dohlen:
You ask whether the legislature may, pursuant to article
. . . the Legislature by general law may exempt all or part of the personal property homestead of a family or a single adult, ``personal property homestead' meaning that personal property exempt by law from forced sale for debt, from ad valorem taxation.
Article 3836, V.T.C.S., lists the personal property which is exempt from attachment for debt. Section (a)(3) of that statute exempts ``any two of the following categories of means of travel: . . . an automobile or station wagon; . . . a truck; a pickup truck.' Thus article VIII, section 1, authorizes the legislature to enact a general law exempting from ad valorem taxation personal property homestead which under current law includes one automobile or station wagon owned by a family or single adult. See Coghlan v. Sullivan,
We next consider whether the local option tax statute would unconstitutionally delegate legislative power to make or suspend law, in violation of article III, section 1 or article
Although the legislature may not authorize a political subdivision to make or suspend state law, it may permit it to accept or reject a power which is consistent with general law. Lyle v. State, supra at 683. The people of a locality may be empowered to accept a completely enacted general law relating to administration and local control. Ex parte Francis, supra at 171 (dissent). Relying on this principle, the courts have upheld numerous statutes granting political subdivisions power to be exercised only upon a favorable vote of the governing body or the people. A statute leaving it discretionary with the commissioners court to order the election of public weighers was upheld in Johnson v. Martin,
The more recent cases accept the principle that the legislature may authorize a political subdivision to accept the provisions of general law by a vote of the people. The statute permitting cities to provide a police and firemen's civil service system, following an election, did not unconstitutionally delegate the power to suspend laws. City of Fort Worth v. Fire Department of City of Fort Worth,
Article 2997a is a general law and complete within itself. It applies to all counties in the State but becomes operative in a county only upon its adoption by the commissioners court of that county. . . . [T]he legislature cannot delegate to the people . . . its authority to make laws; but that does not mean the legislature is without authority to confer a power upon a municipal corporation or its governing body authority and power to accept or reject the benefits and provisions of a general law legally enacted by the legislature.
Additionally, unlike the early cases limiting the use of local option laws, the legislature here is exercising a specific permissive constitutional power which it has chosen not to exercise to the fullest degree. The legislature has adopted a law which effectively provides an exemption only when a certain condition is met. The condition which the legislature has recognized is the determination by the local jurisdiction to tax automobiles and is grounded in the constitutional authority of the various political subdivisions to levy and collect taxes. Even if Mitchell, Lyle and similar cases still are correct statements of the law, we believe this situation is fundamentally different from those cases which involved the local option prohibition of the operation of pool halls.
In view of the language and holdings of the more recent cases on local option laws and in view of the fact that the constitutional provision allowing the legislature to exempt is a permissive one, we believe the legislature can enact a local option tax law without violating article I, section 28 or article
We finally consider whether the tax on automobiles will be ``equal and uniform' within the first sentence of article VIII, section 1, if some taxing jurisdictions provide the exemption while others do not. Taxes are ``equal and uniform' within the constitutional provision when no one within the taxing district is taxed at a different rate than other persons in the same district upon the same property. Norris v. City of Waco,
Very truly yours,
Mark White Attorney General of Texas
John W. Fainter, Jr. Assistant Attorney General
Ted L. Hartley Executive Assistant Attorney General
Prepared by Susan Garrison Assistant Attorney General
Sullivan v. Roach-Manigan Paving Co. of Texas , 1920 Tex. App. LEXIS 362 ( 1920 )
Ex Parte Mitchell , 109 Tex. 11 ( 1915 )
Trimmier v. Carlton , 116 Tex. 572 ( 1927 )
Ex Parte Francis , 72 Tex. Crim. 304 ( 1914 )
Smith v. Davis , 11 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 364 ( 1968 )
Stanfield v. State , 83 Tex. 317 ( 1892 )
Brown Cracker & Candy Co. v. City of Dallas , 104 Tex. 290 ( 1911 )
Weatherly Independent School Dist. v. Hughes , 1931 Tex. App. LEXIS 1358 ( 1931 )
City of Fort Worth v. Fire Department of City of Fort Worth , 1948 Tex. App. LEXIS 1425 ( 1948 )